Commentary

Volume Seventy-nine, Number Three, March 1985

"Star Wars" & the Scientists: An Exchange

Robert Jastrow,
Hans A. Bethe, Carl Sagan,
Edward Teller & Others

Famine, Development & Foreign Aid

Nick Eberstadt

The Hidden Holocaust
Theodore S. Hamerow

How to Support the Democratic Revolution
Michael Ledeen

F. Scott Fitzgerald at the End
Jeffrey Hart

Does Neoliberalism Have a Future?
Leslie Lenkowsky

MUSIC: **Out of the Ghetto** Samuel Lipman

MOVIES: **Eddie Murphy, American** Richard Grenier

BOOKS: Samuel McCracken/Robert Alter/Wayne M. Sarf/ Kevin G. Barnhurst/Alvin H. Bernstein

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE/$3.25

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SUSPEN

"Whether it's with fully independent four wheel suspension on Tempo or computerized air suspension on Continental Mark VII, we're putting you in closer touch with the road."

Lonnie R. Fredricks,
Suspension Design Engineer



Ford Motor Company is the only major American car company to offer fully independent four wheel suspension on most of its smaller, less expensive cars. Ford Escort, Mercury Lynx, Ford Tempo, Mercury Topaz, and Ford EXP all offer the comfort and sure handling of this advanced engineering development.

Ford Tempo's rear suspension longitudinal tie rods allow for "give" which reduces the effect of hard impacts.

Ford Tempo's front end upper strut mounts channel mechanical hydraulic forces to fine-tune ride and handling quality.

Get it together—Buckle up!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SION

Continental and Continental Mark VII are the only luxury cars in the world with computerized air suspension.

From Tempo to Continental, sophisticated suspension systems like these are just part of the quality that goes into every car Ford makes. Whether you're behind the wheel yourself, or just a passenger, you'll *feel* that quality.



On Mark VII, nitrogen gas-pressure front struts and rear shock absorbers are matched to variable rate air springs illustrated here, to provide a unique blend of ride and road handling.

Quality is Job 1.

Ford

Ford • Lincoln • Mercury • Merkur
Ford Trucks • Ford Tractors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

VOLUME 79 NUMBER THREE *MARCH 1985*

Articles	25	Famine, Development & Foreign Aid *Nick Eberstadt*
	32	The Hidden Holocaust *Theodore S. Hamerow*
	43	How to Support the Democratic Revolution *Michael Ledeen*
	47	F. Scott Fitzgerald at the End *Jeffrey Hart*
Observations	54	Does Neoliberalism Have a Future? *Leslie Lenkowsky*
Music	56	Out of the Ghetto *Samuel Lipman*
Movies	63	Eddie Murphy, American *Richard Grenier*
Letters	4	"Star Wars" & the Scientists Robert Jastrow responds to: *Edward Teller*; *James A. Abrahamson*; *Lowell Wood*; *Hans A. Bethe, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Henry W. Kendall, Carl Sagan & Victor F. Weisskopf*; *Ashton B. Carter*; *A.L. Drumwright*; *Larry Clifford*; *Thomas J. Rath*; *Edward F. Hennessey*; *Allen Finegold*; *David R. Perles*; *Marvin King*; and others Additional letters from *Claire L. Baron, Adrian R. Valentino, Milton Birnbaum, Lauren Weiner*, and *Richard Grenier*
Books in Review	68	The Good News Is the Bad News Is Wrong, by Ben J. Wattenberg *Samuel McCracken*
	69	Back to the Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish Texts, edited by Barry W. Holtz *Robert Alter*
	71	Son of the Morning Star, by Evan S. Connell *Wayne M. Sarf*
	75	America's Saints: The Rise of Mormon Power, by Robert Gottlieb and Peter Wiley *Kevin G. Barnhurst*
	77	The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam, by Bruce Palmer, Jr. *Alvin H. Bernstein*

Editor: Norman Podhoretz

Executive Editor: Neal Kozodoy

Managing Editor: Marion Magid

Associate Editor: Brenda Brown

Contributing Editors: Robert Alter, Milton Himmelfarb, Walter Laqueur

Comptroller: Philip Shamis

Production Manager: Bruce Lodi

Circulation Manager: Helene Hansen

Cover: The Sheldon Group, Inc.

COMMENTARY (ISSN 0010-2601) is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single copy is $3.25, $33 a year; 3 years $89; 5 years $132—Add $5.00 per year for all foreign, including Canada and Latin America—Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to COMMENTARY, 165 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.
Copyright © 1985 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions—Indexed in *Readers' Guide, Book Review Digest, Public Affairs Information Service, Index to Jewish Periodicals, ABC Pol Sci, Historical Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life*—Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.
EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICES: 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Take our course on Current Events.



April 29, set sail for a most memorable 13 days when Richard Allen, former National Security Advisor to President Reagan, joins Royal Viking Line's cultural cruise through the Mediterranean/Holy Land. Learn the current Middle East situation on-the-scene while you cruise like Royalty on Royal Viking Line from Venice to Athens. Highlights of your journey include Jerusalem, Egypt, and Israel. Also call at Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia.

On May 12, join us for another cruise with former CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner through the Black Sea/Greek Isles. This 13-day intriguing itinerary offers cultural stimulation both aboard and ashore as you catch the spirit of the Greek Isles, Istanbul and the USSR.

No one else cruises the Mediterranean in this most meaningful manner. With an elegance so extraordinary, *Travel/Holiday* readers rank us the #1 cruise line in the world!

ROYAL VIKING LINE
World Wide cruising. World Class style.

Royal Viking Line, One Embarcadero Center, San Francisco, CA 94111 (Phone 800-634-8000).
Please send me information on your Current Events cruises and Royal Viking's Royal Collection of Mediterranean cruises.

Name_____ Address_____
City/State/Zip_____
Travel Agency_____



From our Royal Collection of Mediterranean Cruises.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Statement of Aims

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of COMMENTARY by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Howard I. Friedman, *President*

The Commentary Publication Committee

Donald M. Blinken, *Chairman*

Morris B. Abram
Norman E. Alexander
Theodore Ellenoff
Edward E. Elson
Stephen Friedman
Lawrence Goldmuntz
Mark Goodson
Robert H. Haines
Lewis J. Laventhol
Bess Myerson
Robert L. Pelz
Ned Pines
Frederick P. Rose
Michael Saperstein
Nanette Scofield
Henry Sherman
John Slawson
Alan M. Stroock*
Laurence A. Tisch

**Honorary Member*

Letters from Readers

"Star Wars" & the Scientists

Robert Jastrow & Critics

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I want to commend Robert Jastrow for his article, "The War Against 'Star Wars'" [December 1984]. His arguments are painfully correct in their direction, and, as a result, Mr. Jastrow has been attacked in a very sharp manner.

His detractors, some of whom are publicly well-known, have raised and will continue to raise the argument that Mr. Jastrow, lacking clearance, is inadequately informed. It is important to realize that by abstaining from getting clearance, Mr. Jastrow has retained his freedom of speech. This privilege is one of his main weapons, one which is not available to those of us who have spent years working on the problem of defensive weapons before supporting a major program for their development.

It is worth noting that Hans A. Bethe, one of the outspoken opponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), conceded during a classified discussion in February 1983 that the relevant arguments in physics supported the Livermore Laboratory strategic-defense position. Shortly thereafter, however, Mr. Bethe changed his mind—not because the scientific issues had changed, but on the basis of his ideas about proper politics and military strategy. Mr. Bethe has waited almost two years before scheduling another (forthcoming) visit to review the Livermore strategic-defense work, although he has felt free to attack it on the basis of his outdated knowledge in the interim.

The position taken, by Hans A. Bethe, Victor F. Weisskopf, and many other "concerned" scientists is strongly reminiscent of the hydrogen-bomb controversy which raged more than three decades ago. The argument then was that the project was not scientifically feasible, and if it were successful, the result would be too terrible to bear. Furthermore, the argument went on, if the United States did not attempt the project, probably the Soviets would also forbear.

As it turned out—according to Andrei Sakharov's biographical statement in *Sakharov Speaks* (Knopf, 1974)—before the hydrogen-bomb debate began in the United States, the Soviet hydrogen-bomb project was already under way. Only months separated the successful tests of a fusion weapon by the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet the United States had the advantage that it had been physically untouched by World War II, while the Soviets had suffered terrible damage.

The consequences of a Soviet success on this project coupled with American non-participation would have speeded up the kind of behavior today being demonstrated by the Soviets on the basis of their military superiority. However, the consequences of the Soviets' successful development of protective defenses and our failure to do so are incomparably greater. There is much evidence—evidence that in comparison with that available in the earlier controversy should be called overwhelming—that the Soviets are hard and successfully at work on strategic defense. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative would be more appropriately named if it were called the Strategic Defense Response. Yet Mr. Weisskopf, present for President Reagan's original speech requesting the cooperation of the scientific community in this effort, appeared to disapprove before the President even had time to develop his point.

Returning to Mr. Jastrow's article and his purported lack of scientific information, I would end with a question. Which better represents the method of scientific inquiry: limited, careful arguments that include all of the pertinent perspectives, or dogged support of narrow convictions based on superficial assessments?

I appreciate Mr. Jastrow's courage in attempting to bring reason and common sense to this vital discussion.

EDWARD TELLER
The Hoover Institution
Stanford, California

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TWA introduces the business class seat that makes all the others obsolete.

TWA has a whole new angle.
Our revolutionary 747 Business Lounger℠ reclines like no seat ever before. It tilts back to a completely different position. To cradle you in comfort.





Six seats across, across the Atlantic.
It's the widest, most comfortable business class seat. Ever.
Now available on selected international 747 flights.
And on all 747s in June.

And by the way, it's the widest seat in the sky.

A leg up on the competition.
For comfort down to your toes, TWA presents something practically unheard of – a business class footrest.
And it automatically adjusts to your height.
Whether you're 5'2" or 6'3".

TWA

LEADING THE WAY. TWA.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To the Editor of Commentary:

I read Robert Jastrow's article with great interest. It has always been a matter of surprise to me that some members of the scientific community have been critical of the technical soundness of our strategic-defense efforts, when it is clear from my knowledge of the research program that the technical promise is great. Indeed, rapid progress has already been realized in some of the most critical areas. In addition, prospects for countering future missile defenses or overwhelming such defenses seem less and less likely as we come to understand better the potential of the new defensive technologies.

James A. Abrahamson
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor of Commentary:

"The War Against 'Star Wars'" by Robert Jastrow was as excellent an article on this major public-policy question as it was overdue. Those of us constrained by the restrictions of government security clearance often despair of responding effectively in public forums to critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Government classification rules perversely permit all manner of nonsensical "straw men" to be put forward and then kicked apart by those holding clearance and exploiting the prestige of being "in the know," while strictly forbidding countervailing arguments containing compelling technical material to be aired publicly. Mr. Jastrow's article demonstrated that a response to SDI critics on a more fundamental level is not only feasible but can be telling, for these critics unblushingly impeach themselves at levels of logical consistency recognizable by a perceptive undergraduate.

A notable example of this gambit of kicking apart a straw man of one's own manufacture, and one with which I happen to be particularly familiar, involves X-ray laser technology, which has been singled out by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) as "the leading candidate" among pop-up defensive systems, and thus has been extensively assailed by them in public. The straw man in this case consists of the assertion that X-ray laser platforms having carefully chosen limitations, when popped up from carefully selected sea- or land-basing points in time of defensive need, cannot engage even present-generation ICBM's, let alone ICBM's of some future era employing hypothetical "fast-burn" boosters, due to limb-of-the-earth constraints on X-ray-laser-beam propagation from the platform to the booster targets.

In fact, it has been explained on many occasions, to a variety of government forums all over the country, why and how reasonably-sited, technologically-accessible, popped-up X-ray lasers can plausibly engage even fast-burn boosters, and at cost-exchange ratios which strongly favor the defense. Some of these occasions have involved face-to-face discussions with leading strategic-defense critics, none of whom has contested the technical points being made. Nonetheless, the public debate continues to be saturated with pessimistic assertions by these critics concerning this point which, to put it charitably, are disingenuous.

The stunningly effective supporting barrages laid down by sympathetic sectors of the news media amplify the efforts of SDI critics completely out of proportion to their minuscule numbers, ludicrously inflating them into "virtually all knowledgeable scientists"; even the Wizard of Oz was less flagrant in his mummery, more modest in his pretensions. This hyperinflation is the more remarkable as anti-strategic-defense arguments have fared uniformly poorly in technical debate in the classified surroundings required by government regulations. In spite of having failed to make their anti-SDI case to their well-informed colleagues in technical discourse, these critics continue to advocate their rejected positions to the public in impassioned terms, immune from the criticism of their technical peers.

Mr. Jastrow has performed a real service to the thoughtful public by documenting how sloppily this tiny group of scientists compound their nostrums, and with what generous dollops of bias. Focusing on this basic point, his article made devastatingly clear that these individuals, capable scientists though they may be, do not merit the political confidence of their fellow citizens.

Lowell Wood
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
Livermore, California

To the Editor of Commentary:

Robert Jastrow has done it again. He seems to be the greatest single asset we have in making a strategic-defense system an eventual reality. . . . Ever since I took part in a debate on strategic issues sponsored by the Union of Concerned Scientists, I have realized the irrational fear of ABM systems among many intellectuals. People who would acquiesce in an actual U.S. surrender to the USSR to obviate the risk of nuclear war, but would not be willing to spend tens of billions of dollars to banish its possibility forever, show where their objectives really lie. . . .

George Fishman
University of Illinois
Champaign, Illinois

To the Editor of Commentary:

Mr. Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative raises issues of the utmost gravity. We are astonished that Commentary would present a brief for SDI in the guise of an uninformed attack against the report prepared by us under the auspices of the Union of Concerned Scientists, *The Fallacy of Star Wars* (Vintage, 1984). Robert Jastrow's "The War Against 'Star Wars'" takes issue with our criticisms of SDI by pretending that the entire enterprise stands or falls on a precise calculation of how many laser satellites would be required by the defense. There are some honest disagreements among knowledgeable experts that are central to the SDI debate which we wish to bring to your readers' attention, but this is not one of them.

In his "Star Wars" speech, Mr. Reagan proposed to defend the *population* of the United States against Soviet nuclear-armed missiles, and thereby to replace deterrence as the bedrock of our national security. As recently as December 23, 1984, the President and his Secretary of Defense restated this objective in order to proscribe heresies within their administration: SDI would not be bargained away, they asserted, or be devoted to the lesser goal of merely defending American missile silos.

A ballistic-missile defense (BMD) of cities is inconceivable unless the great majority of Soviet ICBM's could be destroyed while their fragile booster engines are still burning brightly. Missiles that survive this "boost phase" would pose a much more formidable threat to any de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fense because they would release a large number of elusive and far less vulnerable warheads immersed in a vast swarm of decoys and other "penetration aids." The subsequent defensive layers could not, it is widely acknowledged, cope with such a prodigious "threat cloud." The fact that the earth is round requires an attack on Soviet boosters to be launched from space.

We examined all credible proposals for boost-phase defense. (While infrared and laser homing projectiles are promising interceptors for mid-course and terminal defense, they are implausible boost-phase weapons because of their low speed.) Orbiting defenses suffer from a fatal flaw: they would rely on delicate precision instruments which would be exquisitely vulnerable to attack. We share this conclusion with Edward Teller, an ardent SDI advocate, who has said that "lasers in space won't fill the bill—they must be deployed in great numbers at terrible cost and could be destroyed in advance of an attack." As we shall see, Mr. Jastrow's own argument leads to the conclusion that countering new Soviet ICBM deployments with orbiting lasers would be ludicrously expensive.

These pitfalls could be averted if the defensive weapons were "popped-up" into space on warning of attack. But this would pose insuperable time constraints: the defensive weapon must rise to a height of at least 650 miles before the enemy booster completes firing, feasible with current slow-burning Soviet missiles, but hardly practical against a Soviet equivalent of the much faster MX. Furthermore, the Soviets could readily develop boosters that finish burning too soon for any pop-up scheme to work.[1] Claims that the Soviets would find it difficult to develop such "fast-burn" boosters should be laid to rest by noting that our SPRINT missile, which operated as a BMD interceptor in 1974, already demonstrated this technology.

In sum, no technical scheme exists for a comprehensive strategic defense free of fundamental conceptual flaws. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger has said, "In our lifetime and that of our children, cities will be protected by the forbearance of those on the other side, or through effective deterrence." Nor is there any basis for Mr. Jastrow's assertion that the reports of the "blue-ribbon panels," appointed at the President's request, are "as different" from our report "as day is from night." The technical [Fletcher] panel's summary emphasizes that "survivability of the system components is a critical issue whose resolution requires a combination of technologies and tactics that remain to be worked out." Major General John C. Toomay, the panel's Deputy Chairman, has said that the panel tended to be "pessimistic whether these technical objectives could be realized but felt that, on balance, the research and engineering was well worth doing," and that the difference between the panel's qualified assessment and its recommendation is "like the difference between the horse you bet on and the sentimental favorite."[2]

Not only is there no technical scheme, there is not even the vaguest outline for a political scenario that might propel us toward a defense-dominated world. That political factors are essential was recognized in the Fletcher report, which stated that the effectiveness of the defense would depend not only on technology, but also on the

[1] The Martin-Marietta Corporation studied fast-burn boosters for the Fletcher panel, and concluded that they would impose a payload-loss of at most 20 percent, a consensus confirmed in writing by the Deputy Chairman of the panel. Claims to the contrary stem from an abandoned Pentagon attempt to discredit Ashton Carter's Congressional Office of Technology Assessment report on SDI. This misinformation is still being spread (e.g., *Wall Street Journal* editorial, December 10, 1984).

[2] *National Journal*, July 7, 1984, p. 1316.

AT ABOUT $8 A BOTTLE, EASILY THE BEST VALUE IN THE HAUT-MÉDOC.

We went through 400 chateaux to find the best value in Haut-Médoc. And our long search ended at Château Larose-Trintaudon. Here was a wine on the verge of classic proportions. Well-balanced. Distinguished. A fine red wine that would hold its own in the most formidable of cellars.

Château Larose-Trintaudon
Imported by Seagram Chateau & Estate Wines Co., New York, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

degree to which Soviet offensive forces could be constrained. Moreover, the Hoffman panel, which considered the strategic implications of SDI for the President, noted that the past behavior of the Soviets "suggests that they would be more likely to respond with a continuing build-up of their long-range offensive forces."

Hence our disagreement with knowledgeable and candid supporters of SDI is one of risk assessment. They are gambling on the President's "sentimental favorite," in the hope that unforeseen technical advances might transform the prospects for strategic defense, and are not as troubled as we are by the risks that the pursuit of SDI would entail. Our studies persuaded us that all the envisaged BMD schemes are ruinously expensive, and could not protect the United States from utter destruction because they could be readily overwhelmed or outfoxed at much less cost. We shall also explain why the very attempt to proceed toward a comprehensive missile defense will provoke a massive escalation of the competition in offensive nuclear weapons, and increase the likelihood of nuclear war.

WHY should a thrust toward strategic defense have any risks beyond galloping budget deficits? What is the harm in trying? This has been answered by the Hoffman panel: defenses that could withstand a small attack, but would collapse under a large onslaught, are highly provocative. In the early stages of BMD deployment we would have just such a defense, as well as vulnerable land-based missiles. This would have two grave hazards. First, the Soviets would fear that if the U.S. were to attack preemptively our defense could cope with their surviving missiles; they would also know that our defense could, at most, provide poor protection of our vulnerable missiles against a Soviet first strike. This would greatly enhance their incentive to attack preemptively in a serious crisis.

Second, Soviet leaders have asserted that they would avert this predicament by enlarging their offensive capabilities. This build-up would emphasize submarine-based cruise missiles, which underfly space defenses and provide little warning; ICBM's equipped with countermeasures against U.S. defense; and anti-satellite weapons to attack our BMD space platforms. Painfully aware of the fragility of our embryonic defense, we would find such Soviet moves highly provocative, and respond in kind. A budding BMD system is therefore a catalyst for an acceleration of the offensive arms race, not for reductions in offensive arms, as many SDI advocates claim.

SDI is often portrayed as a benign research program. But a program launched from the Oval Office, described as a vital element in the nation's future strategic posture, and funded at already so lavish a level, is not merely a research project. It will not be so treated by the Soviets, no matter what we may say or believe. Modern military systems take many years to develop, so the Soviets will feel compelled to initiate programs to counter the still unborn U.S. defense. Hence SDI is likely to enmesh us in a more dangerous offensive confrontation even if it is eventually abandoned before any defenses are deployed. Those who find this farfetched have not learned the saga of MIRV—the multiple-warhead ICBM. We invented MIRV's as a BMD countermeasure. When the Soviets installed a rudimentary ABM system, we forged ahead with MIRV development, and then to deployment *after* the ABM treaty prevented the Soviets from installing a defense that made MIRV's necessary. The Soviets then followed suit. As a result, the incentive for a preemptive strike has grown because a single warhead can destroy many MIRVed enemy warheads before they are launched. Now there is a consensus that MIRVing was a dangerous mistake; former MIRV advocates such as Henry Kissinger look back fondly to the days of one warhead per missile.

We are also disturbed that the mere prospect of lavish funds is already giving SDI a life of its own. With jobs, university research, profits, and promotions at stake, such an enterprise can quickly turn into a juggernaut that cannot be stopped even when it is clear that its goals are unattainable.

MANY officials now realize that SDI holds no promise for population defense, and so ersatz rationales are coming into vogue. The most popular is that a partially effective BMD would bolster deterrence because defenses would compound the problem of planning an attack.[3] True enough, if the offense stays frozen while the defense is installed. But each superpower's highest priority is a nuclear arsenal that can, with full confidence, penetrate to its opponent's vital targets. Only technologies far more robust and inexpensive than anything now dreamed of could alter that priority.[4]

Another fashionable rationale is that even a modest BMD could protect us from accidental launches and from terrorists. But protection from accidental launch by the superpowers does not require space weapons. Devices installed on ballistic missiles to destroy them on receipt of secure, encrypted radio messages would suffice. And attack by terrorists would hardly come via ICBM. Delivery of nuclear explosives by plane, ship, or diplomatic pouch would be far easier. A nuclear weapon hidden in a bale of marijuana would apparently find ready entry into the U.S. The cost of one laser battle station uselessly orbiting would pay for legions of secret agents who could actually grapple with this threat.

There are those who favor SDI because they believe it best exploits the great U.S. advantage in high technology. Their position seems to be supported by the apprehension that Soviet leaders express so vigorously about SDI. Is that not enough reason to pursue the program?

We have observed and participated in the nuclear competition since its inception. Thanks to U.S. technological superiority, virtually every new technical initative has come from the United States: the fission bomb, the hydrogen bomb, the intercontinental bomber, submarine-launched missiles, high-accuracy ICBM's, MIRV's, and high-accuracy long-range cruise missiles. The only significant Soviet initiative was the ICBM itself, but our ICBM's quickly surpassed those of

[3] The diversion of SDI to silo defense is the only rationale that makes technical (though not necessarily strategic) sense. Hard targets, especially expendable silos, could be defended. However, we agree with the administration's Scowcroft commission that such defenses are not needed at this time. In any case, space-based weapons are not suited to this purpose.

[4] Indeed, the growth in the offense is bound to exceed any attrition that the defense is likely to attain. The U.S. nuclear threat against Moscow multiplied as soon as we learned that the city was being surrounded by ABM batteries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviets in both quality and numbers. The net result has been a steady erosion of American security. There is no evidence that space weapons will be an exception. It is true that we have a significant edge in all the technologies that strategic defense would depend on. But in the nuclear era a sophisticated defense can be foiled by relatively rudimentary means. Which is easier: the construction or the disruption of an exquisitely shaped mirror 30-feet across which must swiftly turn from one target to another with very high accuracy? Moreover, it is cheap to build devastating weapons that could readily penetrate our exorbitantly expensive "shield." Unless there is a breakthrough in defense as revolutionary as nuclear weapons themselves, the strategic offense will reign supreme.

But if so, why are the Soviets so opposed to SDI? Because they are exceedingly cautious, and have been playing catch-up with American nuclear technology since 1945. Soviet military planners are obliged to take American pronouncements, however implausible, much more seriously than American strategists, and will respond with an offensive build-up and by expanding their already significant BMD research effort.[5] They seem to recognize that this will require vast expenditures they can ill afford, and that the net result will be a decrease in their national security. The same would be true for us.

We should vigorously exploit our technological advantage to acquire military intelligence about the Soviet Union, to strengthen our strategic command-and-control systems, and to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. The search for new BMD techniques must go on, but the distinction between research and deployment should not be blurred. But in assessing military technologies we must recognize that any attempt by either superpower to increase the threat to the other's survival will soon redound to its own disadvantage.

We now return to Mr. Jastrow's caricature of our case against SDI. He would have readers believe that the prospects for SDI can be decided on the basis of just two numbers that we had calculated incorrectly in our earliest report, *Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense* (Union of Concerned Scientists, March 1984); and that our "many major errors . . . go in one direction only—toward making the President's plan seem impractical, costly, and ineffective."

What did we set out to do? Since there is no plausible concept for strategic defense, we sought to fill this void. To that end the technical portions of our report assessed separately the interception mechanisms; illustrated the magnitude of the defender's task by estimating the size of the defensive system required in the absence of all countermeasures; and examined a large variety of countermeasures. A realistic net assessment would integrate the last two items, and incorporate the likely enhancements of Soviet offensive capabilities. Had we carried that through in a hard-nosed fashion it would have led to the conclusion that the cost and size of the defensive system are unbounded. Why? Because the largely unknown defensive technologies, whose ultimate effectiveness is still a matter of speculation, would be pitted against prodigiously effective weapons and many known countermeasures invented during twenty-five years of BMD research. We firmly believe that countermeasures will carry the day into the foreseeable future.

Mr. Jastrow's two make-or-break numbers are the size of the laser constellation that would have to be in orbit and the weight of a neutral-particle-beam weapon. Regarding the satellite number, he claims that "the whole 'Star Wars' plan rested on this one point." But it is at least as important whether orbiting lasers could themselves

[5] The Soviets' BMD program seems to be quite similar in character to what ours was before the "Star Wars" speech. We know of no evidence that they are moving toward a comprehensive strategic defense of Soviet society. As the Fletcher panel emphasizes, the most daunting BMD problems are computer-intensive, an area in which the Soviets are exceptionally weak. Indeed, they lag in almost all technologies critical to space-based BMD, so they would be ill-advised to start a contest in this arena.

Exile and the Writer

"The modern world's most invidous literary conditon—spiritual exile. . ."
Martin Tucker, Editor

Confrontation

THE LITERARY JOURNAL OF LONG ISLAND UNIVERITY
A Special Anthology Issue

George Konrad, *first printing of an excerpt from his forthcoming novel*

Jakov Lind, *a memoir*
Joseph Brodsky, *a poem*
Lore Segal, *a memoir*
Stanislaw Baranczak, *2 poems*
Armando Valladares, *2 poems*
. . . and others

Available from:
Confrontation Magazine Press
c/o Dr. Martin Tucker
English Department
C.W. Post of L.I.U.
Greenvale, N.Y. 11548

Subscription rates:
$ 8.00 One Year
$15.00 Two Years
$20.00 Three Years

Orders of ten or more copies of this SPECIAL ANTHOLOGY ISSUE will be discounted 20% off the list price of $6 a copy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

withstand attack. As for neutral-particle-beam weapons, he asserts that they are "that most promising destroyer of Soviet missiles and warheads," but neglects to mention that once fast-burn boosters are developed they would be completely shielded from such beams by the atmosphere—the reason we relegated our discussion of the characteristics of such devices to a technical appendix.[6]

Mr. Jastrow's allegation that our work contains "many major errors" is both false and undocumented. We erred twice in our first report: in arriving at the number of 2,400 satellites and in estimating the weight of the particle-beam weapon; but these errors had hardly any bearing on our overall assessment of SDI, were corrected in public at our first opportunity five weeks after the initial report was issued, and do not appear in any of our subsequent publications.

The calculation of the number of satellites is not simple. For example, the "fine work by the theoretical physicists at Los Alamos," to which Mr. Jastrow alludes,[7] makes just the mistake that we had made, even though it appeared four months after our report was publicly corrected. The claim that "the experts had been looking at this problem for more than ten years, and the accurate results were well known" is not correct.

How many satellites must then dance on top of a laser beam? Mr. Jastrow implies that the calculation that produces the smallest number of satellites is the most accurate, a clear absurdity. A small satellite fleet is much more vunerable than a large one. Indeed, there is no "right" number of satellites, for it depends on a host of unknown performance parameters, the nature of the attack, etc. Given the present level of ignorance, all such calculations are based on ad-hoc assumptions of varying degrees of implausibility. They are meant to be illustrative, and bear no relation to actual designs, since they all ignore a host of factors that would greatly increase the number of satellites. Taking the rather small differences in assumed parameters into account, our corrected estimate of 300 laser stations is consistent with those by Carter, Drell *et. al*,[8] a fact Mr. Jastrow neglected to mention.

Unfortunately, Mr. Jastrow has failed to notice that he is impaled on his own sword, blunt instrument though it may be. "Everyone acknowledges that these satellites are going to be extremely expensive; each one will cost a billon dollars or more," he says. Quite so. What would be the cost trade-off if the Soviets were to deploy a cluster of 3,000 small three-warhead fast-burn ICBM's at a cost of about $50 billion?[9] Let us accept Mr. Jastrow's favorite satellite-number calculation,[10] and his cost per satellite. We then find that it would cost the U.S. $1 trillion to deploy the additional space defenses required by this new $50 billion threat![11]

Mr. Jastrow has painted a picture of the Senate hearing at which our errors were rectified that does not conform with the hearing record.[12] He asserts that our statement on the particle-beam weapon ended with the sentence: "Our colleagues have pointed out that the area could be increased after the beam leaves the small accelerator." Mr. Jastrow then charges us with deceiving the Senators because we did not say that this correction brought with it a great saving in weight. But that was not all that happened. The written testimony of our witness, Richard L. Garwin, distributed before the hearing to the press and the committee, and reproduced in the hearing record, actually reads: ". . . leaves the small accelerator, *saving a great deal of weight*" (emphasis added). Before our witness took the floor, Donald Kerr, the Director of Los Alamos, had said:

> I think the UCS report in many ways helps to illustrate the great difficulty involved in first devising and then developing the technology that might be used for strategic defense. They have properly focused on the concerns with command and control, countermeasures, and vulnerability. In some cases I think their analysis has either been overly simplified for the purpose of the public document that it is, or at least in one case, they are totally in error.

Kerr then described our error concerning satellite numbers, and explained how we had overestimated the weight of the particle-beam weapon. He then went on to say:

> So I think on the one hand UCS has done a service to the country in raising these issues. I would hope that a longer-term, more sophisticated analysis, albeit one still in the open unclassified literature, might dispel some of the inaccuracies that are also in it.

That analysis was already under way, and is continuing. It is reflected in our October 1984 *Scientific American* article and in our book, *The Fallacy of Star Wars*. When our witness testified, there was little point in going over these errors yet again.[13]

The allegation that we systematically tilted the case against "the President's plan" is untrue. In fact, we granted it every benefit of the doubt allowed by the laws of physics: beams that would be aimed instantly from one booster to the next without ever missing; laser

---

6 Mr. Jastrow claims that a neutral-particle-beam weapon would only weigh 25 tons. That agrees with our estimate of the weight of the accelerator alone, but ignores the far heavier beam expansion and targeting magnets (see *The Fallacy of Star Wars*, p. 97).

7 G.H. Canavan, *Simple Estimates of Satellite Constellation Sizing*, Los Alamos National Laboratory, August 6, 1984. A detailed solution of the satellite-coverage problem has now been found (Richard L. Garwin, to be published) which shows that the "square-root law" of the Los Alamos paper, to which Mr. Jastrow ascribes such importance, is incorrect under all but highly artificial circumstances.

8 S.D. Drell, P.J. Farley, and D. Holloway, *The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political, and Arms Control Assessment*, Stanford University, July 1984.

9 This comes from the projected cost of the Midgetman missile, though not in its mobile form, and includes the cost of the extra warheads, the silo, and ten years of maintenance.

10 C.T. Cunningham, Report No. DDV-84-0007, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, August 30, 1984.

11 This is arrived at from Cunningham's number of 120 lasers for 1,400 co-located boosters with an engagement time of 150 seconds. Our 3,000 fast-burn boosters give an engagement time of 40 seconds, which then gives 120 (3000/1400) (150/40) = 964 laser satellites. (All agree that the number of lasers is proportional to the number of co-located boosters, not to their square-root.) Cunningham assumed a booster hardness that is 50 percent of the Fletcher panel's baseline figure. Were the latter used, the laser constellation would cost $1.9 trillion. This illustrates the sensitivity to assumed parameters.

12 Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY85, The Strategic Defense Initiative, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 98th Congress, Second Session, April 24, 1984.

13 He did, however, read the phrase at issue, "saving a great deal of weight." Unfortunately the stenotypist missed precisely one line of written text, and the last word, as restored in the record, was misprinted as "height."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons having a lethality far beyond that for which not even conceptual designs exist; no redundancy to compensate for attrition due to enemy action; no growth in the size and capability of the Soviet ICBM force. No military system in history has ever attained the level of perfection that we granted to "the President's plan." (One of us, Richard L. Garwin, even made an original suggestion that greatly improves the prospects for the ground-based laser scheme.)

Mr. Jastrow opens his attack on our treatment of countermeasures by admitting that "I am not an expert in this dark area," and then reveals that (always anonymous) professionals of his acquaintance "regard many of [the UCS] proposals as bordering on inanity." His rendition of our treatment of countermeasures is another caricature. It is he who emphasizes "tricks" like spinning the missile or "putting a shine on it." We focused on techniques that would prevent accurate targeting on the booster, on measures that would greatly increase the power levels needed for destruction, and on the inherent vulnerability of spacecraft. He would also have readers believe that decoy balloons are a kind of schoolboy prank, but in reality they have been studied for over two decades[14] by "defense professionals," and are taken very seriously.

This picture of us as babes in the cruel woods of countermeasures does not wash. One of us (Richard L. Garwin) recently participated in the Discrimination Countermeasures Panel of the Army's BMD Program Office. We (in particular Richard L. Garwin and Kurt Gottfried) have had repeated contacts with senior members of the Fletcher panel. They have given our countermeasure suggestions serious consideration in those few cases where they had not already been studied by the panel. Since some of these men are devoted advocates of SDI, and not shy, we wonder why these charges of "inanity" have not been voiced in public, but have been whispered only into Mr. Jastrow's ear.

Mr. Jastrow seems perplexed as to how some of "the giants of 20th-century physics" could have "lent their names" to an effort that is "pretty good for high-school students, but not good enough to stand up to more than a thirty-minute scrutiny by the defense professionals." He attempts to resolve his paradox by quoting Lowell Wood of Livermore: "Is Hans Bethe a good physicist? Yes, he's one of the best alive. Is he a rocket engineer? No. Is he a military-systems engineer? No. Is he a general? No."

As this quotation is intended to discredit all our work on these matters, we reluctantly respond. Three of us (Hans A. Bethe, Richard L. Garwin, and Henry W. Kendall) have together had a total of over eight decades of extensive experience with a wide variety of military systems, including BMD technologies and countermeasures, extending to nuclear-weapons designs and effects and missile-and-reentry-vehicle development. Another (Carl Sagan) has a twenty-five-year continuing involvement in the development of major U.S. space projects. While none of us is a general (in contrast, we presume, to Messrs. Jastrow and Wood), a member of our study panel, Noel Gayler, is an admiral who has served as Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, Director of the National Security Agency, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Research and Development, and as Deputy Director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, which is responsible for the operational plans for all our strategic-nuclear forces.

Mr. Jastrow concedes that we did not engage "in a deliberate, conscious effort to deceive," but surmises that our "rational judgments [were] clouded by ideological preconceptions." What are these "preconceptions"? A defense against Soviet missiles, he quotes us as believing, would " 'have a profoundly destabilizing effect on the nuclear balance, increasing the risk of nuclear war,' " and " 'could well produce higher numbers of fatalities' than no defense at all." But those are not ideological preconceptions. They are the unhappy conclusions to which our analysis has inexorably led. We stand by them.

HANS A. BETHE
RICHARD L. GARWIN
KURT GOTTFRIED
HENRY W. KENDALL
CARL SAGAN
VICTOR F. WEISSKOPF
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Robert Jastrow attempts to defend "Star Wars" by criticizing other analysts rather than by setting forth his own analysis. This approach would be inconclusive even if Mr. Jastrow were correct. As it happens, Mr. Jastrow's four criticisms of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Background Paper which I authored are technically in error. His essay therefore does not offer a serious alternative treatment of this vital national-security issue.

Let me take the four points in turn.

Mr. Jastrow's first and main criticism rests on his proposition that if the Soviet Union increased its arsenal of missiles by a certain factor to try to overwhelm a U.S. laser defense, the U.S. would have to increase its constellation of orbiting lasers by the square root of that factor. This is wrong. The true dependence is closer to a direct proportionality, which the OTA report uses. Mr. Jastrow's proposition *would* be true if Soviet missiles were distributed uniformly over an enormous area and the U.S. laser satellites were at the same altitude as the missiles. These are hardly good approximations to the real world, where Soviet missiles are deployed in a band stretching from east to west across the Soviet Union and the lasers are in space. Careful calculations making few simplifying assumptions have recently been completed by competent government scientists, notably at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Mr. Jastrow's most misleading error, of course, is implying that constellation size is the key to judgments of the plausibility of "perfect" defense, whereas in fact it is a relatively insignificant issue.

Second, in his footnote 10, Mr. Jastrow criticizes a pedagogical device used in the OTA report, which involved deploying satellites in clusters. This short-cut has little effect on most calculations, since time averages of the constellation coverage enter these calculations. This pedagogy was intended to avoid confusing the reader, but seems to have confused Mr. Jastrow, who thinks it is a serious "error."

Third, Mr. Jastrow misunder-

[14] See Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, *Scientific American*, March 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stands the calculation of the number of terminal interceptors needed for nationwide coverage. One thousand defensive batteries are needed for nationwide defense because the missile interceptors in each battery have limited range, not because "1,000 sites in the United States need to be defended," as Mr. Jastrow supposes. The OTA report makes clear that 280,000 interceptors would be needed only if one aspired to a *literally* leakproof defense that would prevent *all* Soviet warheads from detonating on U.S. territory. The point of the calculation was to show how absurd that aspiration is. Mr. Jastrow got the point, but missed the irony.

Fourth, Mr. Jastrow claims that the OTA report said that one-tenth of an inch of lead could shield a Soviet booster from a neutral particle beam. This is indeed untrue, as Mr. Jastrow suggests, but the report does not say any such thing. Mr. Jastrow has confused "a few centimeters of lead" on page 49 of the OTA report with "a few grams per square centimeter" on page 50. The point made on those pages was that covering the entire upper-missile stage rather than just parts of it with enough shielding is impractical, a point with which Mr. Jastrow agrees but thinks the report missed.

Mr. Jastrow is therefore wrong on every single point. But there is an interesting pattern to his errors. Last July some Defense Department contractors, in an equally clumsy attack on the OTA report, made exacty the same spurious "criticisms"! How did Mr. Jastrow hit upon precisely the same points as these contractors? Obviously he was simply parroting them, unaware that they were incorrect.

It is furthermore a matter of public record that OTA convened a panel last summer to review these criticisms of its report. The results of this review were conveyed by OTA's Director to Congress and to the Department of Defense. The panel consisted of Charles Townes (Nobel laureate, discoverer of the laser, and adviser to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger), William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering), and General Glenn Kent (USAF, retired). This panel also found no substance to precisely those criticisms that now, six months later, Mr. Jastrow "discovers."

Robert Jastrow has taken up the lonely task of championing the notion of perfect defense of the United States, a task that is widely agreed to be a poor basis for the Strategic Defense Initiative's research program. To succeed he will need to ask those who are aiding him to keep him better informed.

The issue of strategic defense is not a simple one of "for" and "against." There are many shades in between. The dim prospect for leakproof nuclear defense is a fact that will not be dispelled by shooting the messenger. Moreover, recognizing that fact does not end, but just begins, a serious discussion of other missions for missile defense. COMMENTARY would serve its readers better by drawing out this variety of views rather than by seeking simplistically to set up opposing camps.

ASHTON B. CARTER
John F. Kennedy
School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I always look forward to the writings of Robert Jastrow, who manages to be lucid when analyzing the most complex subjects. All the more bewildering, then, his paragraph disposing of decoy balloons.

The picture he paints of laser beams sorting out the decoys from the warheads, after which particle or other beams go after the warheads, somehow does not jibe with my vision of one bullet hitting another, both traveling at enormous speed through the immensity of space. How does one "observe" the recoil of a tapped balloon at such great distances and blazing speeds? Are all the balloons tapped simultaneously, with separate laser beams? Does the device then remember which ones carry warheads, all the while tracking each one? If each of the balloons must be intercepted for identification, why not use the same number of beams to attack? If it is possible to intercept them all, is it not then irrelevant which of them carry warheads? Please, Mr. Jastrow, this subscriber would appreciate a bit more detail.

A. L. DRUMWRIGHT
Sarasota, Florida

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As an engineer, I would like to disagree with one aspect of Robert Jastrow's defense of the "Star Wars" ABM concept.

His technique for making such a system sound plausible, and for making the possible defensive measures against it sound absurd, is to attribute virtually unlimited ingenuity to those people who are to design the missile-destroying system, and virtual imbecility to those who are to foil it. For example, he says that if the Soviets try, among other things, to spin their missiles and shine them up, "their missile program will be tied in knots." And what is the fatal flaw in the shininess defense? According to Mr. Jastrow, simply that "no shine is perfect," and, given time, a sufficiently powerful laser could burn through it. With a wave of his authoritative hand he has implied that we can deliver massive amounts of focused radiative energy against a distant target for as long as necessary, whereas the Soviets will throw in the towel at the very prospect of mirroring their missiles. Is this the kind of meticulous analysis that Mr. Jastrow would substitute for the supposedly biased science of the Union of Concerned Scientists? In reality, there are many pros and cons to the idea of a durable, reflective missile surface. How reflective can a surface be made? Can we allow it to erode like a heat shield while maintaining control of the missile? On the other hand, can we invent a weapon, by an effort which will not tie *our* military economy in knots, which can overcome with near-100 percent reliability an optimally reflective, robust missile surface?

Such questions are real. One need not be soft on Communism to contemplate them. Perhaps shininess and all other possible defensive measures could be overcome by some attainable, affordable laser technology. However, it is certainly possible that they might not; the idea of missile durability does *not* "border on inanity." If Mr. Jastrow really thinks so, then I suggest that his judgment is at least as "clouded by ideological preconceptions" as he claims that of the UCS scientists to be, despite his pose of sweet reasonableness.

LARRY CLIFFORD
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Robert Jastrow's "The War Against 'Star Wars'" was, like all his writing, clearly conceived and powerfully delivered. I agree completely with his scientific arguments; they needed to be made. Yet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the end I was alarmed and frustrated; Mr. Jastrow has provided the right answers, but in doing so he has legitimized some very wrong questions.

The most crucial fact in this entire debate is one that has been totally ignored: "Star Wars" is *not* an American initiative, it is a response. The Soviet Union has the initiative. . . .

The data supporting this statement are easily researched; they have been available in the popular press for at least seven years, and important scientific clues have been available in technical journals for nearly a decade before that. The most important article, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapons," was published in the May 2, 1977 issue of *Aviation Week*. The intelligence data contained in the article suggested that the Soviet program was at that point already six to ten years old and was very broad and deep. Jane's *Defense Weekly*, this year, reported that the Soviets are clearly ahead despite the very broad industrial base America can draw from.

The ramifications of this simple fact are enormous. For instance, Mr. Jastrow excuses the Union of Concerned Scientists on the grounds that "their rational judgments can be clouded by their ideological preconceptions." Yet most of these scientists, led by Harold Brown, were deeply involved in the effort to discount all the evidence of the Soviet program throughout the 70's. Interestingly, this brought them in direct conflict with Air Force intelligence and the data gathered by reconnaissance satellites, the very sources these same scientists claimed could be relied upon for verification of SALT provisions, negating the need for on-site inspections. No, these scientists are not innocents, they are quite familiar with Soviet efforts in this field. . . .

But the more important issue is the way such weapons tie in with the evolving strategic picture. The Soviets already possess a first-strike capability, an existing ABM system which violates the ABM treaty and forms the basis for a multilayered ballistic-missile-defense system, and an extensive civil-defense program. Were they to succeed in being first to emplace even an austere version of "Star Wars," the temptation to launch a first strike would very likely be irresistible. Whatever would be left of the U.S. strategic forces after a first strike might well be handled by the defensive system they are currently building. Even if events proved them wrong, once they acted upon obvious calculations, the world would see a nuclear war. Thus, Mr. Jastrow's tacit acceptance of the UCS argument that "Star Wars" is potentially destabilizing legitimizes a very wrong-headed perception of reality—the situation is already seriously destabilized and the Strategic Defense Initiative is a minimum attempt to restabilize it.

Even the MX missile plays a significant role in the accurate perception of "Star Wars." All our current ballistic missiles, both ICBM's and SLBM's, are so weight-limited that they offer no potential for modifications which might make them effective a decade from now. Only MX and a projected version of Trident provide sufficient flexibility to incorporate a response to whatever emerges from the massive Soviet beam-weapon program. Midgetman, against any potential Soviet defense system, is an anachronistic joke.

One more point—no matter how permeable or vulnerable the space battle stations envisaged in the Strategic Defense Initiative might be, in launching a first strike the Soviets would have to deal with them first. Such action eliminates *all* possibility of surprise. Indeed, it eliminates even the very idea of a first strike, since action against American satellites would fully justify a launch-on-warning stance for American strategic forces, as well as immediate counter-strikes against Soviet satellites and any battle stations. The corollary of this time-sequencing is that, while launching a thousand complex missiles within thirty minutes is a very difficult technical feat, launching sufficient numbers to overwhelm a "Star Wars" defense within the time-frame necessary to achieve an effective first strike is likely to remain impossible for quite a while. . .

THOMAS J. RATH
Altadena, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Robert Jastrow's dismissal of the Union of Concerned Scientists' proposals for countermeasures to the "Star Wars" defensive system leaves me more than a bit confused about how thoroughly the author and the unnamed "experts" to whom he so often refers understand the criticisms they rebut.

HEIMISCH & STYLISCH.



Sheraton Hotels in Israel

The hospitality people of ITT

King Solomon-Sheraton Hotel Jerusalem
32 King David Street, Jerusalem 94101, Israel
Telephone: 02-241433. Telex: 26434 KNGSOL IL.
Cable: SHERACO JERUSALEM

Tel Aviv-Sheraton Hotel
115 Hayarkon Street, Tel Aviv 63573, Israel
Telephone: 03-286222. Telex: 342269 BOOKUS IL.
Cable: SHERACO TEL AVIV

For reservations call: U.S. (800)325-3535
or any Sheraton Hotel or Regional Sales Office

GOLDFINE

"The Resurgent Religious Quest in Contemporary America and Its Social and Political Implications."

Hear Professor Peter Berger, author of *The Social Construction of Reality, A Rumor of Angels, Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural, The War Over the Family,* deliver the first in a new distinguished lecture series in the humanities.

Thursday, March 21 at 8 p.m.
Admission $7. Students $4.

92 St Y
Y-Charge
(212) 831-8603
92nd Street Y
1395 Lexington Ave.

A beneficiary of the UJA Federation Campaign.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. Jastrow seems to refute the charge that cheap "balloon" decoys could degrade the performance of a defensive system by conceding the validity of the point. Decoys are intended to force a defensive system to waste precious time and energy by engaging both decoys and balloon-enclosed warheads. Mr. Jastrow's announcement that "a sharp pulse of laser light" will cause decoy balloons to reveal their identity by their rate of recoil comes as no revelation to this inquisitive citizen, as I have never heard a "Star Wars" critic argue to the contrary.

Mr. Jastrow seems also not to have thought through his remarks on the utility of spinning and shining ICBM boosters as a means of complicating the job of defensive-beam weapons. Hans A. Bethe, Richard L. Garwin, and others have proposed the use of a strippable outer coating on missile boosters to reduce the dulling effect that launch would have on a booster shined to reflect laser light. The coating would shed once the missile moved above the atmosphere and within the range of laser weapons.

As for Mr. Jastrow's observation that a laser firing in pulses would be able to concentrate its energy on a single point on a spinning missile, I must say that a lot of confidence is placed in the laser weapon's ability to track and determine the rate of spin of a fast-moving object at long range. A simple countermeasure to a tactic such as Mr. Jastrow describes would be to vary the rate of spin of the missile once incident laser light is detected.

Specific counter-rebuttals aside, several of the tendencies apparent in the article were disturbing to me. Mr. Jastrow's trust in the proclamations of his communicants in the defense community, whose "ideological preconceptions," while unexamined, must certainly be as clouding of judgment as those of the UCS scientists, and his representation . . . that only professional military-systems analysts can assess competently the merits of the "Star Wars" proposal, lead me to suspect that Mr. Jastrow never undertook a dispassionate analysis but sought instead opinions that reinforced his original enthusiasm for the proposal.

I must note, also, that there is no unanimity of opinion on "Star Wars" within the traditionally pro-defense community. Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that "any defensive system can be overcome with proliferation and decoys, decoys, decoys, decoys." Edward Teller has criticized defensive proposals that depend on satellite-based systems because such systems are "costly to put up and cheap to shoot down." . . .

The most bothersome of Mr. Jastrow's prejudices is his refusal to see criticisms of "Star Wars" for what they are, that is, attempts to inform the public of the vulnerabilities of a system only the putative virtues of which have been presented publicly by the Reagan administration. Mr. Jastrow does not detail the "promising new developments" that might defend components of a defensive system from space- or ground-based attack. I, and I am sure others, would appreciate any information on progress toward remedying the problem of satellite vulnerability. . . .

EDWARD F. HENNESSEY
Wethersfield, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Robert Jastrow states that "90 satellites—and perhaps somewhat fewer—are needed to counter a Soviet attack." His argument, however, contains one profound flaw. He deals solely with the defensive systems needed to neutralize a massive attack of Soviet land-based missiles. The actual attack scenario would almost certainly include substantial numbers of submarine-launched missiles as well as cruise missiles that can be fired from a variety of platforms, both moving and stationary. This consideration would exponentially magnify the task of the defense. Indeed, even if the oceans were rendered "transparent" by evolving technology, the cruise missile, relatively inexpensive and readily camouflaged, might easily overwhelm any combination of defensive systems.

Other considerations abound, such as the destabilizing nature of any truly effective defensive system and the obvious inference that its deployment might trigger the very suicidal confrontation that all nations seek to avoid.

I would also assume that any defensive system resulting in the physical destruction of thousands of warheads would result in a literal rain of radioactive bomb components into the atmosphere and thence to the surface of the earth. I wonder if Mr. Jastrow's celluloid computer has taken this into account.

DAVID R. PERLES, M.D.
Chief Radiologist
Woodruff Community Hospital
Long Beach, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Even if a satellite-type ABM system could be made 100-percent effective against ICBM's, the U.S. would still be vulnerable to submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or cruise-type missiles launched from bombers.

Moreover, the deployment of the "Star Wars" system, intended only for defense, could lead to a far more precarious situation than we are in today.

If it were possible to place a working satellite system above the Soviet Union, our weapons-controllers would be tempted to arm those satellites with nuclear warheads; overwhelmingly tempted. The Soviets would certainly react, not necessarily by trying to disrupt or destroy our "Star Wars" system, but by deploying one of their own, albeit with inferior safety controls.

If such systems are deployed, they will dangerously diminish the response time to suspected attack. Instead of fifteen to thirty minutes, the President or Premier will have about sixty seconds to respond to signs of an adversary's nuclear strike. Hence, both the U.S. and Soviet Union would almost certainly revert to a "launch-on-warning" system, computer-controlled and unalterable by human judgment.

Worse yet, the Soviets, knowing the inferiority of their own radar and signaling equipment, might place their whole nuclear network on a state of constant alert—in which the "red button" does not initiate but merely restrains the launching of their nuclear missiles. Hence, if that trigger were destroyed, a Soviet nuclear attack would automatically follow.

ALLEN FINEGOLD
Amarillo, Texas

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Robert Jastrow exposes and dramatically debunks some of the errors committed by the enemies of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" proposal, in their blind attempt to kill this program. However, in addition to claiming erroneously that the hardware re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quired to implement SDI would be virtually impossible to develop, opponents also offer flawed arguments that it would violate the ABM treaty and would stimulate a new defensive arms race.

One way SDI opponents bias their discussions against the feasibility of the hardware is to confine their attention to a perfectly leakproof defense . . ., even though the cost and technical risk of a partially effective nuclear-missile-defense system would be far less than the cost of a leakproof defense. Also, a leaky nuclear-missile defense would strengthen deterrence significantly by drastically reducing Soviet confidence in their ability to launch a successful first-strike nuclear attack. . . .

In an apparent attempt to frighten the public, opponents also declare that SDI violates the terms of the ABM treaty. But SDI is a research program of the kind that is not prohibited by the ABM treaty; it contains no development, testing, or deployment activities. If, in the future, the U.S. determines that it would be in the national interest to go beyond the research stage, then a new kind of activity not in the current SDI program would have to be initiated, and the U.S. would have to determine whether the new activity would violate treaty limits.

This attempt on the part of those who oppose SDI to mislead the public blurs the distinction between the administration's SDI program, which is well within treaty limits, and some hypothetical program, which has neither been proposed nor planned, and which may or may not confront the treaty limits.

Arguments that SDI would trigger a new defensive arms race are contrary to the facts because the Soviets have been racing in this direction since well before the signing of the ABM treaty in 1972. During the past dozen years, they have developed a new, transportable, phased-array ABM radar and a new interceptor missile, both of which could be deployed rapidly should the Soviets choose to do so. (The U.S. has no equivalent deployable capability.) They have also upgraded the Moscow ABM defense system (the U.S. has no defense system), have deployed additional phased-array radars on their periphery for ABM target-acquisition support, and are now developing an advanced anti-tactical-missile-defense system that definitely has value for strategic-missile defense.

The attack against SDI seems to assume that all of the initiative in strategic defense lies with the U.S. It ignores the chilling and fairly obvious possibility that the Soviets will find it advantageous to accelerate their own strategic-defense programs or even break out of the ABM treaty. The political costs to the West of a substantial Soviet lead or break-out in defense would be great.

SDI should be pursued to give us a chance to strengthen the security of the U.S. and the rest of the world by making nuclear-ballistic missiles less useful as instruments of politics and war.

MARVIN KING

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Robert Jastrow faults the Union

IMPORTED BY KEDEM WINE CO., NEW YORK, N.Y.

THE CHOSEN ONE

It took forty years of wandering in the desert to learn we are the Chosen People. It will take you just a few moments to see why Monfort is the Chosen Wine. Delicate, crisp whites, and full-bodied aromatic reds from Israel's award-winning Monfort Wine Cellars. Monfort wines are blessed with all the promise of the Promised Land. Monfort premium varietal and traditional wines are imported by Kedem to be chosen by you.

Ⓤ KOSHER FOR PASSOVER

The Pride of Israel

MONFORT

To send a gift of Kedem, call 1-800-L'-C-H-A-Y-I-M (524-2926). Ask for a free catalog. Void where prohibited by Law.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Concerned Scientists for some unfortunately flawed calculations concerning the size and weight of satellites required to set up a "Star Wars" defense against Soviet ICBM's and the numbers of such satellites that would be needed. But the case against a "Star Wars" defense is far more substantial and is based upon serious technical matters. The numbers and dimensions of "Star Wars" satellites are significant *only* if the X-ray lasers, optical lasers, and particle beams will actually function. The UCS's *The Fallacy of Star Wars* raises many doubts about these weapons, doubts which Mr. Jastrow ignores in his article. . . .

The use of X-ray lasers powered by nuclear explosions and launched at the time of a Soviet attack would require building a new fleet of submarines to launch the "pop-up" X-ray laser weapons, since we have no satisfactory land bases close enough to Soviet silos to enable us to intercept Soviet ICBM's in the short time which will be available. We would also have to build attack submarines and surface vessels to protect the X-ray laser submarines. The X-rays of this type of laser are unable to penetrate the atmosphere, . . . and the Soviets could easily shorten the boost phase of their ICBM's to end before the missiles have left the atmosphere. The Union of Concerned Scientists has concluded that "the X-ray laser is not a viable BMD weapon." . . .

In addition, . . . the concept of using the weapons as "pop-up interceptions" is not feasible. The Soviets have located their silos in the area of the Trans-Siberian railway at about 55 degrees latitude. The area closest to these silos that American forces can reasonably use is the Arabian Sea to the south of Pakistan, about 23 degrees latitude. The X-ray lasers would have to be launched to a point where they can fire at the Soviet ICBM's while they are out of the atmosphere and still boosting. Assuming an interception altitude of 110 kilometers, the distance from a submarine to a satisfactory interception firing point for an X-ray laser would have to be at least 1,200 kilometers.

Assuming far more powerful propellants than those currently in use, the minimum flight time of an X-ray laser from launch submarine to interception-firing point would be 120 seconds. To these 120 seconds we have to add the time involved in the decision to launch the X-ray lasers: the processing and verification of satellite warnings that ICBM's are being launched; the acquisition, processing, and transmssion of targeting information; and the firing of the X-ray lasers from the submarines. According to John Steinbruner, in the January 1984 issue of *Scientific American*, 120 seconds would be needed merely to process and verify the data from the early-warning satellites. Regardless of how long this takes, the 120-second flight time of the X-ray lasers is far short of the 50-second booster time the Soviets would be able to achieve for their ICBM's.

Submarines are also crippled by their inability to fire all their X-ray lasers in a single salvo. The first launch would give away the submarine's position and invite a Soviet attack.

The interception of Soviet ICBM's during their boost phase is the most important consideration of the "Star Wars" defense. The large ICBM's are easier to locate and track than relatively small warheads after they have been released from the final stage of ICBM's. The Reagan administration's own Defense Technologies Study Team, headed by James C. Fletcher, agreed that a "Star Wars" defense is impossible unless the great majority of Soviet ICBM's were intercepted during the boost-phase of their flight. X-ray lasers are clearly not feasible for boost-phase interception. The much-touted particle-beam weapons fired from orbiting satellites are also not feasible because of the effect of the atmosphere and the magnetic field of the earth upon particle beams. The particles from neutral-particle-beam weapons would, if fired into the atmosphere, encounter air molecules in the upper atmosphere and disintegrate into charged particles which would be pulled by the earth's magnetic field, resulting in a steady increasing of the width and consequent decreasing of the intensity of the particle beam. . . .

Optical lasers, which emit light in the infrared (chemical lasers), ultraviolet (excimer lasers), and visible (free-electron lasers) portions of the spectrum, may also be unsuitable for interception of Soviet ICBM's during their boost phase. The wave nature of light means that the edges of the beams will tend to spread out increasingly over increasing distance. This means that the size of a spot upon which a laser can be focused increases in proportion to the distance from the target. Since the energy carried by a laser beam spreads over distance, the effectiveness of a laser weapon decreases over distance in proportion to the square of the distance. The energy needed for optical lasers suggests they could be functional only in low orbits where they would be vulnerable to attack from Soviet anti-satellite weapons of various sorts. Clouds of fine abrasives, for example, could be used to damage the laser mirrors. Clouds of light-absorbing substances could be used to limit the efficiency of the mirrors. Battle stations in space are much more vulnerable than boost-phase ICBM's to a wide variety of rather crude attacks.

The "Star Wars" defense would have to have battle-management systems that would deal with hundreds of thousands of objects. For this we would need computers able to carry out at least hundreds of millions and probably billions of authentic operations each second. Even if huge strides in computer technology were to produce hardware able to perform such gigantic numbers of operations per second, other problems connected with the implementation of a "'Star Wars" defense would probably never be resolved.

One very serious problem is that of designing and developing the programs (software) needed to direct the defense computers. Experience with the software involved in other defense systems as well as non-defense software indicates it will be extremely difficult—if not impossible—to create software capable of functioning properly in a nuclear attack. . . .

We could never be reasonably confident that a "Star Wars" defense with all its complex facets would function harmoniously and effectively during a strategic-nuclear attack. The "Star Wars" defense would be a gigantic, intricate assemblage, novel in conception, involving the farthest limits of advanced technology, and required to meet an extremely high performance standard, even though it could never be adequately tested.

Complex designs generate complex problems. All large computer programs contain flaws or bugs which decrease over use but which may never be entirely eliminated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . But no amount of simulated battle situations could satisfactorily examine the actual response of a complex "Star Wars" defense system to an actual nuclear attack. This is so not only because of flaws or bugs in software . . . but also because the precise nature of a nuclear attack, along with the enemy's countermeasures, can never be known in advance. . . .

JOSEPH FORBES
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

ROBERT JASTROW writes:

Edward Teller's letter makes an apt comparison between the controversy over the feasibility of "Star Wars" and the H-bomb controversy of the early 1950's. Confident in the superiority of American scientists, we were certain at that time that the decision to build the weapon rested solely with us. But we now know that the Soviets were in fact hard at work on their version of the H-bomb as we argued over whether it should be built at all.

Today, as we again debate the wisdom of research on another weapons system—this time, a system that destroys weapons rather than people—we assume that the decision will be made in this country, whereas in fact the Soviet Union is already hard at work on its own "Star Wars" program, and has been for many years. In the twelve years since the USSR signed the ABM treaty, the Soviet Union has, according to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, spent more on strategic defense than it has on its arsenal for strategic offense. Elements of the Soviet missile-defense effort that violate the ABM treaty in particularly conspicuous ways were publicized last October in a report to the President by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Because of this massive Soviet strategic-defense effort, Mr. Teller rightly concludes, our government's missile-defense program, officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, could better be called the Strategic Defense Response.

Soviet emphasis on a defense against missiles, and the total Soviet rejection of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), go back at least two decades. Andrei Gromyko called for the deployment of a missile defense by the superpowers in a speech to the UN in 1962, in which he strongly criticized the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Gromyko said the "balance of fear," as he called it, kept the world in a "a permanent state of feverish tension." He compared MAD to a duel in which the superpowers "raise their pistols, aim at each other's foreheads, and wait for the other to shoot."

JAMES A. ABRAHAMSON's letter underscores the fact that attacks on his program by a few academic scientists are entirely at variance with the rapid technical progress being made by thousands of scientists and engineers who work full time on the "Star Wars" project. Even without access to classified information, a diligent reader of aerospace trade journals can gain tantalizing hints of extraordinary developments taking place in the basic technologies of missile defense.

It is also reassuring to have General Abrahamson, who is in a better position to know than anyone else, agree that various Soviet countermeasures to our defense—highly touted by the Union of Concerned Scientists and discussed in my article—are not holding up well under the scrutiny of the defense professionals. The Soviets have confirmed General Abrahamson's evaluation of their countermeasures. If they thought the proposals put forward by the Union of Concerned Scientists were truly effective and inexpensive, they would not be trying so desperately to stop our "Star Wars" research. They would encourage us instead to go on with this expensive program that could be so cheaply countered by them. But they are fighting tooth and nail to kill the "Star Wars" project. Clearly, they disagree with the Union of Concerned Scientists and believe that it will cost them a great deal of money and trouble to counter our defense, if that can be done at all.

LOWELL WOOD of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory stresses a very significant point which has been made a number of times in my hearing by scientists working on defense matters. The university scientists who put forward the egregiously flawed arguments against missile defense have been repeatedly and firmly corrected by their colleagues in classified technical discussions that are not open to the public. But, as Mr. Wood notes with exasperation, after failing to make their case to their technical peers, they continue to present the same rejected arguments over and over again to the press and public.

One of the prime examples is the so-called "pop-up X-ray laser," which requires much additional research and development but holds the promise of being a devastatingly effective destroyer of missiles. In the report by the Union of Concerned Scientists and in the recently published UCS book, *The Fallacy of Star Wars*, the pop-up X-ray laser is dismissed as a useless device, readily countered by Soviet fast-burn boosters—that is, by missiles that accelerate very quickly and burn out at an altitude of 50 miles or less. One UCS criticism relates to the fact that a fast-burn booster may burn out in the atmosphere at depths to which X-rays cannot penetrate. But this criticism turns out to be invalid when classified information relating to the intensity of the X-ray laser beam is taken into account.

The classified information, Mr. Wood notes, has been presented in face-to-face discussions with the critics, who have not contested the technical points being made. Yet the critics continue to make their pessimistic comments in public where they cannot be countered by the classified facts.

This behavior seems to me and many of my colleagues to be less than responsible.

I SHARE with George Fishman his puzzlement over the fears of a space-based missile defense expressed by many academics. These fears seem indeed to be "irrational," as Mr. Fishman says, because the space-based weapons proposed for the "Star Wars" defense are not weapons of mass destruction, and cannot blow up a city or incinerate millions of civilians. The weapons that can do that are on the ground, in silos and submarines. "Star Wars" space weapons do not kill people; they destroy the weapons that kill people.

THE letter by Hans A. Bethe, Richard L. Garwin, Carl Sagan, *et al.* deals in its first section mainly with the strategic and political dimensions of missile defense. I should like to pass beyond these to the technical issues which were the principal thrust of my article, and take up those in order.

First, Mr. Bethe and his colleagues say that fast-burn boosters

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

protect the Soviets from our neutral particle beams, because the neutral particle beam does not penetrate the atmosphere. The thought here is that the booster will reach full speed in 50 seconds and burn out at an altitude too low to be reached by the beam. But, as my article noted, the neutral particle beam is just as effective against the bus carrying the warheads after the booster has burned out, as it is against the booster itself. If the beam catches the bus early on, while most of its warheads are still on board, the results are just as good for our defense as destroying the booster would have been.

If the Soviets try to escape the neutral particle beam by pushing their warheads off the bus while it is still within the atmosphere, air drag will seriously degrade the accuracy of the warheads, with disastrous consequences for Soviet hopes of taking out our retaliatory forces. That problem might be overcome by putting every warhead on its own mini-bus, with separate guidance and steering rockets. But if the Soviets do that, the extra weight required will substantially diminish the total number of warheads carried on the missile, probably by a factor of 2 to 5. And when the warheads are released, they are still vulnerable to the neutral particle beam during the long mid-course phase of their flight, which lasts many minutes. So, if the Soviets go to the enormous expense and trouble of replacing all their missiles with 50-second boosters—and, as George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, has noted, that means wiping out a fifteen-year investment in their missile force—it will avail them nothing.

In fact, the consensus among the experts is that the fast-burn booster, so highly regarded by the UCS and by Ashton B. Carter in his report to the OTA, is not a useful ploy for the Soviets. This has been pointed out to Mr. Garwin and other critics in classified discussions, but they continue to present their discredited arguments to the public "immune from the criticism of their technical peers," as Mr. Wood has said.

Not only are fast-burn boosters ineffective against several defenses being designed in General Abrahamson's program, but there is even some doubt among missile experts as to whether such a thing as a 50-second booster can ever be built on a mass-production basis and perform reliably. A rocket that accelerates from a standing start to roughly 15,000 miles an hour in less than a minute presents horrendous technical problems to the missile designer. Fast-burn rockets tend to explode and are not reliable; they get very hot because they move through the atmosphere so rapidly; and their structure must be stiffened to protect them against the battering forces created by their own acceleration. This last point imposes a heavy penalty on the Soviets, because the added weight must be compensated by the loss of a quarter to a third of the missile's payload.

Mr. Bethe and his colleagues cite a report submitted to the Fletcher panel that suggests 50-second boosters are feasible, but fail to mention that after examining all the evidence available to it, the Fletcher panel concluded that the Soviets could not hope to deploy a missile of this kind before the 21st century. In the light of these circumstances, many people in the defense community find it impossible to understand why Mr. Bethe and the UCS put so much emphasis on the fast-burn booster as *the* Soviet response to our defense.

TURNING to the question of the number of satellites needed for our defense, Mr. Bethe and his colleagues dispute my statement that the experts have been looking at this question for more than ten years. My remark was taken from an unclassified report dated May 9, 1984 by O. Judd of Los Alamos. I spoke with Mr. Judd recently and he confirmed the accuracy of the statement.

On this same matter, according to the Bethe letter, I imply that the calculation that produces the smallest number of satellites is the most accurate, which is a "clear absurdity." Not at all. I only note that the UCS calculations went from 2,400 satellites down to 800, then to 300, and, in the most recent report on the matter by Mr. Garwin, to 162 satellites. This sequence of numbers, which started out at 2,400 satellites, seems to be converging to a result in the neighborhood of 100 satellites, which is where the professionals pegged their results all the while.

Anyone can draw his own conclusions from these facts. My impression is that the UCS theorists first did a hasty piece of work and then, under criticism, did more extended calculations, until finally Mr. Garwin did a careful analysis. Throughout this long learning process, their numbers came down steadily, until leveling off in the neighborhood of the right answer.

Hans A. Bethe and his colleagues allege that there is no right answer because the answer depends on many factors, some of them unknown. But there is a "right" answer to the specific theoretical problem which they addressed. For that particular problem they presented a calculation to the public which turned out to be wrong by a factor of about 24, and in a direction that made the "Star Wars" plan seem very costly and impractical.

The Bethe letter also mentions the "square-root law," which is critical to the assessment of Soviet prospects for overwhelming our defense, because it indicates that we can overcome a massive build-up of Soviet missile forces with a relatively modest increase in the size of our satellite fleet. Richard L. Garwin's detailed report of December 30, 1984 concedes the validity of this relationship. Yet the letter from Mr. Bethe and his colleagues states that Mr. Garwin has proven the Los Alamos report to be incorrect under "all but highly artificial circumstances." How do we explain this contradiction?

The answer is in Mr. Garwin's paper. He has invented another problem involving satellites and missiles, which is quite different from the problem that was analyzed by the Union of Concerned Scientists in its report, and then in its book, and by Ashton B. Carter in his report to the OTA, and by G.H. Canavan and his colleagues at Los Alamos, and by C.T. Cunningham at the Livermore Laboratory. In this new problem, Mr. Garwin assumes that 3 seconds are needed, on the average, for a laser to swing around from one missile it has just destroyed, and lock its beam onto another missile. This is the so-called "retarget time," which was assumed to be zero in all the calculations mentioned above. If the retarget time is indeed as long as 3 seconds, our laser-equipped satellites will be very inefficient at shooting down Soviet missiles, and many more satellites will be needed than the previous estimates assumed. We will lose not only the square-root law, but the entire effectiveness of this part of our defense.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the design objectives in General Abrahamson's program call for a retarget time of 0.1 seconds and not 3 seconds. If the retarget time is 0.1 seconds, the results for the number of satellites are not very different from those for zero retarget time. In particular, the important square-root law is valid.

But how can we hope, in a time as short as 0.1 seconds, to rotate the mirror that directs the laser beam, damp down its vibrations, and lock in on a new target? A retarget time of 0.1 seconds would indeed be difficult to achieve if the experts were planning to rotate the mirror mechanically to redirect the beam from one Soviet missile to another. But the "Star Wars" program is probably not going to do that. A part of its funding is going into research on an extraordinary new technology that uses "phase conjugate coatings," which change the direction of the laser beam electronically in a fraction of a second, leaving the mirror fixed in place. The technique is essentially that used in phased-array radars, which do not rotate like the earlier radars, but sweep the sky electronically. This is a fascinating illustration of the black arts being practiced on the cutting edge of technology by the scientists and engineers working with General Abrahamson.

MR. BETHE and his colleagues also take up the critically important question of cost ratios, saying it will cost us a trillion dollars in additional satellites to counter an increased Soviet missile force costing only $50 billion. With a cost ratio like that, we are lost before we start, for clearly the Soviets can overwhelm our defense by outbuilding us. But I have looked into the cost figures, and they turn out to be entirely different from those given by Mr. Bethe and his colleagues.

First, on the matter of the cost to the Soviets of building more missiles, the letter states that $50 billion will buy 3,000 fast-burn, three-warhead, Midgetman-type missiles, including the cost of warheads and silos plus ten years of maintenance. This amounts to about $15 million per missile, or $5 million per warhead. Missile designers do not know yet what a fast-burn missile would cost, because none has been designed or built, but we can get an idea of the cost by using the current life-cycle cost for the MX missile. This is $40 billion for 100 missiles, each containing 10 warheads. That works out to $400 million per missile, or $40 million per warhead.

The cost per warhead for the proposed Midgetman will certainly be more than that, first, because fast-burn boosters are a new generation of missiles that must be built to withstand the stress of high acceleration, and second, because the cost per warhead is greater for small missiles than for big ones. According to Mr. Carter, a fair guess for the cost per warhead of a fast-burn booster is two to three times the corresponding cost per warhead of the MX missile. It is safe to say the cost of the proposed new Soviet missiles is at least $40 million but probably not more than $100 million per warhead. Thus, 3,000 fast-burn Midgetman missiles will cost the Soviets between $400 billion and $1 trillion.

Now for the cost to us of our defensive satellites. Mr. Bethe and his colleagues say we will require an additional 964 missiles to counter the new Soviet satellites. Using the accepted ballpark figure of $1 billion per satellite, this works out to $1 trillion in round numbers. Where does the figure of 964 satellites come from? It rests on the assumption by Messrs. Bethe *et al.* that the Soviets will cluster all 3,000 new missiles tightly together in one spot. But is it conceivable that the Soviets would do that?

For several reasons, they would not. For one thing, if all the missiles are located in one spot, and all are launched at one time, the times of arrival at their various targets in the United States will be widely different. That means the Soviets cannot effect a surprise attack that would take out all at once our command structure, airfields, submarine bases, and missile silos, since these are located at widely different flight times from any single place in the USSR. Suppose the Soviets try to overcome this handicap by launching their missiles over an extended period of time, so as to achieve a simultaneous arrival at the various targets. Then our boost-

JERRY THOMAS GAVE US THE FIRST MARTINI.
BUT BEEFEATER GAVE US ITS FIRST NAME.

Jerry Thomas was a colorful 19th century bartender in San Francisco. Legend has it that he concocted the first martini to cheer a weary traveler on his way to an outlying village called Martinez—which is how the martini got its name.

Its popularity, however, did not grow dramatically until knowledgeable people began making the martini with Beefeater Gin...the driest and most delicate of the classic London gins.

Today, the martini has an acknowledged first name: Beefeater.®

We think Jerry Thomas would cheerfully admit it's an improvement on the original.

BEEFEATER® GIN.
The Crown Jewel of England.™

IMPORTED FROM ENGLAND BY KOBRAND CORP. N.Y. 94 PROOF 100% GRAIN NEUTRAL SPIRITS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phase defense becomes enormously more effective, because we can pick off the Soviet missiles one by one as they rise from their silos.

The so-called "point" launch will create other problems for the Soviets. If they launch from one location at one time, all their warheads and decoys are bunched tightly as they course through space. This reduces the retarget time for our mid-course defense and, again, greatly increases its effectiveness. It also makes the warheads ideal targets for the X-ray laser. Finally, putting all the Soviet missiles in one place increases the effectiveness of our terminal defense as well, because it then becomes difficult for the Soviets to "ladder down." That refers to a technique for foiling our terminal defense in which the Soviets explode a nuclear weapon far above the missile silo or other target to create a fireball that will blind the ground radars on which our terminal defense depends. The fireball clears the way for another nuclear weapon that explodes and creates a fireball farther down, which clears the way for still another warhead, and so on, until finally the last warhead, swimming through these fireballs, reaches the target. But laddering down is impossible if all the missiles are in one place, unless they are launched at different times, and that is, as noted, disadvantageous to the Soviets for other reasons.

All in all, the last thing the Soviets are likely to do in response to our defense is to place their entire fleet of new missiles at one location.

But if the assumption that they would do this is removed, and the hypothetical new Soviet missiles are assumed to be spread across the Soviet land mass, as Soviet missiles are today, the number of American satellites required to counter their hypothetical attack goes way down. The reason is that the swath containing Soviet missile fields extends nearly a third of the way around the world at these latitudes. This considerably increases the chance that one missile or another in that vast expanse will be within the range of our satellites. The effect is to reduce by about a factor of approximately 3 the number of satellites required for our defense.

But there is more. The estimate of 964 satellites given by Mr. Bethe and his colleagues also assumes that the Soviets will have available to them a fast-burn booster that completes its acceleration from a standing start to full velocity in 50 seconds. This assumption means that each satellite has a very short time in which to attack the Soviet missiles, and therefore can destroy only a relatively small number of them. That means, in turn, that we need a large number of satellites to do the whole job.

As a practical matter, however, the goal of a 50-second booster is so difficult that the United States probably could not attain it until the late 1990's, and the Soviets are not expected to achieve it until the 21st century. When the assumption of a 50-second burn time is removed, and the more realistic assumption is made that the Soviets will have boosters similar to our MX, which has a 180-second burn time, the number of satellites required for our fleet goes down to 88, or, in round numbers, to 100.

At a billion dollars a satellite, that brings our investment down to about $100 billion, compared to between $400 billion and $1 trillion for the Soviet investment. In other words, the ratio of costs is very favorable to our defense over their offense.

Next, Mr. Bethe and his colleagues take up the matter of the 40,000-ton accelerator, and suggest that my description of their testimony is distorted because I have omitted the important phrase, "saving a great deal of weight." But I have the stenographic transcript of the hearing in front of me and it does not contain that phrase. Even if that phrase had been in the transcript, it would not have conveyed the full flavor of the difference between 25 tons in orbit and 40,000 tons in orbit; but in any event, it is not there.

TURNING to Ashton B. Carter's letter, objections are raised therein to four points in my criticism of his analysis. First, Mr. Carter says that the "square-root law," to which I attribute much importance, is wrong. He refers to calculations by the Livermore Laboratory for support. But the Livermore report confirms the square-root law. I have in hand the Livermore report on this subject by C.T. Cunningham, dated August 30, 1984. It was one of the sources for my article. The report shows that a fleet of 60 satellites in orbit at an altitude of 300 kilometers will shoot down 97 percent of the Soviet missiles in a mass attack from all 1,400 Soviet missile silos; whereas 90 satellites will shoot down the same percentage of the Soviet missiles in a mass launch from 2,800 silos simultaneously. According to the square-root rule, a defense against the increased Soviet missile force should require $\sqrt{2} \times 60 = 85$ satellites. But if Mr. Carter's analysis were correct, and the number of American satellites rose in proportion to the number of Soviet missiles, 120 satellites would be needed to counter the doubled threat. It is clear that the Livermore result is much closer to a square-root rule than it is to Mr. Carter's result.

Mr. Carter says his hypothetical deployment of satellites in bunches or clusters was a pedagogical device. But his device has an unfortunate effect, for when the satellites are bunched we lose the square-root rule; and when they are unbunched, we get it back again.

Mr. Carter also says I misunderstood his calculations on the number of intercepting missiles needed for our terminal defense. I think I understand them all too well. Mr. Carter estimates our need for thousands of intercepting missiles on the assumption that the Soviets might throw their entire force against one defended site. This leads to a requirement of 280,000 intercepting missiles. That is an implausible number based on an implausible assumption.

In the matter of the lead shield against a neutral particle beam, Mr. Carter suggests that he has been misquoted. Here are his statements. On page 30, his report states that such shielding could be an "attractive countermeasure" for the Soviets. On page 50, the report states: "But if the third stage, say of the MX, were covered with a few grams per square centimeter of lead [about a tenth of an inch], the shielding would weigh as much as several RV's [i.e., warheads]. On the other hand, if the neutral particle beam is only designed to disrupt or damage sensitive electronics . . . only the sensitive components need be shielded. The weight penalty then becomes small." It seems to me that my article gives a fair account of the meaning of these remarks.

Finally, Mr. Carter says a panel of experts found no substance to criticisms of his report which had been directed against it by Los Alamos and other groups. Most important among these is a 57-page technical memorandum issued by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Los Alamos Laboratory that contained many detailed criticisms of Mr. Carter's work, some of them devastating. According to Mr. Carter, the panel refuted these criticisms. But the panel that endorsed Mr. Carter's report offered no technical arguments whatsoever to counter the carefully reasoned criticisms offered by the Los Alamos scientists. The Los Alamos critique was a serious study, bearing on a matter vitally important to the security of the United States, and its criticisms had to be either rebutted or accepted. The distinguished panel of three experts cited by Mr. Carter did neither. As C. Paul Robinson, Principal Associate Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory pointed out, their benediction, unaccompanied by a technical backup, was without value. Mr. Robinson went on to note that "Los Alamos's concerns have since been debated in other technical forums, where they have been sustained."

In response to A.L. Drumwright, the decoy balloons are tapped rapidly, one after the other, with moderate-energy laser beams, and tracked repeatedly throughout this process to observe their recoil. Computers on our satellites keep track of the separate warheads and decoys and remember the information acquired about each one. As Mr. Drumwright suggests, a little more laser energy could destroy the lightweight decoys, instead of just identifying them. That would mean a different kind of midcourse defense, in which we hit all the warheads and decoys with moderately energetic laser beams, and observe what survives. The surviving objects must be the warheads, and we would go after these with our heavy guns.

Larry Clifford asks about my objections to the Soviets shining up their missiles. This proposal generates even more problems for them than I mentioned in my article. For one, as the booster accelerates it compresses and heats the air above it, and the plume of hot air sweeps downward around the side of the missile, oxidizing the surface and taking its shine away. Furthermore, the shine itself is obtained by applying a thin coat of reflective material to the missile, but under the high heat resulting from the the laser attack and from atmospheric friction, the coating tends to disintegrate. Finally, the coating has a different coefficient of expansion from the metal skin underneath, and tends to buckle when the missile is heated by the laser beam, leading to its catastrophic failure.

Thomas J. Rath makes the very interesting point that if the Soviets attempt to destroy the satellites in our space-based defense at the outset, before launching their missiles, they must necessarily give us warning of their attack. For this reason alone, our defenses will make it difficult for them to achieve the element of complete surprise that is essential to the success of a Soviet first strike.

Edward F. Hennessey asks about the possibility of a strippable outer coating that would keep the missile surface clean and shiny during launch. The trouble with this suggestion is that the strippable coating, which is to be wrapped around the entire missile, must be quite thin, or it will weigh too much and force the Soviets to eliminate several warheads from the payload. It must be sturdy, or air resistance will strip it away. And it must be heat-resistant, because the missile gets quite hot as it rises rapidly through the atmosphere. These requirements are partly contradictory, and reconciling them will not be easy. A substantial amount of development and testing would be necessary to make certain that such a device works well and does not interfere with reliable missile performance. And all this is for a very uncertain gain to the Soviets, because, as noted in my article, when the coating is stripped away and the shiny surface underneath is exposed to attack by our laser beam, the heat of the laser beam will degrade the shine rapidly.

Allen Finegold and David R. Perles suggest the "Star Wars" defense, even if effective against land-based missiles, will be vulnerable to submarine-launched missiles and cruise missiles. This is not the case. When our boost-phase defense system of approximately 100 satellites is in place, a dozen or so satellites will be over the missile fields of the Soviet Union at any one time, defending us against an ICBM attack. But most of the remaining satellites will be over the oceans and in a position to defend us against missiles launched from submarines. Moreover, for several reasons—slower speed, staggered launches, and dispersed launch sites—the interception of submarine-launched missiles is considerably easier than the interception of land-based missiles.

As for defense against cruise missiles, that is a different problem from defense against ballistic missiles, but not a harder one. In fact, it appears to be considerably easier,

UNSATISFACTORY PEOPLE

Ronald Reagan, for screwing up in Minnesota and the District of Columbia.
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., for describing Averell Harriman as "our wisest living statesman."
Howard Metzenbaum, for the big squeeze, followed by the big lie, followed by the big gesture.
Lee Iacocca, for selling 550,000 copies of his memoir and wondering if that's good.
The (hee hee hee)
House (hah hah hah)
Ethics (haw haw haw)
Committee.

For a free copy of the current issue of National Review write to Dept. C-1. 150 East 35th Street. New York, N.Y. 10016.

"The Sacred Executioner and the Jews."

"The Sacred Executioner" kills as a sacrifice to God and is, therefore, both sacred and accursed.

Follow the trail of this enigmatic figure through mythology and the Bible.

Consider the role of the Jews in the New Testament and the early Christian Church.

Don't miss this provocative, day-long exploration by Dr. Hyam Maccoby, author and librarian of the Leo Baeck College, London.

Hear:
"The Sacred Executioner": A Study of Anti-Semitism.
Sunday, March 24,
9:30 am-5 pm.
Tickets: $55. (A Kosher lunch available.)
Reservations and information:
(212) 427-6000 ext. 162.
Y-CHARGE (212) 831-8603.

92 St Y ***92nd Street Y***
1395 Lexington Ave.

A beneficiary of the UJA-Federation Campaign.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

because we have many minutes or even hours in which to find, track, lock our beams onto, and destroy the relatively slow-moving cruise missiles. Lasers in space, contrary to some views that have been expressed, are effective against cruise missiles and bombers because their beams, being light rays, reach to the ground. Clouds offer a temporary screen, but a cover of clouds is not likely to exist all the way to the target. And bombers fly above the clouds, at stratospheric heights, on their way to their targets, and are vulnerable to space lasers for hours.

MARVIN KING correctly rebuts the charge by some critics of the "Star Wars" research program that it is a violation of the ABM treaty. The language of the treaty states that "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components," but research on missile defense is not prohibited.

JOSEPH FORBES's comments on the usefulness of the X-ray laser are taken from a section of the UCS report which Lowell Wood has shown to be in error. For example, the UCS proposes to have the X-ray laser pop up from submarines located in the Arabian Sea. This relatively distant launch site, about 2,000 miles from the closest Soviet missile fields, would introduce a substantial delay of some minutes in the availability of the X-ray laser for combat—that interval being the time required for the X-ray laser device to climb to an altitude at which the Soviet missile fields are in its line of sight. But, as Mr. Wood pointed out, the eastern Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan are much closer to the Soviet missile fields, and just as accessible to our submarines politically. A launch from these waters largely eliminates the problem cited by the UCS.

Mr. Forbes also says that satellites are necessarily more vulnerable to attack than missiles. This is often stated, but is quite untrue. A satellite, being weightless in orbit, can be defended by heavy armor, guns, and maneuvering rockets. On the other hand, a missile, which must propel itself upward against the backward pull of gravity, cannot afford any substantial amount of armor or shielding, or it loses much of its payload. Today's military satellites are quite vulnerable because no one has been shooting at them, and we have not bothered to go to the expense of protecting them, but tomorrow's satellites will be another story. A substantial part of the Defense Department budget is going into research on the hardening of our military satellites.

As for the computations needed in the "Star Wars" defense, as many as several billion operations per second may be necessary, but parallel computer architectures should make this possible. Computing speed is not expected to be a major problem for our defense. The preparation of the complex programs needed is another matter. This is one of the pacing items in the "Star Wars" program, and is receiving a great deal of attention in early planning.

"The Bostonians"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It is not a matter of great moment, and in no way affects the argument of Richard Grenier's brilliant analysis of *The Bostonians* ["*The Bostonians* Inside Out," October 1984], but I should like to point out that his reference to Elizabeth Peabody as Hawthorne's elderly sister is incorrect. She was Hawthorne's sister-in-law and was known as one of the famous "Three Sisters of Salem." Another of the sisters, Sophia (a recognized painter in her day), married Nathaniel Hawthorne, and the third sister, Mary, married Horace Mann, the educator, and collaborated with him in his work.

Elizabeth Peabody was only incidentally a feminist. She opened a bookstore in Boston which became the gathering place for intellectuals of the day (mostly male) and there she printed the *Dial* magazine (a literary journal) and three of Hawthorne's first books. In later years, her principal interest lay in the field of education, and in 1860 she established the first kindergarten in America.

CLAIRE L. BARON
Rye, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Should we be terribly concerned with Christopher Reeve's "explanation" of the ending of *The Bostonians*? According to Richard Grenier, "Reeve feels that . . . Basil Ransom and Verena [will] live a life 'a lot like' that of Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda." I certainly did not receive this impression from the movie. Granted there are any number of distortions of Henry James's novel in the movie, but let us be fair: this is not one of them. Verena, in choosing Ransom, has unequivocally given up her public life. Throughout much of the movie, Ransom insists on this. Notwithstanding Reeve's personal wishes, there is no evidence in the movie that might lead us to believe otherwise.

My point in this apparent nitpicking is that in an otherwise fine movie review, one among many Mr. Grenier has written, he fails to distinguish what the movie "explains" from one of the "explanations" given by an actor *outside* the movie. With all due respect, this appears to be a somewhat deliberate confusion on Mr. Grenier's part, in order, perhaps, to support his more general argument, an argument that I believe to be valid, namely, the increased politicization we are now finding in American movies. . . .

ADRIAN R. VALENTINO
Hicksville, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have generally found Richard Grenier's movie reviews emotionally galvanizing and intellectually stimulating, but his article on *The Bostonians* contains serious flaws in judgment. . . .

What Mr. Grenier fails to realize is that in the triad of major characters—the other two being Olive Chancellor and Verena Tarrant—both Ransom and Chancellor are power-driven egotists who fight to possess the poor victim, Verena. It may be true that Ransom is the conquerer, but so was Attila the Hun. Although James may have shared some of Ransom's anti-feminist sentiments, he himself admitted that Ransom was "rather vague and artificial, quite *fait de chic*." In the novel, James seems to be saying "a plague on both your dogmas."

Mr. Grenier's zeal to paint a portrait of James in anti-feminist, conservative colors . . . leads him to bring in irrelevant corroboration in an attempt to buttress his case. For example, he quotes William James's praise of "martial virtues" . . . and then goes on to cite the revelation by William's closest friend, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., that his involvement in the Civil War was "the most exalting experience of his life." I suppose if there is such a thing as guilt by association, then there must be glory by association. I prefer to think that one should rest one's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

case on the merits—or demerits—of the subject himself, rather than relying on his family or friends.

Not only does Mr. Grenier misinterpret the hero's character, he misreads the novel's message: that Verena's marriage would be a most tearful one because she would be bullied by Basil and reduced to an identity-less existence. Mr. Grenier quotes F.R. Leavis's hyperbolic—and, in the case of *The Bostonians*, inane—judgment that *The Bostonians* and *The Portrait of a Lady* are "the two most brilliant novels in the language." James himself admitted that the novel was "too diffuse and insistent—far too describing and explaining and expatiating." I prefer James's judgment.

But when Mr. Grenier confines himself to a discussion of the defects of the film (I haven't seen it yet, and therefore rely on his judgments), he is on solid ground. Anyone who can make Olive Chancellor an attractive figure . . . and then change the ending completely by adding a "rousing feminist speech" deserves forty lashes—correction, make that eighty! . . .

MILTON BIRNBAUM
American International College
Springfield, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Richard Grenier's article, which I read after thinking I had enjoyed the movie, led me to have another look at the novel. It turns out that my memory of James's original was pretty hazy and Mr. Grenier was right about there being significant, even huge, discrepancies between novel and movie. . . . [But] the movie did a little more justice to the novel's minor characters than Mr. Grenier lets on. He describes Miss Birdseye at great length as a "humanitary hack," in James's words, and as just a sweet old lady in the movie. But surely Miss Birdseye appears in the film as something of a dodo. She is shown smiling blithely at Verena and Basil, because she supposes that Verena is converting him, rather than being unconverted by him. Her misguidedness is not totally blotted out, leaving only kindliness.

Similarly, the movie's Dr. Prance is not devoid of the flinty perceptiveness she exhibits so richly in the novel. Mr. Grenier forgets the scene in the boat where Dr. Prance (Linda Hunt) tells Basil of the suffragists' hypocrisy in valuing male converts to the cause more than female converts. All in all, I would not have called Miss Hunt's chilly if good-natured Dr. Prance a performance of "dulcet gentility." . . .

Mr. Grenier is also a bit off—or F.W. Dupee, whom he stands behind, is—about James's view of Olive, the proper Bostonian spinster-zealot. . . . It is wrong to say that James had "not the slightest sympathy" for Olive, though, to be sure, he invested her with both personal and political traits that were odious to him. . . . Henry James is nothing if not a genius at conveying a complicated sort of *sympathy* (he would have italicized it) for his fully realized creations. Olive is one of these. In the novel she jumps eagerly, flails self-consciously, believes too passionately—but the author makes these things touching at times.

Yes, Vanessa Redgrave does exploit Olive to serve her own and the film-makers' revisionist ends, and this disfigures the movie. But Miss Redgrave is not as untrue to James as Mr. Grenier says she is being when her "sudden surges of emotion and moments of sublime awkwardness" touch fleetingly upon his heartstrings. Unpluckable as Mr. Grenier's heartstrings usually are, it is surprising that an ideologue-actress played them better than a master novelist did.

LAUREN WEINER
Institute for Contemporary Studies
San Francisco, California

RICHARD GRENIER writes:

My thanks to Claire L. Baron, Adrian R. Valentino, and Milton Birnbaum for their compliments. I am also grateful to Miss Baron for the biographical information on Elizabeth Peabody and for straightening out her relationship to Nathaniel Hawthorne.

Mr. Valentino is certainly correct. Statements made by Christopher Reeve in interviews are unquesionably external to the movie. But if Mr. Valentino knows how directors work in the theater and in "quality" films, he will know that they spend a good deal of time explaining to their actors the roles they are about to play. Since Christopher Reeve, whom I have met, is not the least bit stupid, I can only assume that James Ivory's explanations of Basil Ransom were either nonexistent or grossly inaccurate, as Mr. Reeve issued from the movie making the most ludicrous statements—plainly (my point) without the faintest notion of what either his role or the story was about.

Mr. Birnbaum raises the interesting question of "glory by association." Now Mr. Birnbaum knows that Henry James was not a political essayist. The reason I quoted his brother William and his brother's best friend, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was that they articulated values that Henry James shared but never phrased in quite so ringing a manner. Has Mr. Birnbaum read the epistolary exchange between William and Henry James on the subject of Rudyard Kipling—of whom they were both great admirers? Mr. Birnbaum's "a plague on both your dogmas" thesis regarding *The Bostonians* is that of today's more literate feminists (as opposed to the illiterate ones who merely saw the movie). But the view of Basil Ransom as Attila the Hun—or at least as a character of a noxiousness equal to that of Olive Chancellor—I frankly find bizarre. It would mean that James put marriage on the same footing as spinsterhood, motherhood on the same footing as childlessness, and love between a man and a woman on the same footing as love between two women. It simply was not so.

Lauren Weiner, last, is simply clutching at straws. I forgot nothing. Miss Birdseye is not presented in the movie as anything like James's "humanitary hack," and the movie's Dr. Prance has no "flintiness" whatever. I am glad, I suppose, that Miss Weiner thinks I have heartstrings. But, if I may be considered an authority on my own heartstrings, I can confidently say they were not plucked by Vanessa Redgrave. I think she gave an excellent performance. I find Miss Weiner's suggestion that Vanessa Redgrave was better than Henry James at "playing" on my heartstrings somewhat confusing, as I do not think Henry James's purpose was to play on my heartstrings, certainly not on behalf of Olive Chancellor. This might be an error of perception on my part, but Henry James, in any event, is not at the top of my list of heartstring writers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kosher wine needn't be sweet just special

And special means Kedem. From world-renowned vineyards in France, Italy, California and New York. Rated and recommended by leading wine critics and editors, Kedem wines are superior to the world's great wines for one special reason, they're kosher.

KEDEM®

KOSHER PASSOVER WINES

To send a gift of Kedem, call 1-800-L'-C-H-A-Y-I-M (524-2926). Ask for a free catalog. Void where prohibited by Law.

KEDEM WINE CO., NEW YORK, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Famine, Development & Foreign Aid

Nick Eberstadt

IN RECENT years, American foreign-aid policies have been shaped increasingly by the argument that the many different problems facing the poor nations are inextricably interconnected, woven together into an all-encompassing "seamless fabric." However pleasing this notion may seem to theoreticians, its practical implications are dangerously wrong. The problems facing poor nations can be distinguished from each other and treated separately—and must be. It is no act of charity to suspend the rules of policy analysis and problem-solving at the borders of the Third World.

Although current American policies often fail to distinguish among them, three separate purposes underlie our foreign-aid programs. The first is the humanitarian purpose of alleviating suffering and minimizing loss of life from the upheavals following sudden, unexpected catastrophe. The second is the developmental purpose of encouraging poor nations to find their best path to economic health, self-sustaining growth, and general prosperity. The third purpose is to promote the security of the United States and the Western order through military aid or security assistance to a foreign government.

Military aid to less developed countries is but a part of a larger, global American defense strategy. The aid the United States extends to nations which happen to be poor, moreover, is only a tiny fraction of the money it expends to preserve the security of Allied nations that are already rich—such as Japan and the NATO countries. Military aid to less developed countries, then, is not in any meaningful sense a Third World policy, even though it involves transfers of money and resources to nations in the Third World.

Humanitarian aid and development aid are quite different. These address, respectively, short-term exigencies and long-term prospects of poor nations, and are governed by an attention to poverty. To understand the best use of these different forms of aid, we must appreciate the problems each must address. Let us examine them separately.

NICK EBERSTADT, a visiting fellow at the Harvard Center for Population Studies, is the author of *Poverty in China* and the editor of *Fertility Decline in the Less Developed Countries*. His articles in COMMENTARY include "What We Know About China" (March 1984) and "Hunger and Ideology" (July 1981).

II

MUCH of mankind continues to live under the shadow of life-imperiling disasters and upheavals. Floods, earthquakes, and storms still endanger millions of people every year, and the human cost of famine is even greater. Since the end of World War II it is believed that tens of millions of people have perished from famine in Asia alone.

To deal effectively with today's natural disasters, we must begin by recognizing that there is very little that is natural about them. Acts of God cannot be prevented, but the quotient of human risk and suffering they exact can be vastly and systematically reduced. Current events underline the point. The United States and Japan happen to be more subject than most regions of the earth to sudden natural disturbances. The Japanese archipelago, after all, is an earthquake zone, buffeted by tropical storms and exposed to *tsunami* (tidal waves). The U.S. land mass is threatened by earthquakes, tropical storms, and tornadoes, and the country, in addition, has more active volcanoes than any other. Nevertheless, very few people in Japan or America die from these natural perils.

The African continent, by contrast, would appear to be comparatively well protected against sudden disasters. It is exposed only slightly to tropical storms and tidal waves, has only a small earthquake belt, few active volcanoes, and it experiences tornadoes only in South Africa. Despite these natural advantages, however, sub-Saharan Africa has been stricken by perennial disaster in the decade since decolonization was effectively completed. These disasters are believed to have cost hundreds of thousands of lives.

Western peoples have not always enjoyed their present protection against adverse acts of nature. In the first ten years of the 20th century, over 8,000 Americans died in hurricanes,* as opposed

* Cited in Anders Wijkman and Lloyd Timberlake, *Natural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man?*, London and Washington, Earthscan, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the 100 who died over the past ten years. What accounts for this almost 99-percent drop, despite a doubling of the population and a steady urbanization of the coasts where hurricanes most often strike? Affluence, as manifested in safer dwellings, explains part of the change; even more, however, is explained by those handmaidens of affluence, technical advance and government competence. Improvements in communications, transportation, weather tracking, emergency management, rescue operations, and relief capabilities have made it possible to reduce dramatically the human price exacted by even the worst hurricanes in the most populated areas. Purposeful private and governmental action can now substantially cut the toll from other natural disasters as well, even in the poorest nations.

Not all governments, however, work at minimizing the havoc which sudden disasters wreak upon their people—as the two most costly sudden disasters of the 1970's attest. In 1970, East Pakistan, as it was then known, was devastated by a typhoon. The Pakistani government—seated in and dominated by West Pakistan—responded to the extreme distress in its Bengal territory with what might at best be described as reserve. As many as 100,000 Bengalis are thought to have perished in the aftermath of that typhoon.

In 1976, the city of Tangshan in China was flattened by an earthquake. One of the Chinese government's first responses to the disaster was to announce it would refuse all international offers of aid for the victims. Details about the actual rescue operations which China itself undertook remain obscure to this day. One of the few accounts of the disaster permitted in the Chinese press at the time was a front-page feature in the *People's Daily* praising a peasant who let his own two children die as he rescued instead an aged party cadre; local and foreign readers came to their own conclusions about what this carefully placed article was intended to suggest. Since the rise of Deng Xiaoping, China's media have severely criticized his predecessors' handling of the Tangshan affair; they now state that almost a quarter-of-a-million people died in the disaster.

IF GOVERNMENT action can be consequential in limiting the suffering caused by sudden upheavals, it can be even more important in controlling or preventing famine. In the past, famines were typically related to regionalized crop failure. It is now possible to cushion the impact of crop failure in even the poorest regions of the earth. Concerned governments can monitor the progress of their nations' harvests by following local markets, by direct on-site inspection, and by studying the data from worldwide aerial and meteorological surveillance services.

These early-warning systems can give governments valuable months in which to prepare against food shortfalls. Food grain may be purchased from the world market, which trades and transports over 200-million tons each year. If for some reason a government cannot finance its emergency food-grain needs, it may draw upon the 7-million-ton reserve of concessional food aid which Western governments set aside each year. If a government lacks the administrative capacity to manage a far-reaching relief effort, it may request free assistance from the many impartial international organizations which have proved they can both supervise and staff effective relief operations on short notice and under difficult conditions. Almost twenty years ago, concerted American-Indian cooperation after a series of harvest failures saved millions of Indians from starvation, and even seems to have prevented death rates from rising in the afflicted provinces. Since then, the capabilities of both the world food system and international relief organizations have grown steadily. They now present even the most modest and least sophisticated government with an opportunity to control famine within its borders—if it wants to do so.

The terrible truth, however, is that many governments in the world today have demonstrated that they are not interested in seeing their people fed. Some have deliberately ignored signs of incipient crisis. Others have interfered with international relief for their stricken groups. Still others have actually created famine conditions through premeditated action. In every recent instance where a potential food shortfall has developed into a mass famine, the hand of the state has been prominently involved

Consider the great famines that have gripped the poor regions over the past quarter-century. In China, the Three Lean Years lasted from 1959 to 1962. Chinese officials now say that millions of people died during this famine, and Western demographers have recently suggested that "excess mortality" during this period may have been as much as thirty million. The Three Lean Years were a direct consequence of the Great Leap Forward, an awesomely ambitious social and economic experiment which resulted in a nationwide collapse of agriculture and a brief but virtually total destruction of the national food system. Even as their policies were causing millions of their citizens to starve, China's leaders denied there was a crisis, refused all offers of international aid, and exported food.

In Nigeria, where perhaps a million ethnic Ibos died of famine in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the federal government deliberately encouraged starvation in that province, which had proclaimed its independence, in the hope that this would hasten its reconquest. In Ethiopia in the early 1970's, the Haile Selassie regime consciously concealed a famine which was ravaging its minority peoples; it is now said that several hundred thousand people lost their lives as a result of this deception, although the exact cost will never be known. In the mid-1970's, the Indonesian govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment attacked, occupied, and annexed the territory of East Timor; it used hunger as a weapon of conquest. It is believed by outside observers that over 100,000 Timorese starved to death before Indonesia allowed the island to be fed; in all, as much as a quarter of the Timorese population may have perished from famine. In the late 1970's as many as two million Cambodians may have died as a result of hunger; they did so only because the Khmer Rouge government made the mass extermination of whole segments of the national population its official policy.

ONCE again there is famine in Ethiopia. Though its ultimate toll is yet to be determined, its causes are already apparent. After seizing power in 1974, Ethiopia's Marxist-Leninist *Dergue* (Armed Forces Coordinating Committee) launched a campaign against "capitalism" in the countryside, restricting and ultimately prohibiting the private sale and marketing of farm produce and agricultural implements. At the same time, a newly formed secret police executed thousands of students and skilled workers in this predominantly illiterate nation, imprisoned tens of thousands more, and caused even greater numbers to flee their homeland. With the encouragement of Soviet and Cuban advisers, the government used its foreign aid to underwrite military build-up and war.

In a country like Ethiopia, which has always been subject to drought, such policies insured that widespread famine would be only a matter of time. When famine finally did strike, moreover, the *Dergue* gave little priority to relief efforts. Although millions of its citizens were said to be directly affected by the food shortage, the regime concentrated on commemorating its tenth anniversary in power—in a celebration which is said to have cost the equivalent of over $100 million.

Relief operations do not seem to have begun in earnest until after an outcry in the West over the plight of the famine victims. Even then, the Ethiopian government continued to obstruct international efforts to alleviate its people's distress. Instead of helping rescue workers reach famine victims in Tigre and Wollo—stricken regions where the *Dergue* is especially unpopular—the government began a program of mass deportations; 2.4 million of those areas' most able-bodied (thus least endangered) people were scheduled for eventual removal. And in contravention of the two basic principles of humanitarian relief—impartiality and nondiscrimination—the *Dergue* forbade all relief for the territory of Eritrea. Half-a-million people were reported to be starving in Eritrea, but this did not stop the Ethiopian armed forces from attacking convoys suspected of bringing relief supplies into the afflicted region.

Ethiopia is not the only government currently contriving to foment mass starvation. The ongoing efforts of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, for example, are often forgotten. Since the 1979 invasion, Soviet forces have carefully destroyed the food system in many resisting regions. In so doing, they have turned literally millions of Afghans into destitute refugees, no longer able to feed themselves in their own nation. Over two million of these people subsist today in refugee camps in Pakistan. They are kept alive by charity from the West.

THE American architects of the postwar international order did not anticipate such problems. In 1943, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt laid the foundations for the broadest and most successful relief effort the world had ever seen, he explained that the new United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) would be operating only in "liberated areas." He assured "liberated peoples" that "in victory or defeat, the United Nations have never deviated from adherence to the basic principles of freedom, tolerance, independence, and security." President Roosevelt believed that preventing famine would be an eminently manageable task under governments which respected the sanctity of human life and upheld Western values, and he was right. With the spread in membership in the United Nations, moreover, it seemed that enlightened governance might eventually prevail across the entire globe. Today, however, only a handful of countries beyond the borders of the West embrace the values codified in the United Nations' Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Many member states now disregard these codes when they prove inconvenient. Others reject them out of principle, since they are inconsistent with their regimes' totalitarian or anti-Western ideologies.

It is now almost forty years since our victory in World War II. Even so, very few of the world's poorest and most vulnerable peoples live in what President Roosevelt would have considered "liberated areas." It is this fact and not any other which accounts for the persistence of famine in the modern world. Nations can always share the West's technical capacities to save people stricken by catastrophe, but regimes that do not share the West's values cannot be counted on to put these capacities to use.

III

ACCORDING to many leaders in the Third World and to some development organizations in the West, the principal obstacle to accelerating the pace of material progress in low-income nations today is the insufficiency of concessionary aid from Western countries. It is striking, and inadvertently revealing, that such criticisms of Western giving often neglect to discuss either the quality of the aid received or the ends that it achieves. Such thinking is worse than illogical. By

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dissociating development aid from measurable results, it reduces Western assistance from a practical policy to an aesthetic, possibly only a symbolic, gesture. To advocate massive new aid programs irrespective of their impact on the economic health of recipient nations would be expensive for the West, but could prove far more costly to the world's poor.

Few people in the West appreciate the magnitude of current resource flows from Western societies to the Third World. Such flows are, in fact, extremely difficult to measure, not only because of the inevitable delays between commitments and disbursals, but because of the complexities of tracking and accounting for funds in a world financial system which is at once open and closed. Nevertheless, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) attempts to measure these flows, and its computations are instructive.* In 1982, the most recent year for which OECD has made estimates, the net total for what it labels "overseas development assistance" provided directly by Western nations to Third World countries was about $18 billion.

But there was more. Multilateral development banks and multilateral development agencies, underwritten overwhelmingly by Western donations, provided an additional sum whose 1982 net OECD put at about $8 billion. And there was still more. Western nations were also providing finance capital to less developed countries under a variety of arrangements, including bank lending, government-to-government loans, export credits, and direct private investment. All told, OECD placed the total net transfer of financial resources from Western nations to Third World countries at almost $80 billion in 1982. This, it must be emphasized, is supposed to be the *net* total: the residual after financial withdrawals, profit repatriation, and loan repayments have been taken into account.

Of course, 1982 is but a single year. OECD estimates of financial flows to developing countries extend back to 1956. According to these computations, the net transfer of financial resources (both concessional and commercial) from Western nations to less developed countries between 1956 and 1982 exceeded $670 billion. This figure, however, seriously understates the true magnitude of the transfer, since it is denominated in current rather than inflation-adjusted dollars. Adjusting for intervening inflation, we find that the OECD estimate would be valued today at over $1,500 billion—that is, over $1.5 *trillion*.

Even this figure, however, understates the total postwar transfer of resources from the West to the Third World. It does not, for example, seem to measure either concessional grants or commercial loans for military matters, even though these play a prominent role in the finances of many developing countries. And it obviously cannot measure the net flow of resources in either the first half of the 1950's or the years since 1982. Taking everything into account, it seems quite possible that the total net transfer of capital from the West to the Third World since the beginning of the postwar international order may have already exceeded $2 trillion at today's prices. Although the complexities of international financial accounting and the unavoidable inexactitudes of adjusting for inflation and international fluctuations in exchange rates prevent us from arriving at a more precise figure, $2 trillion will probably do as the nearest round number to describe the magnitude of the net financial transfer from the West to the poor nations in the postwar era.

Large figures tend to seem abstract, and $2 trillion is an especially large figure. One way to appreciate its size is to consider what it could buy. Think of the entire U.S. farm system. Now think of all the industries listed on the New York Stock Exchange. At their current market values, $2 trillion would pay for *both*.

WHAT has been the impact on the societies which have received this extraordinary transfer of Western wealth? The answer is obviously different in every case. Even so, broad and unmistakable patterns arise, some of which can be glimpsed in the composition of the transfers themselves. Less than one-quarter of the inflation-adjusted total for the years 1956 to 1982, for example, appears to have accrued from direct (and voluntary) overseas private investment. That fraction, moreover, has steadily diminished over time. Whereas in the late 1950's direct private investment accounted for almost two-fifths of the net financial flows to the less developed countries, in the last five years for which OECD has published figures, the fraction has dropped to below one-sixth.

One of the original arguments for foreign aid was that development assistance would increase the capacities of poor nations to make productive use of international-investment resources. The record seems to suggest that precisely the opposite has happened. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars of Western development assistance, and a generation of economic growth in the meantime, the less developed countries, taken as a group, obtain a far smaller fraction of their foreign resources from direct private investment today than they did a quarter of a century ago. This must mean either that Third World nations, taken as a group, have grown more hostile to direct private investments, or that they have become less capable of attracting such investment, or both.

The eclipse of direct private investment from the West was made possible in no small part by the ascension of an alternative medium of capital

* *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Nations*, Paris, OECD, 1984. The calculations here are based on this volume and its predecessor series.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transfer, commercial lending. Unlike direct private investment, bank loans to less developed countries accrue principally to governments and state-owned public corporations. Such lending effectively severed the connection between the provision of capital and the right to manage it. The responsibility for determining the use of these funds, and of repaying them, fell squarely on the state. It was not long before dozens of nations in the Third World announced that they would be unable to repay their commercial obligations to their Western creditors on schedule.

The attitudes which led to this generalized debt crisis were highlighted in the subsequent rescheduling negotiations in which many Third World governments requested debt relief. Such proposals would have converted a substantal portion of their obligations into a retroactive and unintended gift from the West. This view of Western capital suggested not only that it would be appropriate to convert commercial funds into concessional bequests without warning, but, no less significantly, that there was no reason to expect concessional bequests to earn productive returns.

Within the diverse and disparate amalgam of nations that goes by the name Third World there has been a dramatic and general improvement in material living standards during the era of Western transfers. This fact should be neither ignored nor belittled. Life expectancy for the people of "developing regions," according to the World Health Organization, rose by over 50 percent between the late 1930's and the late 1960's, and has risen still further since then.* Although no great confidence can be placed in economic estimates for the less developed regions, the World Bank says that per-capita GNP has more than doubled between 1960 and 1980 for the billion people living in what it terms "middle-income economies."† According to the same source, per-capita GNP rose by over 30 percent in India during this period. Even that most troubled category of states, the "other low-income economies" of Africa and Asia, are said to have experienced a 20 percent increase in per-capita GNP during these two decades alone.

But while the peoples of the less developed countries have seen far-reaching material advances in their societies, their economies have also typically undergone strange and troublesome transformations. In a great many countries of the Third World it has proved possible to finance the ambitious and comprehensive recasting of the national economy in ways not unlike the mobilizations of societies preparing for protracted and total war. These exercises in economic conversion have left the structures of some less developed countries grotesquely distorted, unnecessarily incapable of meeting either the social needs or the commercial demands of their people. They have left many others in a curious state of economic imbalance: richer than ever before, yet less capable than ever of pursuing self-sustaining growth.

In the Western nations, agricultural development proved to be a key factor in overall economic development. In the era of Western transfer, many governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have attempted to bypass agricultural development in their rush to industrialize. They have pursued policies systematically prejudicial to the interests of their rural populations: overtaxing farmers, underpricing their produce, and diverting resources so that the growth of cities and factories may be sustained at a forced pace. Neglect and exploitation have left many poor nations with unnaturally small agricultural sectors in relation to their people's needs or their development potential. Imitating the style of development without capturing its substance, such efforts at development planning have, by and large, succeeded in replicating the structure of the industrialized economies while leaving the populace in poverty.

Some of the resulting distortions may be illustrated by international economic comparisons. (The estimates for poor nations, which come from the World Bank, should not necessarily be treated as reliable or even meaningful, but they are the most commonly used figures in such exercises.) For Peru and Mexico in the early 1980's, the proportion of agriculture in overall GNP was put at roughly 8 percent. This is only half the share that Germany devoted to agriculture in the 1930's, even though Germany then was much more prosperous than Peru or Mexico today by almost any economic measure. By the same token, the share of agriculture in Ecuador's GNP today is apparently smaller than Holland's was in 1950. Bolivia's ratio of agriculture to GNP is lower today than that of Greece, although by any other measure it is Greece which should be considered the more industrialized society. Present-day Nigeria and the Denmark of the early 1950's show roughly equal ratios of agriculture to GNP. Senegal, a nation affected by the Sahelian food crisis, has managed to reduce its current ratio of agriculture to national output down to the level that characterized Japan in the early 1950's. The relation of agriculture to output in Pakistan and India is about the same as in prewar Italy, and is only slightly higher in Bangladesh today than it was in Italy at the turn of the century.**

THE same policies which produce industrialization without prosperity have created an equally paradoxical phenomenon in

* World Health Organization, "Mortality Trends and Prospects," in *WHO Chronicle*, 1974, Vol. 28.

† World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1982, Oxford University Press, 1982.

** Data for "developing countries" come from various issues of the World Bank's *World Development Report*. Historical figures for Western nations are from Simon S. Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth* (Yale University Press, 1966) and *The Economic Growth of Nations* (Harvard University Press, 1971).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many less developed countries: investment without growth. By the estimates of the World Bank, in the early 1960's the ratio of gross domestic investment to GNP in Jamaica, Mauritania, Liberia, and what is now the People's Republic of the Congo was equal to or higher than that of Japan in the early 1950's, at the start of its remarkable boom. Yet over the course of the 1960's and 1970's, while Japan was quadrupling its per-capita output, Mauritania and Liberia are said to have raised theirs by less than 40 percent; the People's Republic of the Congo, by the World Bank tally, registered a rise of less than 20 percent; and Jamaica apparently increased its per-capita output by a mere 13 percent. It is worth considering the scale of economic mismanagement necessary to achieve such results. We might also wonder how a poor government could maintain such strikingly high rates of capital accumulation in the face of indisputable and continuing economic mismanagement.

Just as agricultural sectors in the Third World have been artificially restricted and diminished by national policies, so what is termed investment has been artificially swollen. According to the World Bank, the region of the world with the *lowest* overall investment rate today is the West. In the "middle-income economies," overall rates of gross domestic investment are said to be just short of the historically extraordinary levels Japan achieved at the start of its growth spurt in the 1950's. For the "low-income economies," overall rates of gross domestic investment are higher today than they ever were in the United States or the fastest-growing nations of Western Europe.

But these patterns of investment cannot be taken as a sign of economic promise. In many countries, they have already proved to be manifestly unsustainable—the "debt crisis" affecting so many poor nations is only a formal recognition *in extremis* of this fact. To a distressing degree, the capital build-up to which so many Third World governments have committed themselves over the past three decades was guided not by economic logic but by the political imperative of maximizing the resources and power in the hands of the state. The misuse of resources, always costly, is especially hard on the populace of poor societies. It is poor people, after all, who can least easily forgo consumption today, and investment is by definition forgone consumption.

The postwar transfer of resources from Western nations to the less developed countries, as it has been conducted, appears to have accorded with neither of the two original premises for extending "development assistance": it has not improved the climate for productive international investment and it has not contributed generally to self-sustaining economic growth. Ironically, financial transfer from the West may actually have made it possible for many nations to avoid participating more fully in the world economy. Under the best of circumstances, financial aid increases the local money supply, and thus stimulates inflation and reduces international competitiveness unless offsetting measures are enacted. Many regimes have demonstrated that they are not interested in enacting such measures. After all, overvaluing the local currency makes imports cheap, and to the extent that foreign finance is available, exports are unnecessary.

THE justification for "development assistance" which has been voiced increasingly since the early 1970's is the need to "build human capital." There should be no mistaking the crucial importance of human capital in economic growth. Health, education, knowledge, skills, and other immutably human factors determine the maximum pace at which development may proceed. But returns from human capital, as from any other potentially productive resource, depend upon the environment in which they are put to use. Where physical capital is mismanaged and depleted, it would seem unrealistic to expect human capital to be carefully preserved, augmented, and utilized.

Human capital is much more difficult to measure and evaluate than physical capital—a fact that may not have escaped advocates of new spending programs in this area. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some tentative assessments of the effectiveness of some of the human-capital programs Western aid has helped sponsor. Consider education. As a very rough rule of thumb, the literacy rate in a poor society today should be similar to its primary-school enrollment ratio twenty years earlier. The rule holds in many developing nations, but not in all. According to the World Bank, for example, 47 percent of Bangladesh children were enrolled in primary schools in 1960 but the nation's literacy rate in 1980 was only 26 percent. In Togo, the enrollment ratio was 44 percent in 1960, but literacy is put at 18 percent today. In Zaire, the enrollment ratio was 60 percent in 1960, and the literacy rate today may be as low as 15 percent.*

Literacy, of course, is notoriously difficult to measure. Such radical discrepancies, however, appear to speak to something more fundamental than inexact definitions. They suggest that spending in the name of human capital can be wasted, and often has been. The irony is that such wastage seems most likely to occur as governments restrict their societies' contact with the world economy—preventing them from participating in the learning process which has so demonstrably enhanced the productivity of nations at all economic levels in modern times.

In the final analysis, the economic impact of

* *World Development Report*, 1982 and 1983. The World Bank did not publish literacy estimates in the 1984 edition of its report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western financial transfers on the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America seems to depend very largely on the attitudes and inclinations of the recipient government. Taiwan and South Korea were both major beneficiaries of foreign aid in the 1950's and early 1960's, and South Korea has been a major borrower of international capital in the 1970's and the early 1980's. Both countries have used these resources in ways that have enchanced their overall economic productivity, improved their international competitiveness, and increased their ability to take advantage of the growing opportunities afforded by world markets. But easy credit and free aid need not be put to economically constructive purposes. They may also be used for quite different goals—even to underwrite practices so injurious that they could not otherwise be afforded.

IV

If opinion surveys are correct, the American people are troubled by our present policies to relieve distress and promote prosperity in the poorer regions of the earth. They are right to be so. As they are currently conducted, American foreign-aid policies cannot be relied upon to encourage economic health or self-sustaining growth in low-income nations; indeed, they may actually subsidize practices that perpetuate or even generate poverty in certain places. Such programs betray the wish of the American people to extend their help to the world's least fortunate groups and dangerously compromise America's moral role in the world.

In the decades since they were initiated, the official development policies of the United States have undergone a progressive divorce from their original purposes and principles. To judge by the results of current foreign-aid programs, the United States government has become comfortable with the idea of conducting a special, separate foreign policy toward the world's poor—a policy whose principles and goals are distinct from, even opposite to, those by which we guide ourselves in the rest of the world. Pursued to their logical conclusion, America's current aid policies would leave poor nations ever less capable of self-sustaining growth, and increasingly dependent on foreign largesse to maintain or improve national standards of living. These same aid policies appear to be indifferent to the politically induced suffering which so many poor peoples must endure at the hands of irresponsible or actively mischievous governments. Would we ever think of guiding our relations with another Western people by such rules?

The terrible irony of this situation is that the United States created a new global order at the end of World War II precisely to eliminate the sorts of suffering we now seem to be inadvertently underwriting in different poor nations. The economic pillars of this new order were an International Monetary Fund, a World Bank, and a generalized arrangement for the promotion of international trade; the political framework for this order was to be the United Nations. The liberal international economic system which was built on those foundations has proved to be the greatest engine of material advance the world has ever known; it has demonstrated its ability to contribute to prosperity in any and all nations willing to avail themselves of its opportunities. The values we impressed upon the original documents of the United Nations not only laid down the guidelines for decent and humane governance, but suggested the approach to policy most likely to relieve suffering and promote general prosperity. These postwar arrangements, which the United States struggled to produce, have created the greatest opportunities for satisfying the wants and needs of mankind that history has yet seen.

A generation of divisive rhetoric and drift has taken its toll on the United States. What is often easy for Americans to forget is that our divisive rhetoric and drift take an even greater toll on other peoples. The fact is that the United States—as a nation, a power, and an idea—is the greatest hope that the world's poor and unprotected peoples have. It is the American people's unmistakable preference that the peoples of the poorer regions of the earth should eventually be liberated—in the true meaning of that word. The United States can do much to help these peoples in their liberation. But we will not be true to our own preferences, or the promise of our system, if we divorce our policies toward the world's poor from the values, institutions, and international economic arrangements which we cherish for ourselves.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Hidden Holocaust

Theodore S. Hamerow

THE extermination of European Jewry during World War II, a carefully guarded secret while it was going on, has since become the most familiar event of that terrible conflict. Not even the crucial military and diplomatic developments from 1939 to 1945—the fall of France, the battle of Stalingrad, the Normandy invasion, the Yalta Conference, or the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima—have aroused greater public interest or attracted more scholarly attention. At the time of the Holocaust, the leaders of the Third Reich regarded it as a harsh yet unavoidable application of eugenic principles essential for racial purity. The Allied statesmen, on the other hand, saw in it a tragedy so piteous that it threatened to divert popular emotions and energies from the prosecution of essential military operations. Hence, for a variety of reasons, the war against the Jews was deliberately obscured as long as it was a contemporary reality. But now that it has become a historic memory, the attention devoted to it seems inexhaustible.

Today the study of the destruction of the Jewish community of Europe has turned into a respectable academic pursuit. There are symposia, colloquia, conferences, and congresses, all seeking to unravel its meaning. It has become part of the course offerings in many colleges and universities. There have even been efforts to require its inclusion in the social-science curriculum of the secondary schools. The number of books dealing with the Holocaust continues to grow, some of them helping to broaden our knowledge, others simply repeating or elaborating the familiar. Public interest, moreover, inspired by more than intellectual curiosity about a receding past, shows no sign of abating. For it is essentially part of a continuing commemoration of an appalling human tragedy, an expression of collective grief at the inexplicable cruelty of an ethnic destiny.

Yet despite the emergence of the Holocaust as a recognized field of historical study, despite the continuing publication of so many documents, articles, and books, what we know about it is still largely confined to those aspects which can be studied on the basis of the German records. That is in a way quite understandable. The Germans, after all, initiated and directed the extermination program. They received support from many sources, to be sure, but they were its prime instigators and leading advocates. Their documents on the Holocaust are therefore the logical starting point for any systematic investigation of its nature and scope.

More than that, those documents are the ones most readily available to scholars. As soon as the war ended, the victorious Allies found themselves in possession of all the written records of the German extermination campaign against the Jews. They at once set to work organizing this documentary material for presentation at the forthcoming trial of war criminals at Nuremberg. Thus its initial use was to vindicate the struggle against the Axis and demonstrate the justice of the Allied cause. It became the most important or at least the most sensational part of the evidence used to convict the leaders of the Third Reich. The documentation supporting such other charges as the violation of international treaties or the infraction of the laws of war seemed pale by comparison. For while there may have been other statesmen in history who had broken their diplomatic promises or disregarded the conventions of civilized warfare, who else had systematically killed some six million people because of their ethnic or racial origin? This was something quite new.

Once the German documents on the Holocaust had served the primary purpose of helping to convict the leaders of the Third Reich, they were made available to scholars studying the destruction of European Jewry. During the immediate postwar years they remained in the possession of the Allied powers, who saw no good reason to discourage research on the most grisly chapter of World War II. But even after the restoration of German sovereignty, when the records of the Nazi regime were returned to the custody of its two successor states—mostly the Federal Republic of Germany, but partly also the German Democratic Republic—the documentary material pertaining to the Holocaust remained accessible to historians from all nations. In both Germanys, East as well

THEODORE S. HAMEROW is professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and the author of *The Birth of a New Europe: State and Society in the 19th Century*, among other books. His article, "Cravat Jews and Caftan Jews," appeared in our May 1984 issue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as West, there has been not only an official acknowledgment of the crimes committed by the Third Reich, but a willingness to reveal them in all their appalling detail.

The readiness of the Germans to face up to the implications of the genocide committed in their name should not be exaggerated, to be sure. Anyone traveling in Central Europe will soon discover, if he is interested, that there are those who still maintain that the horrors of the Holocaust have been overstated, or that they should be balanced by the atrocities perpetrated against the Germans after the war, or even that they did not really occur at all. Such views are still more common among some German émigré circles in the New World. But this should in no way detract from the recognition that leading politicians, prominent intellectuals, and distinguished scholars in Germany have almost without exception acknowledged the responsibility of their nation for the destruction of European Jewry. More than that, German historians have been among the leaders in the investigation of the crimes committed by National Socialism. Has anyone done more to reveal the cruelty and brutality of genocide than the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich? The willingness of the Germans to study what is surely the most shameful chapter in their history represents a form of moral courage deserving recognition.

Yet they have also thereby unwittingly fostered a one-sided and incomplete view of the destruction of European Jewry. Since the German documentation is so easily available and the German language so widely understood, our knowledge of the Holocaust has come to be based largely on the official records of the Third Reich. All the familiar features of the historical image of the extermination program—segregation and ghettoization, the death squads, the Wannsee Conference, the deportations, the concentration camps, the gas chambers, and the crematories—are derived primarily from the archival documents of Nazi Germany. That image, to be sure, is not inaccurate or unimportant. Indeed, it is bound to remain the basis for any future understanding of the "Final Solution." But it is by now as vivid and detailed as it is likely to become. So many scholars have gone through the German materials that there is little left to discover and explore. Here and there some bit of evidence, some fragment of information, some obscure incident may still lie unknown among the records of the Third Reich. But by and large, we have learned as much about the Holocaust from the documentary data in Germany as we will in all probability ever learn. Further research is only likely to produce findings which are either marginal or repetitious.

EVEN more serious, the preoccupation of Holocaust studies with the historical records in the German archives has tended to obscure the participation of other peoples in the destruction of European Jewry. The willingness of the Germans to accept responsibility for genocide has diverted scholarly attention from the complicity of many non-Germans. To say this is not to deny the primary role of the Third Reich in the extermination program. But it does imply that, having learned so much about what the Germans did, we should begin to look more closely at those non-Germans who were once willing participants in the Holocaust, but who now prefer not to dwell on their collaboration.

That such collaboration was widespread is clear. Any consideration of the Holocaust as simply an organizational problem, as an exercise in logistics, suggests that the Germans must have had many highly efficient assistants. How else could some six million people, who knew or suspected what fate awaited them, and who therefore sought in every possible way to avoid capture, be rounded up, confined, deported, and killed? A task of such magnitude required a considerable commitment of manpower and equipment. Yet the documentary evidence shows that the number of Germans available to carry out the policies of the Third Reich in occupied Europe was surprisingly small.

Only about 2,000 German officials of various ranks administered the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, enforcing not only measures against the Jews, but supervising other functions of government as well. In all of France there were no more than three battalions of German police, somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 men. Isolated, often distrusted, unable to communicate easily with the local population, unfamiliar with the country in which they were stationed, they could not by their own efforts have performed the numerous tasks which their superiors in Berlin had assigned to them. The deportation of Hungarian Jews to the death camps in 1944 was carried out at a time when the German authorities had only 150 to 200 SS men to evacuate some 400,000 people. In Poland the liquidation of the ghettos in the final stages of the extermination program was accomplished by no more than a few thousand members of the security forces. They were supported by between 10,000 and 15,000 German police, but the latter, responsible also for requisitioning harvests and impressing workers in the *Generalgouvernement*, could offer only intermittent help in the deportation of Jews. The entire network of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*, the Main Office for Reich Security, which had prime responsibility for waging the extermination campaign, comprised fewer than 70,000 people. Thus the ratio of Jewish victims to German organizers of the Holocaust was about 100 to 1.

This remarkable level of efficiency was admittedly due in part to the cooperation of other organizations and institutions of the Third Reich: the *Wehrmacht*, the police system, the diplomatic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

corps, and the civil service. But even more important was the assistance provided by local authorities and private individuals in the countries allied with or occupied by Germany. Without their collaboration, the terrible effectiveness of the Holocaust would have been impossible. For by their own efforts the Germans, despite all determination and ruthlessness, could not have come so close to achieving their deadly purpose. In many cases what the Jews needed to survive was not even the active help of their non-Jewish countrymen but simply their inaction, their willingness to look the other way, their refusal to participate in the hunt for victims of official persecution. Yet in fact the Third Reich was able to count on considerable support in most parts of Europe for its genocidal policies.

After the war Adolf Eichmann described the attitude of the non-German officials with whom he had dealt. "In general, I found that there were fewer problems with local authorities the farther East you went," he recalled in the "confession" published shortly before his execution. In Rumania, for example, operations went off without a hitch: "Eager to strike against the parasites, the Rumanians astonishingly enough liquidated thousands and thousands of their own Jews." The situation in Slovakia was similar: "Slovakian officials offered their Jews to us like someone throwing away sour beer." Edmund Veesenmayer, the German plenipotentiary in Budapest, likewise testified at his postwar trial that the "Jewish plan" met with the complete approval of the authorities in Hungary: "The Hungarian government issued orders and laws about it, and the entire execution lay only with the Hungarians themselves. That clearly outlined the Hungarian attitude." In any case, he maintained, the staff of the SS was so small that without the cooperation of the Hungarians nothing could have been accomplished.

THE testimony of those charged in the postwar years with crimes against humanity is admittedly open to question. Eager to exculpate themselves by spreading and diluting responsibility for anti-Semitic measures, they may have exaggerated the complicity of others. But their claim that the destruction of the Jewish community had considerable support throughout Europe is supported not only by contemporary German documents but by the subsequent declarations of many survivors of the extermination campaign. This aspect of the Holocaust has not been entirely ignored, to be sure, but it has been to a considerable extent obscured. While scholars have been sifting and combing the German archives, the records of other countries pertaining to their wartime attitude toward the Jews have remained largely untouched. Yet they must contain historical materials, whether statements of policy or expressions of opinion, which could prove of major importance for an understanding of the destruction of European Jewry. They must include not only government papers and official reports, but newspapers, periodicals, books, pamphlets, diaries, and letters as well as the depositions, written or oral, of people who lived through those terrible years. Here is where the future of Holocaust studies lies.

The attempt to examine and evaluate these materials will not be easy, however. There is first of all the language problem. Most scholars know French and German, often also Italian and Spanish, sometimes even Russian. But what about Polish, Rumanian, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Latvian, and Lithuanian? Even more important, there has been tacit discouragement by government authorities, especially in the East, of research into the participation of non-Germans in the Holocaust. The official attitude has been that the Third Reich, with its hunger for military conquest and its belief in racial superiority, oppressed all the peoples of Europe, Jews and non-Jews alike. The former may have been treated with special cruelty, but what could the latter do? They were forced to look on in silent sorrow at the agony of their Jewish compatriots.

This attitude, which remained generally unchallenged for almost a generation, was expressed most eloquently before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg by Deputy Chief Prosecutor Edgar Faure, who a few years later became prime minister of France:

> I shall not speak in any detailed way about the great sufferings which people classified as Jews experienced in France and in the other countries in Western Europe, . . . I would simply like to mention that it was also a source of great suffering to all the other inhabitants of those countries to witness the abominable treatment which was inflicted on the Jews. All Frenchmen felt profound distress at seeing the persecution of other Frenchmen like themselves, many of whom had earned the gratitude of the fatherland.

The sympathy of the French, moreover, was not restricted to French Jews:

> Frenchmen experienced the same revulsion and the same sadness with regard to the persecutions which affected Jews who were not Frenchmen, foreign Jews and those who were called stateless, because we thought that these men, even if they were not Frenchmen, were men like ourselves, who had also had a nationality and had lost it only because the Nazi abominations had started in their country before the moment when they had been able to start in France.

Indeed, according to Faure, not only Frenchmen were appalled at the cruelty inflicted by Germans on Jews: "The feelings which I have just described from the point of view of the French were naturally experienced by all the inhabitants

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the other occupied countries." The Holocaust was thus a crime which National Socialism and National Socialism alone had committed before a horrified Europe.

This remained the accepted view of the destruction of the Jewish community for nearly thirty years after World War II. But then the comfortable myths and fictions began to dissolve, particularly in the West, under the challenge of a younger generation. As early as 1965, Jacob Presser, himself a survivor of the Holocaust, wrote *The Destruction of the Dutch Jews*, a critical account emphasizing the indifference or even hostility which many Dutchmen displayed toward their Jewish countrymen. During the years which followed, a substantial revisionist literature began to emerge, comprising not only works of scholarship like the illuminating study, *Vichy France and the Jews*, by Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, but documents, memoirs, novels, plays, and films. By now the charge that large numbers of non-Germans supported and participated in the annihilation of the Jewish community has been reluctantly acknowledged even by conservative politicians and apologist historians in Western Europe. There are still many important questions to be answered, but at least the broad outlines of what happened are no longer obscure.

In the East, on the other hand, the accepted attitude has remained largely unchanged. Both the proponents of the new Communist order and its critics, both those who have stayed in the old country and those who have emigrated, all continue to maintain that the Holocaust was the work of those awful Germans, supported perhaps occasionally by a few lackeys and traitors. But, they insist, the great majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Europe remained opposed to the anti-Semitic program forced on them by the Third Reich. Indeed, they did all they could to help the persecuted Jews. Yet now those ingrates—sometimes stronger expletives are used—are repaying the kindness shown them during the war with calumny. Charges of popular support for the extermination campaign are usually dismissed in the official press as "bourgeois defamation," "Zionist propaganda," or "anti-Polonist bias."

A more conciliatory tone, however, can also be heard from time to time. The Jews and the non-Jews of the East, some well-intentioned peacemakers maintain, were distinct peoples with a separate culture but a common history. They may have had their differences, but in view of the tragedy which they suffered together, would it not be best to put those differences behind them? What will be gained by renewing ancient grievances, by reopening old wounds? The time has come to bury the past, to achieve the reconciliation of communities and cultures too long divided by senseless animosities. As for the Holocaust, it was only one of the many atrocities committed by fascist tyranny against all the peoples of Europe.

Still, the reconciliation of hostile nationalities, however desirable, cannot be based on polite, expedient ambiguity. It must arise out of an acknowledgment of unpleasant historical truth. And the truth is that the extermination of the Jews of Europe was to a considerable extent made possible by the support of those among whom they lived. Although a great deal of research into this aspect of the Holocaust remains to be done, enough is known to prove spurious the familiar picture of a shocked continent recoiling from Nazi horror. The reality is more complex and less edifying. For there can no longer be any doubt that the Germans found numerous supporters for their anti-Semitic program throughout the continent, including the liberal states of the West.

For example, the Dutch underground newspaper *De Geus*, edited by a group of students at Leyden University, reported with regret that even among those who resisted the occupation there was considerable hostility toward the Jews: "Many good patriots unknowingly help the Germans carry out their anti-Jewish measures, the first aim of which is to accentuate the separation between Jews and non-Jews." They too seemed to believe that "bad qualities are much more frequent among Jews than among non-Jews." That numerous Dutchmen, "good patriots apart from this," felt this way and yet pretended to adopt lofty principles "is a sorry symptom of the extent to which our feelings of decency and justice have been blunted by the injustice we are experiencing every day."

A case in point was the Dutch clergyman who had been arrested for giving shelter to Jews, and who yet expressed views about them with which not even an ardent Nazi would have quarreled: "They are completely different from us, they are of a different kind, in type a different race. One is conscious of this as soon as one comes into contact with them." There was good reason to speak of "Jewish tricks." Jews were indeed "importunate and domineering," so that "we always had to be on our guard against them in business." They were often, moreover, "incalculable and unreliable" and "pretty well unbearable." Such was the atmosphere of distrust and hostility in which the Jews of the Low Countries struggled to survive during the German occupation.

The situation in France was similar. In the aftermath of defeat, amid mounting hardships and privations, the Jews frequently became a nuisance, a burden, an object of dislike or resentment. In the rural districts, especially in the Southwest, there was strong feeling about the "abuses" attributed to Jewish refugees. As the deportation of alien Jews from the unoccupied zone began in the late summer of 1942, the inhabitants "have not hidden their satisfaction at this departure," according to a government report from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ariège. The prefects of the departments of Aude, Creuse, Gers, Indre, Loiret, Lozère, and Saône-et-Loire confirmed that relief outweighed disapproval at the expulsion of the Jews. Indeed, around Limoges their presence aroused opposition as late as 1944, the prefect of Haute-Vienne discovered. So much for Faure's confident declaration two years later at Nuremberg that all Frenchmen felt "revulsion and . . . sadness with regard to the persecutions which affected Jews who were not Frenchmen, foreign Jews and those who were called stateless."

Less is known about wartime popular attitudes toward the Jews in the East, the classic region of European anti-Semitism, for there the complete picture cannot be reconstructed until all the libraries and archives are opened to students of the Holocaust. But enough has been learned from German documents and survivors' accounts to establish beyond question that the extermination program found widespread support. Within a few days after the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Germans on June 22, 1941, there were spontaneous massacres carried out by local anti-Semites in many of the areas which the advancing *Wehrmacht* occupied. Lithuanians killed 3,800 Jews in Kovno, Ukrainians 7,000 in Lvov, and Rumanians at least 7,000 in Jassy. Not even the worst czarist pogroms had achieved slaughter on such a massive scale.

The Germans looked on approvingly at these demonstrations that they were not the only ones favoring a "Final Solution" to the Jewish problem. "It was desirable that the [German] Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning," wrote one high SS officer. "It had to be shown that the native population took the first initiative by way of reaction to several decades of suppression by the Jews and against the terror recently exercised by the Communists." Yet although the zeal of the local anti-Semites was commendable, their technique was sometimes sloppy. According to a German bulletin, "There would be nothing to say against numerous executions of Jews, if it were not that the technical preparation and the method of execution are defective. The Rumanians leave the executed people where they have fallen without burying them."

While many Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Rumanians regarded the Germans as allies or liberators, to the Poles, the first victims of Nazi aggression, they were nothing but brutal oppressors. There was no sympathy for the Third Reich anywhere in Poland. Yet there too hostility toward the Jews, who had to endure an even more cruel persecution than the Poles, was widespread. The underground press of all the political parties from the Center to the far Right, with their various affiliated civilian and military organizations, supported the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Germans. These groups published approximately 300 illegal newspapers —not counting booklets and pamphlets—which, from the first day of the occupation to the last, waged an unrelenting campaign against the Jews. In this regard they were indistinguishable, either in form or content, from the official Polish press controlled by the German authorities. Both often saw in physical extermination a satisfactory solution to the Jewish problem in Poland.

Is it any wonder then that the Holocaust, the details of which were widely known throughout the *Generalgouvernement*, aroused little popular revulsion? Indeed, Prince Christopher Radziwill, who had been a prisoner in the Maidanek concentration camp, recalled later that the execution there of 11,000 Jewish men and 6,000 Jewish women on November 3, 1943, the largest single massacre of World War II, was greeted by some Poles with open rejoicing: "I will never forget the day that the Nazis killed 17,000 Jews at Maidanek while I was in another part of that concentration camp. That evening many of my Polish fellow prisoners got drunk to celebrate. That's terrible. But it's true." The sufferings which the peoples of Eastern Europe had to endure only seemed to intensify their traditional hostility toward the Jews.

To say this is in no way to deny that there were thousands of people—the exact number will never be known—women as well as men, most of them ordinary and obscure, who risked their lives to help Jews. They are the true heroes of the resistance to Nazi tyranny. For they found not only the physical courage to face the terrible punishment for disobeying the Germans, but the moral strength to withstand the ethnic animosity of their own countrymen. Where did they get that strength? Was it religious faith which instilled in them a feeling of compassion, which taught them that they should do to others what they would have others do to them? Or was it adherence to some secular standard of conduct, to some civic ideology, to freedom and justice, to democracy, to socialism? Or was it simply an instinctive, inarticulate belief in the essential oneness of mankind, in the mystical sanctity of human life? Here is another enigma of the Holocaust waiting to be solved. In any case, the existence of these people attests to the capacity of man's nature for humaneness and decency even under the most terrible circumstances.

It is nevertheless clear that for every one who helped the Jews there were several who persecuted them—through humiliation, exploitation, blackmail, brutality, and sometimes murder. And then there was the largest group of all, those who witnessed the Holocaust in silence and indifference, not participating in its cruelty but doing nothing to alleviate it. They went about their ordinary business, trying to survive, living from day to day, ignoring the horror around them. It may have been unrealistic to expect more.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To be sure, the attitude of the peoples of Europe to the destruction of the Jewish community cannot be separated from their attitude to the German occupation. It has by now been established that the traditional image, carefully fostered during the postwar period, of a continent groaning under the Nazi yoke, yearning for liberation, is in large part fictitious. There were indeed those who resisted the Germans, often at a terrible cost. But there were also others who took a different view of what was happening to their society. Countries like Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland became willing allies of the Third Reich, hoping to be rewarded with substantial territorial gains. Various discontented nationalities, moreover, who had lost or never had independence—Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Croats—sought to achieve statehood with the assistance of National Socialism. For many of them Germany was a friend and protector.

Even in countries which had fought against the Third Reich, the period of the occupation intensified prewar divisions between opposing civic ideologies and social interests to the advantage of the Germans. The shock of defeat encouraged in such democratic nations as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway the growth of political groups favoring, for one reason or another, an accommodation to the new order. There were first of all those who had displayed fascist sympathies even in peacetime, the admirers and imitators of National Socialism. More numerous were conservatives of various schools—royalists, clericals, corporatists, and jingoists—who maintained that defeat, however painful to national pride, had finally put an end to a corrupt parliamentary regime and made possible the return to sound principles of authority. There were still others who had espoused liberal doctrines before the war, but who now concluded that cooperation with Germany was the only means of salvaging something out of military defeat. And then there were the opportunists pure and simple, people without strong political convictions of their own, who decided that the best way to get ahead in a world dominated by the Third Reich was by collaborating with the winners.

The resistance against the Germans was also an uneasy coalition of distinct political groups with diverse ideological loyalties—liberals, trade unionists, socialists, Communists, anarchists, and nationalists—held together only by a common opposition to Nazi oppression. Most Europeans, however, were neither collaborators nor resisters. They simply went on with their everyday lives, now leaning one way, now the other—depending on the fortunes of war—but interested above all in self-preservation.

Differences between those who supported and those who opposed collaboration reflected to a large extent differences in their political philosophy and social position. To put it another way, World War II was a period not only of military but civil conflict in European society. The collaborators were in most cases men ideologically on the Right, who had long warned against the danger of growing class antagonism and social unrest, maintaining that parliamentary government with its multiplicity of parties and interests could not provide an enduring system of authority. The resistance, on the other hand, drew its strength primarily from the political Center and Left, from those who had espoused economic reform and social equality before the war, and who now promised their achievement as soon as liberation had been won.

Throughout the continent, in other words, deep-seated ideological differences and class divisions helped shape popular attitudes toward the Third Reich. To many collaborators the German occupation was not an unmitigated disaster. It led to the introduction of policies and measures which they themselves had advocated. It put an end to the danger of a Communist uprising, halting the Bolshevization of the lower classes. It stabilized the relationship between capital and labor by restricting the right to organize and strike. Above all, it imposed a new respect for law and order on society, a new sense of discipline.

There were of course many aspects of the occupation which aroused resentment among all classes and parties, but others seemed tolerable or even reasonable. Opinions regarding Hitler's new order were thus much more varied than was usually admitted after the war.

The Holocaust should accordingly be seen in the context of the general attitude of the peoples of Europe toward the program of the Third Reich. The campaign against the Jews was clearly among the less objectionable aspects of that program; indeed, in parts of the continent it enjoyed considerable popularity. But here too the willingness of many non-Germans to cooperate in the destruction of the Jewish community arose out of prewar anti-Semitism. The collaborators who shared the views of National Socialism regarding political power and social stability usually also endorsed its doctrines of racial or ethnic purity. To them, European Jewry personified the process of modernization which was transforming their society at the expense of traditional attitudes and values. Such people saw the Jews not only as leading advocates of liberalism, with its fragmentation of established authority and its promotion of private interest, but as radical agitators, rabblerousers, preaching class violence and social revolution. They felt that the rapacity of the Jews promoted economic competitiveness and financial manipulation, destroying the world of small shops and family businesses; that their pushiness undermined a historic hier-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

archy of classes and interests, helping to create a competitive, dog-eat-dog social order. Finally, the Jews always seemed to favor intellectual fads and artistic innovations, scorning accepted tastes and customary standards. Such views regarding the role of the Jews could be found in varying degrees in all countries before 1939.

The war intensified the undercurrent of anti-Semitism. At a time when the old order, which had generally managed to restrain popular ethnic animosities, was disintegrating, when its conventions and civilities were collapsing under the weight of military defeat, the Jews came to be perceived as also responsible for the misfortunes which Europe was now suffering. They were seen as the ones who had provoked the war in the first place, hoping to profit from the misery of the Gentiles. And, it was said, the Jews were the ones who, by hoarding, speculating, and black-marketeering, were causing the shortage of consumer goods; while others had to endure privation, they managed to live in secret luxury. Worse still, it was claimed that the Jews were in sympathy with the enemy, engaging in treasonable activity against countries which had generously offered them a haven. They were busy spreading false rumors and defeatist propaganda. Indeed, they were in contact with the Soviets or the British, providing them with military information. All the hardships and privations of a continent at war were, directly or indirectly, their fault.

The more remote from reality this perception became, as the Jews were segregated, despoiled, deported, and killed, the stronger grew the belief that they were in fact becoming more wealthy and powerful. Many of those who witnessed the Holocaust saw not the systematic extermination of millions of helpless people, but the struggle of the nations of Europe against a cunning, ruthless enemy. Only his total destruction, they were convinced, could save them from his merciless grip.

This attitude toward the Jews, rooted in prewar anti-Semitism but exacerbated by wartime experience, helps explain the deadly effectiveness of the Holocaust. Since the number of Germans engaged in the extermination campaign was small, a few thousand at most in each of the countries allied with or occupied by the Third Reich, they had to depend to a large extent on the cooperation of non-Germans. This meant first of all the willingness of the local bureaucracy to assist in the segregation and deportation of the Jews. In many countries, particularly in the East, the authorities were traditionally anti-Semitic, so that there was little need to persuade them of the desirability of solving the "Jewish question" once and for all. But even where the bureaucracy was relatively free of ethnic prejudice, where it simply acted on the principle that "orders are orders," the results were almost equally deadly.

It is not surprising, for example, that 90 percent of the Jewish population was killed in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; 83 percent in Slovakia; and 70 percent in Hungary. In those countries police officials and civil servants did not require much urging to participate in the hunt for Jews. Yet even in Bohemia and Moravia, where there was a strong liberal tradition, little anti-Semitic paranoia, and even less sympathy for the Third Reich, some 350,000 Czech bureaucrats faithfully continued to perform their duties under the supervision of fewer than 2,000 Germans, with the result that 89 percent of the Jewish population perished during the war, almost the same proportion as in Germany and Austria.

Where the local bureaucracy refused to cooperate in the Holocaust, on the other hand, the outcome was as a rule dramatically different. Italy was the first fascist country in Europe and Hitler's oldest ally. Yet the authorities stubbornly resisted all attempts to enlist their aid in the war against the Jews. There was procrastination, dissimulation, equivocation, and sometimes open defiance, not only in their own country but in the parts of France, Yugoslavia, and Greece occupied by their armies. Thanks to their noncooperation, about 80 percent of the Italian Jews survived the extermination campaign.

In France, the government took the more expedient position that while it would agree to the deportation of alien Jews, it insisted on retaining jurisdiction over native-born Jewish citizens. The result was that the latter suffered relatively minor losses, but even the former could often be saved where local authorities became lax in enforcing the measures against them. During the summer and fall of 1942, when the French police and bureaucracy dutifully assisted in the task, almost 43,000 Jews were deported to their death, perhaps a third of them at the initiative of the Vichy regime. But in 1943, when the government began to drag its feet as the fortunes of war shifted, the number of deportees dropped to 22,000, although the Germans were now in control of the entire country. And after the last participation of the French police in a roundup in January 1944, fewer than 13,000 Jews were sent East, despite feverish efforts by the occupation authorities to increase the deportations. Reflecting on the significance of these figures, Marrus and Paxton write that "one can only speculate on how many fewer would have perished if the Nazis had been obliged to identify, arrest, and transport without any French assistance every Jew in France whom they wanted to slaughter."

Even more illuminating is the case of Bulgaria. There the authorities decided that Jews living within the prewar boundaries of the state should be protected, but those in the newly acquired parts of Macedonia and Thrace were to be handed over to the Germans. The results underscore the crucial role of the non-German bureau-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cracy in the Holocaust. Of the 14,000 Jews in the regions annexed by Bulgaria during the war, almost all were deported and never returned. Of the 50,000 living in Bulgaria proper, on the other hand, almost all survived. Thus the evidence that the collaboration of the local administrative system was essential for the success of the extermination campaign appears irrefutable.

THE attitude of the native population proved of almost equal importance. Where public opinion was sympathetic toward the Jews, where there was widespread revulsion against the Holocaust, the level of destruction remained significantly lower than where popular anti-Semitism prevailed. In some countries, even where local authorities seemed to acquiesce in the war against the Jews, underground organizations and individual citizens would often provide food, clothing, forged documents, or help in crossing the frontier. An obvious case in point is Denmark, whose Jewish community was saved by a voluntary and spontaneous rescue operation involving almost the entire population. It was the most heartening example of resistance against the tyranny of the Third Reich. In Italy and in France as well there were numerous instances of courageous, compassionate men and women risking their own safety to help the victims of racial persecution.

In many other countries, however, especially in the East, pervasive prejudice made the task of the Germans much easier. There every Jew knew that even if he succeeded in escaping from the ghetto or the labor camp, he was likely to encounter blackmail, exploitation, betrayal, or even death at the hands of local anti-Semites. At best he would probably be told to go away before the police were summoned. Only here and there could he find help, all the more remarkable because it was so rare. Prince Radziwill, recalling the war years, described the common Polish attitude with diplomatic restraint, but his meaning was unmistakable: "The Nazi mass killings of Jews had a very bad effect in Poland. Once Poles knew it was that easy to kill Jews, the tendency and temptation was there." No aspect of the Holocaust is more tragic than the hatred with which so many victims of Nazi oppression regarded other victims.

Indifference could often prove as deadly to Jews as hostility. The Czechs, for example, were relatively free of ethnic bias, at least in comparison with most peoples of Eastern or Central Europe. Yet although many of them agreed to accept "non-Aryan" property for "safekeeping," instances of effective help in saving lives were less frequent. Only some 400 Jews in Bohemia and Moravia out of a total of 90,000 survived the war in hiding, a proportion no higher and perhaps lower than even in Germany. The Dutch had long prided themselves on their religious tolerance, especially toward Jews, and a large Jewish community had in fact lived among them for centuries in peace and security. Once World War II came, however, even their traditional humaneness began to erode. Although there was a strong resistance movement in the Netherlands, the willingness of the population to assist those hunted by the occupation authorities varied considerably depending on their ethnic origin. According to calculations published after the war, an "Aryan" had five-and-one-half times as much chance of finding shelter as a Jew. Even in Western Europe, then, popular anti-Semitism contributed substantially to the effectiveness of the extermination campaign.

YET not all of those participating in the Holocaust directly or indirectly were motivated by ethnic hatred. Some acted simply out of privation or greed, hoping to alleviate the misery of a cruel military occupation at the expense of their defenseless neighbors. When the Jews in the Netherlands were ordered to move to Amsterdam so that they could be kept under closer surveillance, the German authorities received numerous requests from non-Jews for the homes being vacated. They are not very edifying, as a rule. "The Jew [identified by name in the document] still living at [address of his residence] is married to an Aryan woman with a small daughter," wrote one applicant. This Jew, moreover, had sold much of his furniture, although that was prohibited, so that his house was now almost empty. "We have not been very successful in getting them out, because the wife is not a Jewess. But ought not such people be treated as Jews?" The writer concluded with an appeal for help: "In any case, I hope that, whatever her position, you will be able to do something for us." At the same time a middle-aged housewife reported in her diary: "I and Truus went over some Jewish homes, but there was little to get—all the essentials had gone, including underclothes and linen. The next-door neighbors had got there first; all I could find were a few trifles and Truus got a pedal-car and some other toys."

There were of course also those who felt repelled by this sight of mass avarice and pillage. "If you watch these compassionate and neighborly Christians," wrote a young Dutch typist indignantly, "swooping down like vultures and seizing everything they can get their hooks on, it makes your heart sick. All they can think of is what they can grab. No one spares a thought for the poor Jews. . . . At times like these you discover what human nature is really like." Yet even some who condemned the spoliation of Jewish property were not always able to resist temptation. "The worst thing is that you learn things about yourself," confessed one of them:

> For even while you are judging the others, you discover that in many ways you are no better yourself. In fact you are just like them, you too put aside all scruples when it serves your turn. There are only too few who are steadfast and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who stick to their principles, come what may. And I'm certain that I'm not one of them, much as I would like to be. And that is the worst of it all, to know that you are no better than those you so readily condemn.

The experience of total war had largely undermined the foundation of decencies and civilities on which prewar society had rested.

More saddening still was the behavior of those who turned against the Jews not out of envy or cupidity but sheer hatred. The true anti-Semite was motivated by more than the hope of eliminating Jewish competition or acquiring Jewish property. He did not simply seek to end Jewish influence in economics or politics, in society or culture. To him Jewry was the embodiment of some terrible, unknown danger, all the more frightening because it could not be clearly perceived or fully explained. The Jew was a cunning sorcerer, a leering incubus, a vampire sucking the lifeblood out of innocent Christians. It was not enough to deprive him of his ill-gotten wealth and segregate him from the community which he had so mercilessly exploited. He had to be destroyed. There was no other way to end the evil which he personified. His destruction, however, was in no sense an act of cruelty. It was simply a harsh yet unavoidable means of self-preservation; it was the only effective safeguard of the moral values and cultural traditions of European society.

This is what Eichmann meant when he insisted after the war that he had not become an enemy of Jewry out of expediency or even out of some abstract principle of racial superiority. "I am no anti-Semite," he declared. "I was just politically opposed to Jews because they were stealing the breath of life from us." It was this conviction that the Jews "were stealing the breath of life" from the non-Jews which motivated the most dedicated participants in the extermination campaign. Seeing themselves as warriors in a life-and-death struggle for the survival of their people, they refused to be moved or mollified or bribed. Their deadly zeal, strengthened by the collaboration of many others acting on more expedient considerations, was responsible for the extermination of some six million people during World War II.

THE widespread hostility against the Jews helps explain their own attitude toward the Holocaust. It accounts in part for the passivity, resignation, or helpless terror with which so many of them met death. Why did they not rebel against their fate? Why did they not attack their persecutors, realizing that resistance was hopeless, but at least making them pay a price for their cruelty? Why did they cooperate in their own destruction by serving as councilors, officials, and policemen in the administration of the ghettos, obediently carrying out the orders of the Germans? Could they not, by fighting back or through passive resistance, have enabled at least a few to escape to the safety of distant forests and mountains?

Questions such as these were in fact asked during the Holocaust itself. The historian Emmanuel Ringelblum, after witnessing the mass deportations from the Warsaw ghetto in the summer of 1942, wondered in his notes why the Jews had yielded so meekly to the tragedy overwhelming them. "Why didn't we resist when they began to resettle 300,000 Jews from Warsaw?" he wrote in October. "Why did we allow ourselves to be led like sheep to the slaughter? Why did everything come so easy to the enemy? Why didn't the hangmen suffer a single casualty? Why could 50 SS men (some people say fewer), with the help of a division of some 200 Ukrainian guards and an equal numbers of Letts, carry the operations out so smoothly?" A few weeks later he returned to the subject. Again according to his notes:

> Whomever you talk to, you hear the same cry: the resettlement should never have been permitted. We should have run out into the street, have set fire to everything in sight, have torn down the walls, and escaped to the Other Side. The Germans would have taken their revenge. It would have cost tens of thousands of lives, but not 300,000. Now we are ashamed of ourselves, disgraced in our own eyes, and in the eyes of the world, where our docility earned us nothing.

There were thus some Jews during the Holocaust who, rejecting the submissiveness of the majority, urged defiance and resistance even under the most hopeless circumstances.

The questions they asked were raised still more insistently after the war. Looking back at the tragic fate which had befallen the Jews of Europe, some observers began to express doubt about their behavior in the face of danger. Why had they been the only ones among the peoples oppressed by Nazi tyranny who were unable to organize an effective resistance movement? Why had they not met their death with greater courage? Why had they not displayed more of the dignity and steadfastness which posterity expects of its martyrs? Why had they not played more convincingly the role of heroes for which destiny had chosen them? There was an implicit reproach in these questions, a faint suggestion that the dead had somehow failed the living.

In her report on the Eichmann trial, for instance, Hannah Arendt described the central issue troubling the hushed, crowded courtroom in Jerusalem: "The contrast between Israeli heroism and the submissive meekness with which Jews went to their death—arriving on time at the transportation points, walking on their own feet to the places of execution, digging ther own graves, undressing and making neat piles of their clothing, and lying down side by side to be shot—seemed a fine point." Indeed, the prosecutor kept asking one witness after another: "Why did you not pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

test? Why did you board the train? Fifteen thousand people were standing there and hundreds of guards facing you—why didn't you revolt and charge and attack?" In view of the militancy displayed by Jews in the Middle East, their readiness to acquiesce in the Holocaust seemed not only puzzling but demeaning.

THOSE dealing with this problem have generally offered two kinds of explanations. The first maintains that the long, bitter experience of the Diaspora had taught the Jews to accept misfortune with resignation. Their history as an alien and despised minority had discouraged overt opposition to oppression; it had fostered the belief that the response to the world's injustice should be prayer, humility, patience, and sometimes cajolery. Their traditional passivity had thus rendered them incapable of effective resistance in the hour of their greatest peril. How could they have realized that the strategy of docility which had enabled them to survive almost two thousand years of persecution would prove ineffectual in dealing with the barbarity of National Socialism?

This is the reason advanced in Raul Hilberg's authoritative account, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, for the abandonment by the residents of the Lodz ghetto—on the strength of assurances from the German administrator Hans Biebow—of plans for a sit-down strike, when they learned in the summer of 1944 that they were to be deported. "For the Jews of Poland resistance was not merely a matter of digging fortifications and procuring arms; resistance required in the first instance a shake-up of the entire institutional structure of the community and a reversal of ancient thought processes." The Jews in Lodz, however, could not break with a historical pattern under which they had lived for so many centuries. "That was why the flight into fantasy, the false hopes, the voice of Biebow, were more assuring to them than the new and untried path into violent, desperate self-defense." Only the Jewry of Warsaw finally turned from compliance to resistance, but by then more than 300,000 lives had been lost and the uprising itself could therefore be easily crushed. "It came too late to change the fundamental reaction pattern; it was too feeble to interfere with German plans." Those who perished in the Holocaust were thus partly victims of their own tragic history.

There are other writers, however, who dispute the view that by their docility the Jews themselves contributed to their destruction. To say so, they insist, is an affront to the memory of the brave men and women who died in defense of their people. The contention of these scholars is that there was in fact an organized, effective resistance by the Jewish community which has been largely ignored or at least underestimated. Therefore the true task of the historian of the Holocaust is not to explain Jewish passivity but to commemorate Jewish heroism. "The active resistance of the Jews against the Nazis was also much greater than most people think," argues Benzion Dinur of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. "There were many aspects of this activity: a Jewish underground; considerable Jewish participation in the partisan movements that fought the Nazis in all countries, as well as a separate Jewish partisan movement; and revolts in the ghettos, of which the revolt in the Warsaw ghetto was the largest and most famous." Besides, the fate of the enslaved Jews of Axis Europe inspired their co-religionists in the Allied armies to fight against the Third Reich with greater boldness and determination.

The theme of courageous Jewry defying tyranny appears even more prominently in Meyer Barkai's foreword to a documentary collection entitled *The Fighting Ghettos*. The name suggests its argument. "Though it flourished heroically throughout the Second World War, the Jewish resistance movement in Europe was overshadowed for many years by other events." But then scholarly research, after disclosing to the world that six million Jews had perished in gas chambers, experimental hospitals, and crematories, "also began to reveal a record of militant defense concurrent with the period of suffering and destruction." The history of the Jewish underground emerged slowly, "from the Nazis, from the tales of survivors, and, above all, from the diaries, notes, and poems of those who lived and died in the ghettos, concentration camps, and forests."

The achievements of this resistance movement should be recorded in full, for "the thousands of underground fighters, most of whom died in battle," won a "decisive spiritual victory." Though unable to save the defenseless Jews of Europe, they were "directly responsible for the temporal victory that established the modern state of Israel." They overcame "every humiliation, every kind of persecution, that the enemy could inflict." They did not go to their death meekly; they demanded "a heavy toll of enemy lives" in return for their own. They were "heroic people" who wrote "another glorious chapter in the history of the Jews." The creation of Israel is a testament to the victory of these descendants of the Maccabees. Barkai concludes with a ringing peroration: "Never again will the ghetto walls be rebuilt; never again will Jews permit themselves to be imprisoned like cattle. Militant defense, not only of beliefs, but of a homeland, has permanently replaced passive resistance to oppression."

Defiant rhetoric of this sort, however, is more appropriate to the struggles and achievements of the postwar period than to the tragic realities of the Holocaust. While there was indeed resistance by Jews against Nazi oppression, it proved nearly as ineffectual as docile submission. To say this does not detract in any way from the dedication

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and courage of those who participated in it. But the odds against them were simply too great.

After the revolt of the Warsaw ghetto in 1943, for example, the most important Jewish uprising of the war, the German commander reported that his losses came to 16 dead and 85 wounded, including the casualties suffered by his non-German allies. Among the Jews, on the other hand, several thousand were buried in the debris, and some 56,000 surrendered. Of these, 7,000 were shot, another 7,000 were sent to the concentration camp at Treblinka, some 15,000 went to the extermination center in Lublin, and the rest ended up in various labor camps. In Galicia, sporadic opposition by Jewish underground organizations resulted in losses to the SS of 8 dead and 12 wounded. There were also clashes between Jewish partisans and German forces in other parts of Eastern Europe, as well as occasional acts of resistance by small groups or individuals in the ghettos and death camps. Yet in all likelihood the Germans and their collaborators suffered no more than a few hundred casualties, killed and wounded, in the course of the entire extermination campaign. Thus the contention that they lost a greater number of men to assorted illnesses, nervous breakdowns, and court-martial proceedings than to the Jewish underground appears by and large valid. Nothing the Jews did could effectively impede their destruction.

THE futility of resistance and the uselessness of submission were rooted in the same cause; they reflected the same cruel reality. Of all the peoples of Europe under the Nazi yoke, the Jews were the only ones without a country which was clearly their own to defend against the foreign invader. They were the only ones unable to find strength in the knowledge that they were an oppressed majority struggling against an oppressive minority. Wherever they turned, they were widely regarded as aliens, spurned by the conquered as well as the conquerors, by the opponents as well as the supporters of the Third Reich. Unlike other victims of the German occupation, they could not count on the moral or material support of their compatriots. Here and there someone was willing to offer them assistance, but in most cases they had to face the Holocaust in isolation and despair. They could feel themselves drowning in a sea of hostility. This was the tragic meaning of a document composed in the summer of 1943 by a resistance group, the Fighting Pioneers, describing for future generations the mood of European Jewry poised on the edge of catastrophe:

> No man so much as stretched out his hand to help the Jews, who were being annihilated and destroyed. No one even tried to help them contrive a way to escape destruction. Our destruction at that time was like that of worms being crushed, and not as the disappearance of a nation with high cultural standards. At the time the Jewish problem came up on the agenda, the hatred of Germans was not as strong as the idea of solidarity, even with the enemy, in joy at the downfall of Jewry. Only a few displayed humanity and social character, and even those did not dare express themselves too definitely or take a firm stand. Truly our separateness and ostracism were illustrated, proved, and repeated at that time. This burden of loneliness and ostracism we shall carry with us all the days of our years.

The state of mind of the Jewish community in the hour of destruction reflected its rootlessness and alienation in European society.

Still, the victims of the Holocaust do not need to be dramatized or idealized; they do not need to be portrayed as warriors and heroes. History as written by posterity requires epics and sagas; gray, everyday reality is not so demanding. The tragedy of the Jews who perished in the Holocaust is no less moving, their agony no less painful because they did not always behave as holy martyrs are expected to behave. Some fought and fell on the battlefield. Others met their death in bewilderment, unable to comprehend what was happening to them, terrified or resigned or apathetic. And still others tried to save themselves at any cost, by abandoning their families, collaborating with the enemy, even betraying fellow Jews. All of them, heroes and non-heroes alike, are now united in a common tragic fate. They are all mute witnesses not to some political ideal or national cause, but to the blind, murderous passions of mankind which are generally obscured by the veneer of civilization. To ask whether they should have behaved with greater courage, steadfastness, serenity, or dignity would be presumptuous. The living who are able to reflect on the Holocaust have no right to pass judgment on the dead whom it destroyed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How to Support the Democratic Revolution

Michael Ledeen

THE streets and campuses of our cities once again resound with the voices of demonstrators calling for the United States to "get tough" with its allies. Whether demanding that we sever all economic ties with the Union of South Africa, or that we pressure Philippine strongman Ferdinand Marcos to share power with his opponents, many Americans are clearly unhappy with the close embrace between their country and such regimes. In short order we can expect similar calls concerning our relationship with General Pinochet's dictatorial regime in Chile.

Such protests are by now a standard feature of public life in this country, but the issues raised by the protesters—which have to do with the nature of our alliances and the objectives of our foreign policy—remain among the most controversial in our national debate. The persistence of confusion about the basic purposes of American foreign policy, above and beyond the latest tactical wrinkle ("Nixon Doctrine," "Reagan Plan," or whatever), suggests that we have yet to come to terms with the requirements for America's proper role in the world. What, then, are those requirements?

IN RECENT years we have seen a remarkable series of transformations from dictatorship to democracy, in countries ranging from Turkey and Spain and Portugal to Argentina and Honduras. There is no question that these examples encourage other countries, especially those with a Spanish or Portuguese tradition, to move in the same direction (Brazil, Uruguay, and El Salvador are instances). In addition, there is the encouraging story of Grenada, where armed American intervention overthrew a Marxist dictatorship and returned the country to democracy, representing the first time that the Brezhnev Doctrine (according to which the Communist takeover of any country is irreversible) has been actively challenged. And, in Eastern Europe, there is the most ambiguous but perhaps ultimately no less hopeful case of Poland, where, despite all efforts to suppress it, Solidarity lives on.

If there is one central theme and organizing principle of our foreign policy, it should be to support this movement—which some observers have called a democratic revolution—around the world. Our task is actively to encourage non-democratic governments to democratize, and to aid democratic movements that challenge totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Not only should this be our objective, in a sense it must be our objective, for without this organizing principle and central theme, even the most brilliantly conceived *Realpolitik* will fail.

Such is the power of our own traditions and of our commitment to the universal value of democracy that Americans will not, for example, support a long-term friendship with a repressive dictatorship; our basic alliances must be with democratic countries, or with countries that are seen to be moving toward greater democracy. There is an important corollary to this axiom: except in extraordinary circumstances, the American people will not long give their approval to a foreign policy based purely or even primarily on abstract considerations of the balance of power.

Some decry this American characteristic, arguing that it makes it impossible to conduct a (presumably more effective) foreign policy, one based on a traditional conception of the national interest. Such criticism, however, is misguided, for the spread of democracy *is* the most basic of our geostrategic interests. If the democratic revolution should succeed, our security will be greatly enhanced; if the democratic revolution is defeated and rolled back, our security will be diminished.

These principles are often less well understood by ourselves than by our enemies, who recognize only too clearly that the existence of free societies threatens them. The vitality of democracy, its appeal to human creativity, and the unlimited range it gives to human development, strike fear into the hearts of those whose power depends upon shackling free people and insisting upon a single "truth." The most aggressive of our enemies, the Communist totalitarians, aim to remove democracy from the earth, in order that they may finally feel completely secure. This point was driven home by the Central American leaders interviewed by the Kissinger commission. Every head of government testified that so long as the Sandinistas were in power in Nicaragua, all chance for democracy in the area would be mortally jeopardized.

MICHAEL LEDEEN is a senior fellow at Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies. His new book, *Grave New World*, has just been published by Oxford University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The implication is clear enough: if we are serious about the democratic revolution in Central America, we must challenge Nicaraguan (and Soviet-sponsored Cuban) totalitarianism there; if we are serious about the democratic revolution in general, we must challenge Communist totalitarianism in general. Indeed, our struggle with Communist totalitarianism—like our previous war with fascist totalitarianism, and like our struggle with dictatorships of all stripes—is unavoidable, a matter of political principle which is simultaneously a strategic national interest. It is not the other side of the coin, it is the same coin as our support of the democratic revolution.

NEEDLESS to say, however, solid unflinching support for the democratic revolution does not mean the abandonment of good sense. American policy-makers cannot be deprived of such essential tools as the choice of the lesser of two evils, the strategic pause, and the wait-and-see. Although we certainly prefer democratic regimes to anti-democratic ones, we should by now also have learned that many of the world's worst tyrants (Stalin, for one) wrap themselves in the mantle of democracy, while some of those we have viewed as hopelessly repressive have actually paved their countries' way from dictatorship toward democracy (Generalissimo Franco providing perhaps the most interesting example). All too often in the recent past, moreover, we have seen dictators friendly to the United States replaced by hostile totalitarians, to the benefit of our enemies and the detriment of our own interests and those of our allies.

Some American policy-makers and intellectuals have concluded from this circumstance that forthright, universal support for the democratic revolution is in fact a dangerous and counterproductive policy, one that will bring us into conflict with some of our most important allies, in areas vital to our national security. The objection is a serious one. How can we continue to maintain close friendships with foreign leaders when we are simultaneously intruding into their internal affairs, trying to get them to dilute their authority and significantly change their political system? More ominously, if we start demanding that South Africa end apartheid or that Marcos share power with his opponents, are we not inviting a reprise of the North Vietnamese takeover of the South and the replacement of the Shah of Iran by the Ayatollah Khomeini, two cases in which a mildly repressive (and friendly) ally was defeated and a far more evil force (both from the point of view of the people living in those countries and of American interests) soon came to dominate the scene?

Yet our having failed in the past does not mean that we must continue the pattern in the future. Our various errors of judgment and omission should not lead us to abandon a policy essential to our interests and of a piece with our national traditions. In part, the Vietnamese and Iranian disasters occurred precisely because we lacked the courage and wisdom to fight for those traditions. Our failure to support the Shah during the crisis of 1979 was criminal, but we could and should have acted in such a way over the preceding quarter-century as to have made the crisis unnecessary. That would have required years (not just months) of steady pressure on the Shah to undertake a gradual liberalization of his regime, to share power with the emerging new middle class (mostly trained in the United States), and to limit his own authority. In this sense intelligent American "meddling" in the internal affairs of other countries is fully justified, for if we encourage allies to become more democratic, it is in order to make their own governments more stable and our alliances more durable.

That having been said, one must add immediately the qualification that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a successful transition from dictatorship to democracy in the midst of a violent crisis. When one of our undemocratic allies is under attack from anti-democratic forces that are also hostile to us, our first obligation is to support the ally, and only then to address the question of greater democracy. In Vietnam, we often acted as if its leaders (and perhaps even the system of government) could be changed without undermining the high morale necessary to sustain the war effort in the South. In Iran, having failed over the years to nudge the Shah toward liberalization, we then conspicuously failed to come to his side in his time of crisis.

THERE are of course factors inhibiting the successful prosecution of a long-term policy of critical support for undemocratic allies. One of them has to do with the way the Left and the Right in domestic American politics line up on the issue of repressive governments. The Left condemns out of hand governments ranging from South Africa to Honduras to the Philippines while tending to turn a blind eye to left-wing dictatorships and/or actively to support Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movements like the FMLN in El Salvador or SWAPO in Namibia. Moreover, this support often continues even after the guerrilla movements seize power and establish single-party dictatorships. As for the Right, it denounces Communist regimes while tending to take a benign view of even such extreme dictatorships of the Right as Pinochet's Chile, Stroessner's Paraguay, and Argentina under the generals who preceded Alfonsín.

Both the Right and the Left are wrong. The error of the Right is to confuse alliances of convenience with principled, durable rapport. We may indeed sometimes be forced into close working relations with undemocratic or even anti-democratic countries, but as a practical matter we

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have to be able to show either that our ally is moving toward greater internal democracy or that there is a crisis so grave as to require our holding firm. If the crisis is of insufficient proportions, or if the democratic credentials of the society fail to pass muster, the American public will not long remain convinced of the necessity of the alliance and it will be broken by the winds of political storms. Marcos and Pinochet, as well as their friends in the United States, should have realized long ago that without movement toward greater democracy, America's support would eventually be called into question.

But if the Right frequently misunderstands the role of the democratic ethos in our foreign policy, the Left all too often performs the more damaging role of rendering that policy impotent, by devising abstractly moralistic standards of democracy that no country can possibly live up to. This extremely dangerous tendency was at work during the fall of the Shah of Iran, when the Carter administration—egged on by elements of the media and the universities—contributed to the paralysis of one of our most important allies. In the opinion of many in the Carter administration, the record of the Shah in human rights justified cutting off support in his hour of need. They held to this opinion even though, in the context of the Middle East, Iran was a remarkably decent place, and even though there was every prospect that a change in regime would make things far worse.

At the same time that the Left holds our allies to impossible standards, it tends to exempt our left-wing opponents altogether, taking their every encouraging word at face value and even urging patience and understanding in the face of barbarisms committed by self-proclaimed "revolutionary" regimes. The cases of Cambodia and Communist Vietnam leap to mind, as does that of the Ayatollah's "revolution," which at the time was mistaken for a movement of the Left and defended as such. During the 1982 war in Lebanon, to cite another example, the systematic terror visited by the PLO upon southern Lebanon over the previous seven years was hardly ever mentioned in the liberal press. (David Shipler did finally write about it in the New York *Times*, but only after the first wave of fighting was over.) It is not as if the Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists, or the Iranian Shi'ites, had neglected to provide detailed descriptions of what they were planning to do once they came to power, or as if the PLO's activities in Lebanon were a secret. The Left simply declined to believe what was there to be seen; it thereby contributed its own decisive share to the American policy fiascos of the recent past.

If our support of the democratic revolution is to have any chance of success, then, the first thing we must learn to do is to assess, realistically, the difference between our friends and our enemies. The second thing we must learn, or relearn, is the difference between authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorships. As it happens, most of our undemocratic allies fall into the former category, most of our enemies into the latter. As it also happens, the prospects for achieving democratization are much brighter in the former than they are in the latter.

The reason is a simple one. In authoritarian dictatorships, the repressive power of the regime generally rests with a single individual or ruling group, and if that individual or group passes from the scene, then meaningful change becomes possible. In authoritarian Spain, once Franco died, the system evolved in a very few years into a full-fledged Western democracy. In totalitarian dictatorships, by contrast, it is the system itself that performs the evil work, generally through the instrumentality of institutionalized terror. Nor does the perpetuation of the system depend upon any single individual: in the Soviet Union, with the death of Lenin, Stalin stepped forward, and after him there have been others, while the system has remained fundamentally unchanged.

The capacity of authoritarian regimes to change does not even depend upon the death or removal of their leaders; in Central America, the military regimes of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala have shown themselves quite able to provide for a smooth transition from dictatorship to democracy. The Salvadoran army has been a driving force behind the successful democratization of the country. In Honduras, the army stepped aside in favor of a freely elected civilian government, while in Guatemala free elections have been promised and a new constitution is being drafted, under the eyes of the current military dictatorship. Farther to the south, Uruguay and Brazil are following suit.

Not only is the democratic revolution more likely to succeed in authoritarian countries than in totalitarian ones, where transitions of this kind are not possible, but our own best chance at helping to bring about the necessary transformation is in countries friendly to us—*provided* that we are perceived by them as steadfast allies who, while calling for change, nonetheless respect and are willing to defend their integrity against our common enemies. That such a strategy can work is demonstrated by the example of Turkey, where we recognized the legitimacy of a military dictatorship that was installed because the country had fallen prey to a violent wave of terrorism, but urged the generals to restore power to the civilian politicians as soon as possible. Once the terrorist threat was quelled, this is exactly what the generals did.

In the Philippines, what the future holds is uncertain. We have, currently, given Ferdinand Marcos two messages: we will support him, but there is a limit to our patience. This tacit threat has real credibility in the Philippines, where we have considerable economic and political lever-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

age, and where we can also contemplate without alarm the possibility that Marcos might be replaced by his most outspoken opponents. Over time, the Philippines will either evolve toward greater democracy or undergo violent internal conflict. The country will not put up with Marcos forever, and neither should we: if Marcos is unwilling to reform, we should seriously contemplate organizing the opposition and supporting it against him, provided the opposition is democratic and its leaders are talented and mature enough to see the country through the difficult transition. If these qualities are lacking, then we will be faced with the unpleasant but unavoidable task of selecting among several poor alternatives.

South Africa is a different matter altogether, because we are morally opposed to the very basis of South African society. No American government can long refrain from outspoken criticism of apartheid, and over the long term, barring a major crisis, if there is no evidence of evolution toward democracy the American people will make it impossible for an administration to work closely with Pretoria. But there is also no gainsaying the fact that we are in almost complete agreement with Pretoria in international affairs, and there are good reasons to fear that a drastic change in South Africa might prove so destabilizing that we, and the entire West, would pay an enormous strategic price for it.

Had Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe turned out to be more democratic and more tolerant of its white and black political opponents, one might be more sanguine about demanding one man/one vote in South Africa; but as things stand today, the United States can hardly urge South Africa to follow the example of what was once Rhodesia. Then again, had we the capacity for real covert action, we might secretly support the democratic element of the South African opposition while openly supporting the Pretoria government; but this strategy is not available to us, because we can no longer keep such actions secret. The problem, in short, is probably the most agonizing one we face in our foreign policy.

YET with regard to the regime in Pretoria, as well as similar, less hateful regimes elsewhere, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that whatever influence we do have will be frittered away entirely unless our allies can be confident that we will not abandon them. That is why today, the great touchstone of American credibility is Central America. It is there that the democratic revolution has the brightest prospects, and there that our commitment to the democratic revolution is being most severely tested. The challenge is all the more dramatic because it is taking place close enough to our borders to constitute an issue of national security.

We have quite vocally stated in Central America that we will not tolerate any further expansion of Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan power. Yet we have not acted in accordance with that declaration. Despite the near-universal recognition that Nicaragua is heading internally toward Communist totalitarianism, that it represents a major Soviet beachhead in our hemisphere, and that it is indispensable to the guerrilla war conducted by the FMLN in El Salvador and by other like-minded groups in Honduras and Guatemala, Congress has decreed that we may not challenge the Sandinista regime in Managua. Nor has the Reagan administration fought hard enough to retain financial support for the contras.

The net result is that it is now an open question whether the United States will bring any meaningful pressure to bear on our Cuban and Nicaraguan enemies, or whether we will leave them free to set the level of conflict in El Salvador and the timing of their attacks throughout the hemisphere. If the latter should turn out to be the case, then we will have sent another depressing message to those around the world who contemplate taking up the struggle for the democratic revolution and who have looked to us as its ultimate defender. We will have told them that Vietnam and Iran are the enduring models of American policy, and that Grenada was simply a momentary aberration.

If we fail in Central America, regimes from Manila to Pretoria will be the more likely to reject our suggestions for change, reasoning that they have only themselves to depend upon in the face of their enemies. The same goes for southern Asia, where the government of Pakistan must decide how much support to give to the freedom fighters of Afghanistan; after all, if the United States cannot protect a nearby ally against Nicaragua, can it be expected to shelter a distant friend against the Soviet Union itself? And the same goes too for northern Africa, where the foes of Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi may be tempted in desperation to seek an accommodation if Libya should offer it.

The list can be extended, from Solidarity in Poland to the refuseniks in the Soviet Union, from the opposition to Castro in Cuba to the democratic foes of Pinochet in Chile. It is only by remaining true to our principles—which in Central America means supporting the democratic revolution in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, while exerting our utmost effort to thwart and ultimately reverse the totalitarian advance—that we can confidently expect to find others willing to take their own risks for freedom and democracy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

F. Scott Fitzgerald at the End

Jeffrey Hart

At the end of November 1940, F. Scott Fitzgerald felt dizzy while in Schwab's drugstore on Sunset Boulevard in Hollywood. He had had a heart attack and was ordered by his doctor to rest in bed, where he was able to write on a board for a couple of hours a day. Since his own apartment on North Laurel Avenue was on the top floor, he moved to the apartment of his friend and lover, the columnist Sheilah Graham, on North Hayworth Avenue. He believed that he was making a good recovery, writing to his wife Zelda, then in a mental hospital, on December 13:

> The novel is about three-quarters through and I think I can go on till January 12 without doing any stories or going back to the studio. I couldn't go back to the studio anyhow in my present condition as I have to spend most of the time in bed where I write on a wooden desk.... The cardiogram shows that my heart is repairing itself but it will be a gradual process that will take some months. It is odd that the heart is one of the organs that does repair itself.

The day after writing this letter, he drew up a schedule that called for him to write 1,750 words a day on the novel we now call *The Last Tycoon*, though he had not finally settled on a title. The schedule called for him to complete a working draft by January 15.

Although Fitzgerald continued to work steadily until his death, he was wrong in his optimistic assessment about the condition of his heart. Chronic alcoholism tends to produce an enlargement of the heart chambers, which can be fatal, and Fitzgerald had other maladies as well. He had tubercular flare-ups, and the indications are that he produced excessive amounts of insulin, which would explain his inordinate craving for candy and soft drinks.

In her last memoir of Fitzgerald, Sheilah Graham recalls that during the night of December 19-20 he slept badly, pacing the floor of her apartment during a large portion of the night. In the morning he explained that "It's the chapter. I can't make it hang together." That day, while Miss Graham was interviewing Spencer Tracy at the studio for her newspaper column, Fitzgerald worked on episode seventeen of the novel, the meeting between his protagonist, Monroe Stahr, and the Communist labor organizer, Brimmer. Later that day, after she had returned to the apartment, Fitzgerald "came beaming into the living room" and "announced 'I've been able to fix it.' " She describes him as exhilarated. " 'Baby, this book will be good.' " They decided to celebrate with dinner at Lyman's, a restaurant on Hollywood Boulevard, and then went to a preview of *This Thing Called Love*, a comedy starring Rosalind Russell and Melvyn Douglas. Miss Graham recalls that when the lights went on and they started to leave the theater, Fitzgerald stumbled; she held his arm, and outside he breathed heavily. As he drove her home he told her, "I had the same dizziness as that time in Schwab's." His doctor was due to call the next day, so he took his usual medicines and went to bed.

The next morning, after sleeping late and dressing around noon, he seemed much better, and he and Miss Graham planned to eat some sandwiches she had bought at a delicatessen. "I settled into the sofa with a biography of Beethoven," Miss Graham recalls. "To reinforce the book, I asked Scott if it was all right for me to play the *Eroica* on the record player. . . . Scott smiled and sank into the dark green armchair with the latest *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, focusing on an article about football." A few minutes later,

> Scott stood up and said, "I want something sweet, I'm going to Schwab's for some ice cream."
>
> "But the doctor is coming soon," I reminded him. "I'm sure he'll have some good news about your heart. Will a Hershey bar do?" I went to the drawer in my bedroom where I had put it for later munching and gave it to Scott. He savored it slowly while, as I found out later, writing down the nicknames of football heroes of his class opposite their names in the magazine. We both looked up at the same time and smiled at each other while he licked his fingers, and then we settled back to the reading. A few minutes later, while the *Eroica* shrilled its prophecy, I half saw Scott jump to his feet and clutch the mantelpiece as though to steady himself. He would often stand up suddenly when

JEFFREY HART is professor of English at Dartmouth and the author of *When the Going Was Good: American Life in the Fifties*. The present article is adapted from his new book, *Fitzgerald and Hemingway: Fighting It Out*, which will be published later this year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> he had an idea for some writing. Or was it the dizziness again? Before I could reach him, he fell to the floor, spread-eagled on his back. His eyes were closed and he was breathing heavily.

Miss Graham tried to pour some brandy through his clenched teeth, but by the time the doctor arrived, he was dead.

Fitzgerald was thus a victim of his third heart attack at age forty-four. But if there is much in this premature ending that deserves Dorothy Parker's comment at the funeral parlor, "The poor son of a bitch" (which echoes a comment by Owl Eyes in *The Great Gatsby* on the death of Jay Gatsby), there is much also that does not. Closely considered, the shape of Fitzgerald's career, including its final Hollywood phase, does not correspond to the pattern of early success and later defeat and failure. Even as his body failed him, Fitzgerald was moving on to new themes and techniques, and he was not finally defeated as an artist.

FITZGERALD reported for work at MGM's Culver City studio on July 7, 1937, and tried with great intensity to become a professional scriptwriter. From his two previous experiences in Hollywood, he had derived firm ideas on the subject. He analyzed movies and scripts and studied the available techniques with a view to mastering them and improving on them, and above all he resolved to try to be "alone on the picture" instead of part of a team of writers. Ironically enough, the team-writing, mass-production approach had been developed and perfected by Irving Thalberg, the boy genius of MGM, dead at thirty-seven by the time Fitzgerald arrived at Culver City. Idealizing important aspects of Thalberg, Fitzgerald would make him a hero of American individualism in the novel he was working on at the time of his death, but it was Thalberg who had devised the team-writing system that Fitzgerald would never succeed in escaping.

Nor did Fitzgerald succeed, as he had hoped, in rising to the top of the movie industry. He did, however, work on a dozen MGM scripts and was one of MGM's highest-paid writers. His special poetic powers did not translate to the screen, and he was much less adapted to film writing than a polished Hollywood professional like his old friend Donald Ogden Stewart. Still, during his year-and-a-half at MGM, he earned some $85,000, more than at any comparable period in his life. He made progress on repaying his debts to his publisher, Scribner's, and to his agent, Harold Ober, and he maintained Zelda and his daughter Scotty. He did not live extravagantly in Hollywood, but he and Sheilah Graham had quiet good times, eating in good restaurants and taking trips to Santa Barbara and La Jolla.

When MGM failed to renew his contract, he turned to freelance screenwriting and began to produce short stories, most of which he sold to *Esquire*, including the seventeen Pat Hobby stories. Between November 1939 and July 1941, seven months after his death, a new Fitzgerald story appeared in every issue of *Esquire*. On the whole, the Pat Hobby stories are minor Fitzgerald, but several are first-rate, and in the figure of the broken-down screenwriter—perhaps inspired in part by Charlie Chaplin's tramp—Fitzgerald found a new note of wry comedy. Hobby, an illiterate fall guy, is by no means a self-portrait of Fitzgerald but a genuine invention akin to the comic creations of Hollywood's great clowns.

Now in his early forties, Fitzgerald was changing as an artist, no longer able to write about sensitive young love and the aspirations rooted in adolescence. "I have a daughter," he wrote to Kenneth Littauer, the editor of *Collier's*, some time during the summer of 1939. "She is very smart; she is very pretty; she is very popular. Her problems seem to me to be utterly dull and her point of view completely uninteresting." Fitzgerald wrote to Zelda saying that their early love had provided the emotional inspiration for his work, and that the feeling must have been intense because it lasted so long for him as an artist. The implication is that he must now turn to other emotions for his work, and we see these beginning to emerge in his most interesting screenplay, the 74-page script for *Madame Curie*. He worked on this between November 1938 and January 1939, dealing for the first time with a figure whose heroism is inseparable from work and genuine achievement.

Fitzgerald's earlier heroic figures had been essentially men and women of leisure, either sensitive adolescents or men whose work was subordinate to the more serious matters of feeling, like Dexter Green in the story "Winter Dreams," or Gatsby, or men whose careers had been explicitly abandoned for love, as in the case of Dick Diver (*Tender Is the Night*). But in the young Madame Curie, Fitzgerald projected a heroism that is essentially a part of the adult world of achievement, and in the story of the two Curies, Fitzgerald engaged for the first time the adult world of love and of achievement based upon professional commitment. Though the movie, planned for Greta Garbo, was shelved until 1943, when it appeared with a screenplay by Paul Osborne and Paul Rameau, with Greer Garson in the title role, Fitzgerald's screenplay marks an important transition for him as an artist.

The reasons for this new development are plain enough. Fitzgerald, as part of the movie industry, was working for the first time in his life at something other than personal expression. He was also in love with Sheilah Graham, and he admired her success as a journalist. It is also likely that the experience of the 1930's and of the Depression had moved him to a new appreciation of the value of work and achievement. The apparently indelible image of Fitzgerald as a hopeless drunk and hack is a false one. He did have several epic benders during this period—in Encino, in Havana with Zelda, in New York and in Hanover, New Hamp-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shire, while working on the movie *Winter Carnival* with Budd Schulberg—the last of which landed him in a hospital and may have shortened his life. But he was sober most of the time in Hollywood. According to Sheilah Graham, he was drinking during nine of the forty-two months they were together. Despite the lapses, it is fair to say that he himself embodied his new conception of the hero as foreshadowed in the *Madame Curie* script, the hero as romantic professional.

Viewed in the context of Fitzgerald's career as a writer, *The Last Tycoon* may be seen as his 1940's novel, and it marks a change in his relationship to America and its history. *Gatsby* was his 1920's novel, with its themes of aspiration and magical transformation and with the towering figure of T.S. Eliot in the background. *Tender Is the Night* was his 1930's novel, with its Spenglerian vision of the collapse of the West and the disintegration of capitalism against a background of revolution and the rise of the dictators, and its implicit view that America was joined with Europe in a common doom whose roots lay in a vast historical violation. But in spirit *The Last Tycoon* is very much a novel of the 1940's, and perhaps also the decade after that. Fitzgerald began writing it as the figure of Adolf Hitler loomed increasingly large over the continent of Europe; by the time of his death, Norway and France had fallen and Hitler was at the English Channel. Fitzgerald followed the war news intently, and planned to cover the conflict on the scene, not leaving the war to Hemingway (as he put it). It is in the context of these apocalyptic events that Fitzgerald makes his last hero, Monroe Stahr, a Jew—surely an American defiance of what was happening on the European continent.

Monroe Stahr, indeed, is one of the most compelling Jewish figures in American fiction, all the more remarkably because of the differences in background between Fitzgerald, the Catholic Midwesterner and at least social anti-Semite, and Irving Thalberg, the Jewish boy from working-class New York on whom Stahr is modeled. Stahr, the risen Jew, becomes the "last" American—but perhaps not at all paradoxically. Putting aside his reservations about Irving Thalberg as a Hollywood production executive, which he expressed in the story "Crazy Sunday," Fitzgerald invested Stahr—like the Irish-Catholic Fitzgerald, a shooting star—with the trappings of mythic immortality:

> He had flown up very high to see, on strong wings, when he was young. And while he was up there he looked on all the kingdoms, with the kind of eyes that can stare straight into the sun. Beating his wings tenaciously—finally frantically—and keeping on beating them, he had stayed up there longer than most of us, and then, remembering all he had seen from his great height of how things were, he had settled gradually to earth.

This is an extraordinary passage in its context in the novel. To define his sense of Stahr, the star, Fitzgerald has used not only the legend of Icarus but also Milton's Christ, who was taken up onto the mountain by Satan to view "all the kingdoms." With Hitler looming over the European continent in 1939 and 1940, Fitzgerald's pessimism was changing to something very different. Fitzgerald fused his own sense of himself with Stahr, the Jew, and with his transformed idea of America, which in 1939-40 looked much better to Fitzgerald than it had in the 1934 *Tender Is the Night*.

In a note lying between the pages of his *Last Tycoon* manuscript, he wrote:

> I look out on it and I think it is the most beautiful history in the world. It is the history of me and my people. And if I came here yesterday like Sheilah I should still think so. It is the history of all aspiration—not just the American dream but the human dream and if I came at the end of it that too is a place in the line of pioneers.

It is fair to say that the fall of Europe had sharpened his feeling for the value of America, and that he had recovered an earlier sense of the validity of the American dream.

Fitzgerald also looked over his shoulder as he wrote at his arch-rival, Ernest Hemingway. He was aware that *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, which he had privately derided as Hemingway's *Rebecca* or *A Tale of Two Cities*, had sold almost a half-million copies by the fall of 1940. For *The Last Tycoon*, he wrote in his *Notebooks*,

> I want to write scenes that are frightening and inimitable. I don't want to be as intelligible to my contemporaries as Ernest who as Gertrude Stein said is bound for the museums. I am sure that I am enough ahead to have some small immortality if I can keep well.

His competition with Hemingway was alive when he reminded himself in a note about his treatment of the figure of Kathleen: "Where will the warmth come from in this. Why does he think she's warm? Warmer than the voice in Farewell [Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms*]." With *The Last Tycoon*, Fitzgerald, who shrewdly saw the deterioration of Hemingway's art, meant to write a novel that would reestablish him at the top of his profession, and he made steady progress on it.

Fitzgerald's new emotions regarding America had been reinforced by his passing acquaintance with Irving Thalberg. He met Thalberg in 1927, when working on the movie *Lipstick* for United Artists, and had reported to Thalberg on his second Hollywood assignment in 1931 to work for MGM on *Red-Headed Woman*. But Thalberg became available as a heroic figure to Fitzgerald only after his death at thirty-seven in 1936; in retrospect, he evolved into Fitzgerald's final metaphor.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thalberg's career, as Fitzgerald now viewed it, combined poetry and work, art and a major industry. The son of a Brooklyn lace merchant, he had been a frail and sickly child, but like Faust or Icarus or even Theodore Roosevelt he had recreated and willed his own being. At age seventeen, after a night-school business course, Thalberg got a job as a stenographer in the New York offices of Universal Pictures, where he caught the attention of the company president, Carl Laemmle, Sr., who made him his private secretary. Before he was twenty, Thalberg was running Universal's Hollywood studio. He left Universal to run the L.B. Mayer studios, and in 1924—when Fitzgerald was writing *Gatsby*—Irving Thalberg at age twenty-five was put in charge of production at the newly formed Hollywood giant, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.

It is thus clear that Irving Thalberg embodied some of Fitzgerald's central themes, though it is not surprising that Thalberg's widow Norma Shearer did not recognize her husband in Fitzgerald's Monroe Stahr. Fitzgerald was responding to the early success of another brilliant young man, born like himself near the birth of the century, who also stood for art and quality in the giant industry he had helped to consolidate. Thalberg was willing to lose money for MGM on experimental films that might pioneer new techniques, and he attracted the loyalty of American and European writers. It was Thalberg, with his succession of high-budget successes and his insistence on quality, who made Hollywood during the 1930's one of the most glamorous places in the world.

Thalberg's aspirations to quality were backed by executive genius. He was the first Hollywood executive to put the production of high-quality films on an assembly-line basis, a contradiction that supplies the fundamental conflict in Fitzgerald's novel. Thalberg set a schedule of one "A" film per week, and met it. He brought original musicals to the screen, rivaling Broadway's. In *The Last Tycoon*, Fitzgerald came to terms with the Thalberg of mass production and team writing by subsuming these aspects under the idea of the heroic executive, and by making the conflict external to Monroe Stahr, who finds his genius thwarted by bureaucracy and by organized labor.

Irving Thalberg's power as a heroic figure comes through clearly in a note Fitzgerald made for an episode in the first chapter of *The Last Tycoon*, reproduced almost exactly in the text of the projected novel. Fitzgerald recalled:

> This will be based on a conversation that I had with Thalberg the first time I was alone with him in 1927, the day that he said a thing about railroads. As near as I can remember what he said was this:
>
> We sat in the old commissary at Metro and he said, "Scottie, supposing there's got to be a road through a mountain and . . . there seem to be a half-dozen possible roads . . . each one of which, so far as you can determine, is as good as the other. Now suppose you happen to be the top man, there's a point where you don't exercise the faculty of judgment in the ordinary way, but simply the faculty of arbitrary decision. You say, 'Well, I think we will put the road there,' and you trace it with your finger and you know in your secret heart, and no one else knows, that you have no reason for putting the road there rather than in several other different courses, but you're the only person that knows that you don't know why you're doing it and you've got to stick to that and you've got to pretend that you know and that you did it for specific reasons, even though you're utterly assailed by doubts at times as to the wisdom of your decision, because all these other possible decisions keep echoing in your ear. But when you're planning a new enterprise on a grand scale, the people under you mustn't ever know or guess that you're in doubt, because they've all got to have something to look up to and they mustn't ever dream that you're in doubt about any decision. These things keep occuring [*sic*]."
>
> At that point, some other people came into the commissary and sat down, and the first thing I knew there was a group of four and the intimacy of the conversation was broken, but I was very much impressed by the shrewdness of what he said—something more than shrewdness—by the largeness of what he thought and how he reached it by the age of twenty-six, which he was then.

As Fitzgerald's friend, the screenwriter Charlie MacArthur, put it, working at MGM after Thalberg's death was like "going to the Automat." Without Thalberg, according to Bosley Crowther's history of the giant studio, MGM had

> lost its savor. . . . It became a mere mass-producing combine, a huge motion-picture dispensing machine. . . . The sense of an inspirational influence, a *genius domus*, the studio had had while he was there, even under the unit system, was gone. There was little or no sense of closeness or creative participation with [L.B.] Mayer who was now the supreme administrator. The air that emanated was one of remote authority.

By May 1939 Fitzgerald had settled on the plan of writing a novel about Hollywood and had outlined the essential story in a long letter to *Collier's* editor Kenneth Littauer, hoping for a large advance. The fact that he and Littauer were discussing an advance in the neighborhood of $15,000-$20,000 for an unwritten novel is evidence of Fitzgerald's estimate of his continuing market value, although the deal fell through when Littauer demanded more than the first 6,000 words Fitzgerald sent him as the basis for a decision.

The work we call *The Last Tycoon* exists only in fragmentary form. Among Fitzgerald's papers at Princeton, five outline plans survive, all of which project a *Gatsby*-length novel of about 50,000 words. In his latest plan, Fitzgerald envisioned a novel of nine chapters—*Gatsby* had nine—consisting of thirty episodes and organized

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into a five-part structure. By the time of his death, Fitzgerald had reached midpoint in the plan and was working on episode seventeen, but at 44,000 words he had already written far beyond what his design called for. Whether he would have cut this material severely or revised his plan to produce a much longer novel, we cannot know.

The only published version of this work-in-progress, the one edited by Edmund Wilson in 1941, provides the basis for most critical commentary, and yet that edition is in important respects somewhat misleading. It gives a more finished impression than the state of Fitzgerald's manuscript material really justifies. As Matthew Bruccoli has pointed out in a valuable study of the manuscripts, even Chapter 1 was to have undergone revision, and Edmund Wilson himself, in his capacity as editor, created "Chapters" 2 through 6 by forming them out of episodes Fitzgerald had not yet organized into chapters. From what we do possess, much that would have happened later in the novel remains unclear, and Fitzgerald had not even determined on a title. As a working title he used *The Love of the Last Tycoon: A Western*; it was Wilson who chose *The Last Tycoon*, an exercise of good but nevertheless independent critical judgment.

As Matthew Bruccoli properly remarks, *The Last Tycoon* "is not really an 'unfinished novel' if that term describes a work that is partly finished. The only way to regard it is as material toward a novel." Nevertheless, it is clear from what we do possess that Fitzgerald at the end of his life was not only writing with undiminished powers, but was changing in his emotional perspective and in his attitudes as an artist.

MONROE STAHR, the last tycoon, is a new kind of Fitzgerald hero. He is a Jew and uneducated, but through sheer ability he has risen from an impoverished Bronx boyhood to complete dominance in a major American industry, perhaps in psychological terms *the* American industry; and he is both artist and entrepreneur, a startling fusion that abolishes the assumed hostility between the two roles and looks back to the Renaissance and even to Shakespeare, successful impresario of the Globe theater. Monroe Stahr is a Jewish Horatio Alger, and Fitzgerald's attitude toward him is wholly positive. He is the star that corresponds to Gatsby's moon; he rises, in America, against a darkening European backdrop of *Götterdämmerung* and *Kristallnacht*. When Fitzgerald considered calling this novel *The Love of the Last Tycoon: A Western*, he had it in mind to direct attention to the association of the American West with the idea of opportunity. Indeed, the use of the word "last" here has an ironic dimension. Monroe Stahr is not the "last" tycoon. His struggle with bureaucracy and with the labor organizers represents a permanent struggle between the creative individual and the anti-creative forces with which he must always contend. Fitzgerald planned to have his Icarus-like Stahr die, appropriately, in a plane crash, but the star of individual genius will rise again.

Unlike previous Fitzgerald heroes, Monroe Stahr lacks any seriously disabling moral weakness: Amory Blaine's solipsism and snobbery (*This Side of Paradise*), Anthony Patch's fecklessness (*The Beautiful and Damned*), Gatsby's illusions, Dick Diver's lack of moral toughness. Stahr is disciplined, and his demands on others are exceeded by his demands on himself. He is also notable as the only major Fitzgerald hero who is committed to his work, his profession; some of the best episodes of *The Last Tycoon* depict him dealing with the moment-by-moment problems that arise in the vast enterprise he is running. No doubt this represents a new moral maturity on Fitzgerald's part. With Zelda and Scotty and his debts and his movie scripts, he had become a minor industrial executive himself; his financial balance sheets were very much a part of his moral reality. The importance of professional accomplishment here is indicated dramatically by a note Fitzgerald wrote about a projected scene in which Stahr is told by his doctors to quit work:

> The idea fills Stahr with a horror that I must write a big scene to bring off. Such a scene as has never been written. The scene that to Stahr is the equivalent to that of an amorous man being told that he is about to be castrated. In other words, the words of the doctor fill Stahr with a horror that I must be able to convey to the laziest reader—the blow to Stahr and the utter unwillingness to admit that at this point, 35 years old, his body should refuse to serve him and carry on these plans which he has built up like a pyramid of fairy skyscrapers in his imagination.
>
> He has survived the talkies, the Depression, carried his company over terrific obstacles and done it all with a growing sense of kingliness—of some essential difference which he could not help feeling between himself and the ordinary run of man and now from the mere accident of one organ of his body refusing to pull its weight, he is incapacitated from continuing. Let him go through every stage of revolt.

Stahr's exhaustion and illness and approaching death reflect Fitzgerald's sense of his own condition in 1939 and 1940. By the time Fitzgerald finished writing the material we have in Chapter 5, both he and Stahr were close to death, and there is something grimly heroic in Fitzgerald's transmutation of his own mortality into art. "He was due to die very soon now," Stahr's doctor reflects to himself at the last examination. "Within six months one could say definitely. What was the use of developing the cardiograms? You couldn't persuade a man like Stahr to stop and lie down and look at the sky for six months."

FITZGERALD'S engagement with American history was deep and rooted, and in *The Last Tycoon*, as in *Tender Is the Night*,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there are presidential presences. Monroe Stahr bears the name of James Monroe, the fifth President, whose Monroe Doctrine was a second declaration of independence from Europe and therefore a symbol of a reaffirmed, unique American destiny. Where *Tender Is the Night* views America and Europe as linked in a common decline, *The Last Tycoon* separates them as Europe undergoes the catastrophe of 1939-40 and America—one thinks of Fitzgerald's great sentence, "America is a willingness of the heart"—becomes the hope of the West. In addition to the fifth President, Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln are here as well. In the opening chapter, the Nick Carraway-like narrator, Cecilia Brady, daughter of a major Hollywood producer, is on her way home by plane from Bennington—itself a name with Revolutionary War overtones—when the plane is obliged by bad weather to land in Nashville. The screenwriter Wylie White takes Cecilia and the failed Hollywood executive Manny Schwartz to visit Andrew Jackson's home, the Hermitage, which is near Nashville. "It was still not quite dawn. The Hermitage looked like a nice big white box, but a little lonely and vacated after a hundred years."

It is impossible to know what Fitzgerald finally would have done with the Jackson motif in the finished novel, but he is clearly setting up an important zone of association here. Manny Schwartz, the once successful but now down-and-out movie executive, commits suicide at the Hermitage. "Manny Schwartz and Andrew Jackson," reflects Cecilia Brady, "—it was hard to say them in the same sentence." But Jackson in one of his historical/legendary aspects is a populist and a democrat, representing an American opportunity that is available to Schwartz as well as to Monroe Stahr. Cecilia goes on, reflecting about the suicide of Schwartz:

> It was doubtful if he knew who Andrew Jackson was as he wandered around, but perhaps he figured that if people had preserved his house Andrew Jackson must have been someone who was large and merciful, able to understand. At both ends of life man needed nourishment: a breast—a shrine. Something to lay himself beside when no one wanted him, and shoot a bullet into his head.

Andrew Jackson in this novel seems to stand for the inevitable tensions between opportunity and failure. The very freedom that makes Stahr's success possible—and indeed, Manny Schwartz's earlier, more modest success—also includes the possibility of Schwartz's failure and suicide. The Jackson presence here also seems to express a tender and elegiac but ambiguous sense of America. Wylie White says, "Old Hickory—America's tenth President. The victor of New Orleans, opponent of the National Bank, and inventor of the spoils system." Jackson is thus winner and loser, victor and source of corruption. He invented the spoils system: Stahr, as president of Hollywood, stood for high quality but also invented mass production and team writing. Within Fitzgerald's encompassing affirmation there remain ambiguity and qualification, a moral perspective that can surely be described as intellectually mature.

When Cecilia Brady and her companions visit the Hermitage, Andrew Jackson, associated with the West and opportunity, has been dead for a hundred years. But Jackson's spiritual heir, Monroe Stahr, is headed west, as far west as you can go on the continent, to Los Angeles in an airliner. Fitzgerald makes the frontier connection as Cecilia says about the airport at Nashville:

> I suppose there has been nothing like airports since the days of the stage stops—nothing quite as lonely, as somber-silent. The old red-brick depots were built right into the towns they marked—people didn't get off at those isolated stations unless they lived there. But airports lead you way back in history like oases, like the stops on the great trade routes.

When Stahr, in a conversation with Cecilia during the resumed flight west, gives her his monogrammed ring, we are not surprised that it is described as being like a gold nugget, reminiscent of Sutter's Mill, with the connecting initial "S": "He handed it to me, a gold nugget with the letter S in bold relief." And then suddenly we are there, in the West:

> The motors were off, and all our five senses began to readjust themselves for landing. I could see a line of lights for the Long Beach Naval Station ahead and to the left, and on the right a twinkling blur for Santa Monica. The California moon was out, huge and orange over the Pacific.

Even though *The Last Tycoon* represents unfinished material, it is clear that Fitzgerald had never written with a greater power of evocation and suggestion. That California moon, huge and orange over the Pacific, is the descendant of the Gatsbyan moon of magical transformation, the moon of permanent American possibility, now rising over Hollywood instead of over Long Island.

Abraham Lincoln is another presence in *The Last Tycoon*, along with Jackson and Monroe, but Lincoln's significance is greatly changed from what it had been in *Tender Is the Night*. The British writer Boxley sees Stahr as Lincolnesque:

> Boxley knew he could sit with Wylie White tonight at the Troc raging at Stahr, but he had been reading Lord Charnwood and he recognized that Stahr like Lincoln was a leader carrying on a long war on many fronts; almost single-handed he had moved pictures sharply forward through a decade, to the point where the content of the "A productions" was wider and richer than that of the stage. Stahr was an artist only, as Mr. Lincoln was a general, perforce and as a layman.

The usefulness of the Lincoln legend here is obvi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ous enough. Like Lincoln, Stahr rose from humble beginnings to a position of enormous responsibility. A Bronx tenement had been his log cabin. In *Tender Is the Night*, Fitzgerald had viewed Lincoln as a failure, his legacy a ruin; he had seen him, in effect, from the jaundiced perspective of the abortive Reconstruction, the corrupt Grant administration, and the democratic vulgarity of the Gilded Age and the Robber Barons. This is a perspective he shared with Henry Adams and Edmund Wilson (of the later *Patriotic Gore*); it is rooted at least in part in Fitzgerald's sense of his own family's history: his negative attitudes toward the commercially successful but parvenu Midwestern McQuillan side of his heritage, as compared with the "defeated" Maryland gentry and Francis Scott Key inheritance on his father's side.

But in *The Last Tycoon*, in a manner undoubtedly reflecting Fitzgerald's changed evaluation of America, the Lincoln-Monroe Stahr connection represents something distinctive and valuable in the American tradition. This is much more the Lincoln of Whitman than of Edmund Wilson, a Lincoln of American possibility. Indeed, *The Last Tycoon* at one point treats Fitzgerald's earlier Spenglerian gloom with a gently dismissive irony. Stahr loves Kathleen Moore, an Englishwoman based on Sheilah Graham. She tells him about a former lover, clearly based on Fitzgerald himself:

> "But the man I told you about knew everything and he had a passion for educating me. He made out schedules and made me take courses at the Sorbonne and go to museums. I picked up a little."
>
> "What was he?"
>
> "He was a painter of sorts and a hell-cat. And a lot besides. He wanted me to read Spengler—everything was for that. All the history and philosophy and harmony was all so I could read Spengler, and then I left him before we got to Spengler. At the end I think that was the chief reason he didn't want me to go."

In this novel, indeed, Fitzgerald seems to regard his earlier pessimism as sentimental, and gently mocks it. He also seems to recover his sense of artistic security in relation to Ernest Hemingway. There is now no more talk of the "authority of failure." And he takes a final playful dig at his great rival. The writer Wylie White, a drunk, at one point speaks of "all this brave gloom," and comments on some café-society types that "the only way to keep their self-respect is to be Hemingway characters."

To be sure, Fitzgerald intended that Stahr, weakened and ill, humiliated in his conflict with a Communist labor organizer, would die in a plane crash. But the ending was not to express a sense of ultimate defeat. "Unlike *Tender Is the Night*," he had written to Kenneth Littauer in 1939, "it is not the story of deterioration—it is not depressing and not morbid in spite of the tragic ending." Fitzgerald apparently planned to end with an affirmation. In a preliminary note he observed:

> The epilogue can model itself quite fairly on the last part of Gatsby . . . and I think I'll do my own method of ending probably on a high note about Stahr but that will solve itself in the writing. And toward the end I'll tend to go into a certain cadenced prose.

Stahr's illness and death were evidently not intended to detract from our sense of his achievement or from the American possibility he represented.

OF COURSE we will never know what this novel in its completed form would have been. Fitzgerald's final outline projects a good deal of plot complication, involving labor disputes and conflict at the studio, and also an episode in which Stahr is "sick in Washington." No doubt this would have involved further elaboration of the presidential themes adumbrated earlier. But no one can know. What we do have of *The Last Tycoon*, notes and drafts really, is very good. There is an aesthetic of the fragmentary, of the torn page, the shred of textile, the unfinished portrait or unfinished symphony which in certain moods we can view as apt comments on the universal human condition; *The Last Tycoon* partakes of that aesthetic.

Hemingway read Edmund Wilson's edition of *The Last Tycoon*, and in a letter to Maxwell Perkins (November 15, 1941) dealt with it harshly:

> I read all of Scott's book and I don't know whether to tell you what I truly think. There are very fine parts in it, but most of it has a deadness that is unbelievable. I think Bunny Wilson did a very creditable job in explaining, sorting, padding, and arranging. But you know Scott would never have finished it with that gigantic, preposterous outline of how it was to be. I thought the part about Stahr was all very good. You can recognize Irving Thalberg, his charm and skill and grasp of business, and the sentence of death over him. But the women were pretty preposterous. Scott had gotten so far away from any knowledge of people that they are very strange. He still had the technique and the romance of doing anything, but all the dust was off the butterfly's wing even though the wing would still move up until the butterfly was dead.

Hemingway here may still have been pursuing his rivalry with Fitzgerald, struggling to be or remain number one, for in an assessment of Fitzgerald he wrote to Malcolm Cowley in April 1951 he said that "*The Last Tycoon* is very good," even while expressing doubt that Fitzgerald had been capable of finishing it. From what we do have of it, however, it seems clear that though Fitzgerald's health was failing as he worked on this novel, he had by no means failed as an artist; indeed, he was continuing to develop.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Does Neoliberalism Have a Future?

Leslie Lenkowsky

Few political ideas have received as much praise lately as those usually labeled "neoliberal." They have been lauded in newspapers and magazines, commended by the academy, and cheered at political rallies. Books expounding them have usually received courteous treatment and, on occasion, the kind of glowing tributes that can turn statistics-filled tracts into coffee-table ornaments. Even some conservatives, like George Gilder, have hailed the advent of neoliberalism as marking a turning point in the political thinking that has dominated American life for most of the last half-century.

With the resounding defeat of Walter Mondale last November and the subsequent disarray within the Democratic-party leadership, neoliberalism seems poised to become a significant factor in national politics. Indeed, one of its foremost champions, Senator Gary Hart, is now the front-runner for the party's presidential nomination in 1988. And two other prominent adherents, Representatives Richard Gephardt and Les Aspin, have moved into the leadership of the party's congressional wing.

Yet just what is new about neoliberalism? The "new ideas" around which Senator Hart sought to build his campaign last year were generally vague or unexceptional. By their votes on major issues, neoliberal Senators and Congressmen are hard to distinguish from more traditional Democrats. Moreover, on some matters, most notably their support for a flat-rate income tax, neoliberals are not far apart from many conservatives.

Leslie Lenkowsky *is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.*

Is neoliberalism nothing more than a publicist's slogan, aimed at breathing some life into an exhausted ideology? Or is it really a distinctive way of looking at public policy that, as its proponents maintain, seeks to achieve old-fashioned liberal goals through up-to-date means? In either case, what future is it likely to have?

Judging from two recent and generally sympathetic books,* neoliberalism's future may not be as bright as its past. This is not because it lacks serious ideas for changing public policy; to the contrary, neoliberalism abounds in them and will almost certainly influence the language of Democratic-party platforms and candidates in the years ahead. The problem is that most of these ideas will not do much to change the impression—unfortunately a true one—that liberalism offers little for average Americans.

Take, for example, what is supposedly the most distinguishing feature of neoliberalism: its commitment to economic growth. One of the reasons traditional liberalism fell out of favor, neoliberals assert, is that it became too preoccupied with slicing up the economic pie instead of increasing its size. Under the liberal banner, a wide variety of special-interest groups were allowed to preserve and enhance their own positions, no matter what the consequences for everyone else. Industries, like steel and automobiles, enlisted government to protect them against foreign competition; labor unions obtained laws and regulations restricting conditions of employment; social-welfare organizations promoted and helped enact public policies that did more for themselves than for their clients. Ultimately, in the name of improving the quality of life, environmental groups sought to ban growth altogether. Liberalism not only tolerated this, say the neoliberals, but also encouraged and depended upon it. Somewhere between the New Deal and the Great Society it had come to view government as being no more than a broker among competing interests, and politics as the art of currying their favor.

Even if all this were true (and it is more than a bit of a caricature), what do neoliberals offer as an alternative? They want to simplify the tax system to remove distorted incentives for investment, an idea that first gained currency in liberal circles twenty years ago as a way to increase the taxes paid by the rich. They want to encourage entrepreneurship, but of a certain sort: the kind which, in the words of a prominent neoliberal writer, creates "enterprises that give people enriching work without making the world ugly or dangerous." They want to rely more on the market to govern economic activity, though they are not hesitant to recommend taxes or subsidies aimed at adjusting it to suit their own tastes.

Perhaps most tellingly, they want an industrial policy. In fact, an industrial policy is, according to Randall Rothenberg, ". . . the culmination of neoliberal themes, . . . a key to their social revolution." The basic premise of an industrial policy is that government, business, and labor need to cooperate more closely if the economy is to grow.

Disagreeing with such an insight is not easy, since it has been a feature of American political thought at least since the days of Alexander Hamilton. The real questions usually arise in connection with ways of translating the insight into prac-

* Randall Rothenberg, *The Neoliberals: Creating the New American Politics*, Simon & Schuster, 288 pp., $16.95; Charles Peters and Philip Kiesling, eds., *A New Road for America: The Neoliberal Movement*, Madison Books, 208 pp., $7.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tice. A number of neoliberals have offered such proposals, each maintaining that his differs from more traditional liberal efforts at national planning and regulation. Yet whatever the intentions of their authors, one cannot avoid the suspicion that all this industrial policy will amount to is the inevitable political brokering by another name.

Neoliberal ire extends not just to special interests but seemingly to anyone with specialized knowledge or training. Indeed, for a group whose vision of the future is a high-technology economy, neoliberals are curiously antipathetic toward experts. As they see it, the problem with business is that businessmen have become better at shuffling paper than at producing goods; the problem with the courts is that lawyers are filing too many wasteful and trivial lawsuits; the problem with health care is that doctors prefer expensive specialties to less costly primary care.

Government itself is in thrall to a tyranny of experts. Neoliberals believe, writes Rothenberg, "that the dependence on systems analysis [to solve society's ills] allowed public policy to be taken over by a class of experts who were removed from the pressures of representative democracy." This, in turn, opened the door to the interest groups. The result has been rigidity, a too-willing acceptance of doctrinaire solutions, and a resistance to rethinking policies in light of changing times—all of which have given liberalism a bad name.

Instead, neoliberalism calls for a more pragmatic politics that would employ "appropriate technologies" and hold those in power—especially in the bureaucracy—more accountable to the public. Just what this would mean in practice is anyone's guess. "Appropriate technologies" seem to encompass almost anything that sounds innovative, ranging from decentralizing government to increasing government funding for investment and "infrastructure" (i.e., public works), from turning doctors into public employees to enlarging the number of civil servants who are political appointees. In the name of wider accountability, neoliberals also seem anxious to limit campaign spending and regulate political advertising.

Even dispensing with those systems analysts seems doubtful. For what is odd about the neoliberal critique of expertise and bureaucracy is that it mostly comes not from piney-woods populists but from writers and politicians who have lots of advanced degrees and university affiliations themselves and who are, in many cases, quintessential Washington insiders. Indeed, insofar as neoliberalism has any broader constituency, one would expect to find it among the younger businessmen, lawyers, doctors, and policy analysts whose work neoliberal spokesmen regularly denounce. In part, all that is going on here may be the familiar attempt of one group of professionals to get ahead of another while not appearing too eager to do so.

NOTHING requires a political creed to be clear, consistent, and disinterested. In the case of neoliberalism, however, more than political calculation may be involved. The fixation on the role of government, on the "technologies" of public policy, on being practical instead of doctrinaire, serves to obscure the fact that neoliberals are not really sure what they want to govern for.

This is most obvious in neoliberal discussions of "military reform." In contrast to the New Left, or to the McGovernite Democrats, neoliberals claim to be tough-minded about the need for a strong national defense. They acknowledge global interdependence and competition, both economic and political. And they generally do not accept facile theories about curtailing American involvement overseas in order to do more at home.

Yet what neoliberals would do is hardly anything as straightforward as simply spending more on defense. Characteristically, neoliberals believe that a large part of the problem with current national-security policy is that it has been devised by military men and defense analysts whose thinking is out-of-date and inflexible. Instead of continuing along the same wasteful and ineffective path, they call for "reform." It is not enough to overwhelm our adversaries; "we've got to out-think them," Senator Hart has said.

Accordingly, neoliberals have put forward a variety of ideas for reshaping America's defenses. They range from adopting more sophisticated and mobile weapons to revising long-accepted tactical and strategic concepts, such as the role of seapower in protecting United States interests. Military research and procurement practices would be changed. NATO and other alliances would be reexamined. Some neoliberals even want to reinstitute the draft.

But while their plans for reform are numerous and specific, neoliberals have been a good deal more vague about what they would do with their improved military forces. In truth, they seem not to know. ". . . [A]side from a lukewarm obeisance to the notion of human rights and a confused acceptance of the concept of a nuclear freeze," concludes Rothenberg, "their foreign policy seems to consist of little more than opposition to the Reagan administration's intransigence on arms control and its intervention in Latin America." Far from differing from the New Left and the McGovernite Democrats, neoliberals share their opposition to using American power anywhere in the world. Even the neoliberal proposal to revive the draft would allow inductees to choose either the military or another kind of national service, as if soldiers were just Peace Corpsmen with sidearms.

This is symptomatic of the fundamental mistake in neoliberalism. It supposes that traditional liberalism went astray primarily in its methods rather than in its goals. But it was not systems analysis that caused liberals to pull back from an internationalist foreign policy. Nor was interest-group lobbying responsible for an economic policy that favored redistribution over growth. What really happened in these and other instances was that liberalism lost sight of where it—and the majority of Americans who supported it—wanted to go. Obtaining a shiny new set of tools will not be enough to put it back on course.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However appealing their rhetoric about economic growth and a stronger defense, the truth is that neoliberals either will not or cannot abandon the values that have come to dominate the Democratic party in recent years. Ultimately, "compassion" will remain more in favor than competition, restraining American power will be more worthy than projecting it, and "investment" will be just another word for social-welfare spending. When prominent neoliberals like Senator Hart and former California governor Jerry Brown urge a lowering of expectations about what government can do, the reason may be that they cannot make up their own minds about what they want it to do. They are trapped, like neoliberalism itself, between today's political realities and yesterday's fashionable beliefs.

Rothenberg is undoubtedly correct when he argues that neoliberalism will not succeed until it embraces a view of the national interest that differs from the "special interests of the liberal upper middle class." For that to occur may require a term in the White House and a costly education for us all. In the meantime, neoliberalism will probably contribute some useful ideas and enliven political debates. But remake the Democratic party? Not unless neoliberalism first remakes itself.

Music

Out of the Ghetto

Samuel Lipman

MUSIC has long seemed a Jewish interest, a Jewish art, and a Jewish business. In the United States, the generalization holds whether one looks at Lincoln Center or at Broadway, at New York or at Hollywood, at the piano or the violin—especially at the violin. What is true for the United States, furthermore, was true for Germany before Adolf Hitler; it seems even to have been true for the Soviet Union, where a persistent Jewish emigration is now carrying off large and probably irreplaceable components of Russian musical life.

The place of Jews in American song and show music is, one need hardly say, a matter of common knowledge and documentation. A line from Irving Berlin to Stephen Sondheim passes through such great figures, each in his own style, as George Gershwin, Richard Rodgers, and Leonard Bernstein. On the business side of Broadway, the achievements of Jewish producers—even Joseph Papp and his *Chorus Line* fit here—are basic to today's Great White Way.

In serious music, the branch of the art with which I will be concerned, the evidence for Jewish participation is overwhelming. It is not that Jews make up a majority of participants, either as performers or listeners; they do not. It is rather that so often their presence is vital to the carrying on of the musical enterprise. Across the country, in leading music festivals, in universities and conservatories, in the most prestigious orchestras and ensembles, Jews are by far the largest ethnic grouping, and self-consciously proud of the fact. This is so at the level of stars and supporting players alike. And it is so, one suspects, for the audience as well, and in particular for that portion of the audience most necessary to the support of music—patrons of taste and generosity.

What is the case across the country becomes doubly relevant in America's cultural capital, New York. Here, in the population center of world Jewry, Jews constitute at once the core and the husk of musical life. James Levine at the

SAMUEL LIPMAN *is* COMMENTARY*'s regular music critic and publisher of the* New Criterion. *His most recent book is* The House of Music *(Godine).* *The present article is adapted from a lecture Mr. Lipman delivered at Temple Emanu-El in New York City last November.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Metropolitan Opera, Beverly Sills at the New York City Opera, the still dynamic presence of the Philharmonic's laureate conductor Leonard Bernstein, even Zubin Mehta, who enjoys status as an honorary Jew because of his long association with Israel and its Philharmonic: these are the decision-makers in New York musical performance.

Among orchestra players the Jewish presence is equally imposing, whether one examines established institutions or the active and prosperous free-lance market. A Jew is the chairman of the board of Lincoln Center. The hall in which the New York Philharmonic plays is named for the Jew who endowed it, and this Jew, Avery Fisher, is the donor of frequently awarded prizes for the most brilliantly successful young musicians. These awards follow in the footsteps of, and to some extent overshadow, similar prizes established by the great patrician Jewish families of Naumburg and Leventritt. Many, if not most, of the prominent concert managers are Jewish, and the same can be said of the legion of publicists whose work is now so vital to the making and keeping of musical careers.

To enumerate with such ease is not, however, to explain. And it is no help to point out that what is true today has been true for many years in the past. Pointing with pride to the rich history of musical interest on the Lower East Side, to the settlement schools and the Educational Alliance, the old Lewisohn Stadium and the still flourishing Peoples' Symphony Concerts, belabors the obvious: Jews and music just seem to go together. The real historical question still remains: why did so many representatives of a people only recently emerged from the social confines of the ghetto and the religious obligations of a demanding faith choose the closest possible involvement with what was, after all, the most highly developed and abstract product of a supposedly alien culture?

Little of importance has been written on this subject in the past century. Historical treatments assign Jewish musicians to their countries of origin, and accounts of Jewish life and culture often seem to ignore music in favor of activities more easily connected with *Yiddishkeit* (as in the case of the theater) or with socialism (as in the case of trade-union activity). Non-Jewish authors avoid the subject of Jews in serious music on grounds, one supposes, of high-minded universalism and a desire to avoid giving offense; Jewish musical historians all too often seem either *parti pris* (as in the case of the composer Lazare Saminsky) or interested primarily in telling the story of the evolution and decline of liturgical music.

If one is willing to go back more than 125 years, it is indeed possible to find a serious work on this subject, Richard Wagner's troubling, distasteful *Das Judenthum in der Musik* ("Judaism in Music"), first published as an essay anonymously in 1850 and then under his own name in 1869. Wagner's argument is, at heart, simple. Jews have no culture of their own, if by culture is to be understood civilization; what passes with them for culture is nothing more than the guttural rantings of synagogue and marketplace, the primitive expression of the uncouth and the grasping. Out of a misguided tolerance (Wagner's argument proceeds), the purer Gentile races allow the envious Jews—especially those who seem eager to abandon their Jewishness—to penetrate the bastions of Christian and folk cultures, appropriating to themselves the styles of others and imitating, often with considerable success, the outward appearances of civilization. But underneath this Jewish cunning lies an inevitable corruption; basically, what the Jew does not understand he hates with a fierce resentment, and mongrelizes as a token of his rage. For the Jew who attempts this passage from one world to another, Wagner descries a fate of loneliness, of isolation not just from the culture he has striven to join but also from the origins he has abandoned.

After proper allowance has been made for Wagner's own envy of his fellow composers who happened to be both Jewish and famous—chiefly Mendelssohn, Halévy, and Meyerbeer—one is still left with the essence of a serious charge. At its core, the charge is that Jews can neither understand the majority national culture in which they live nor participate in its creation—at least so long as they remain Jews. Put in a slightly different way, the charge seems even more stark: Jews cannot be both self-conscious Jews and citizens of the wider cultural world around them.

Of course, the history of Western civilization as a whole provides a continuing refutation of Wagner's xenophobic speculations. And even in Wagner's own domain of music, a domain in which for so many years he ruled supreme, evidence is not lacking that he was wrong. In what follows I mean to provide additional evidence, not from European music, or even from American musical life as a whole, but from the stories of three men, each a Jew, an American, a New Yorker, and a musician. The evidence is of a special kind, being drawn from memoirs and hence reflecting an impulse not just to record but to justify; and the three cases are quite disparate. But perhaps precisely for that reason they throw an especially intense light on the way in which—in direct contradiction of Wagner's argument—serious music has afforded many Jews an avenue into the wider culture while at the same time allowing them to remain conscious, even if not at all times proud, of their identities as Jews.

Samuel Chotzinoff, born in 1889, began his public musical career as an accompanist to several of the greatest musicians of the day (all, incidentally, Jewish): the renowned singer Alma Gluck and the violinists Efrem Zimbalist and Jascha Heifetz; he later married Heifetz's sister Pauline. From 1925 to 1930 Chotzinoff was also Deems Taylor's successor as music critic on the New York *World*, and in 1934 he became critic for the New York *Post*. In 1935 he was able to persuade Arturo Toscanini to come out of retirement to direct the specially founded NBC Symphony

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orchestra. Chotzinoff then continued his work for NBC as general music director of the network, and in 1951 he became producer of the NBC Opera Theater, probably the most innovative attempt at operatic presentation ever made in this country.

Chotzinoff died in 1964, his chief legacy being two richly detailed volumes of memoirs covering his life, personal and musical, from childhood through his twenty-first year. These two books—*A Lost Paradise* (1955) and *Day's at the Morn* (1964)—are the most substantial accounts we possess of a musical growing up on the Lower East Side. The story Chotzinoff tells teems with the life of the ghetto, a life rich in both deprivation and aspiration, in large setbacks and pregnant successes.

Chotzinoff was born in Russia, the first son of an ill-assorted marriage. His father, deeply pious but only superficially educated, had run a small *cheder* (a religious school for young boys) in the old country; in the United States he was only intermittently able to earn what even in those days was only a pittance. The older children in this large family worked; Chotzinoff's mother slaved, scrounged, scrimped, and borrowed. Indeed it was his mother who, as in so many of these immigrant families, held everything together. Perhaps because she was the daughter of a famous rabbi, she had always felt, as her son put it, a confidence in her special destiny. Where this destiny lay she did not know; what she only vaguely could have known, but what became increasingly clear to her son, was that the fulfillment of her life would be worked through his unfolding in the world. Toward this end she gave her son her love, her drudgery, and her self-sacrifice. And as a natural corollary, his two sisters (children of his mother by an unhappy earlier marriage) seemed willing to contribute almost as much.

Because apartments were small and crowded, and because the world was so tempting, Chotzinoff spent much time on the street, where he heard the sound of a piano coming from the basement of a house on Henry Street. He often found himself drawn to the place, and listened with growing absorption. Finally, driven as if by a higher power, at the age of ten he presented himself at the door and, once admitted, arranged lessons for the paltry sum of ten cents an hour—a fee which included an hour's free practice daily on the teacher's piano.

After Chotzinoff had completed a year's study, a private little piano recital in his teacher's studio—unattended, of course, by his pious father—confirmed his mother and his sisters in the value of their sacrifices. Soon he relieved them of the necessity of paying for his lessons at all by finding another teacher. This one, a blowzy young woman anarchist more interested in her consumptive poet-lover than in music, did not charge for lessons, on the condition that Chotzinoff use her "freedom method," an approach which stressed the "soul"—for the most part meretricious—of the music at the expense of both the accuracy of the notes being played and the technical equipment necessary to play them.

FINALLY the family's already straitened circumstances gave way to financial disaster. Chotzinoff's parents could hardly manage to feed themselves, let alone their youngest children. So Chotzinoff, still in his early teens, began to give piano lessons and even to teach English. A purchase on credit of the first volume of the Beethoven piano sonatas from Katz's music store failed to convey to him just how inadequate the "freedom method" was. Fortunately, however, a chance encounter with a family friend who was a member of the Metropolitan Opera Chorus propelled him in the direction of truly professional piano instruction.

The first pedagogue he approached demanded real money on the line; that was quite out of the question. Another teacher—this one a Christian (as if to mark how far the boy already had come)—set a price of one dollar but was not insistent on collecting, and he did teach technique. This teacher, furthermore, not only taught well but also invited Chotzinoff to his home in Brooklyn for extended lessons. Here in addition to music were delicious meals at which the boy ate his first non-kosher food and heard the teacher and his wife explain the philosophical anarchism they espoused. And on one terrible occasion he stayed overnight, leaving behind a bedbug brought all the way from the Lower East Side as mute evidence of his presence on heathen territory.

For the first time Chotzinoff now heard a real orchestra, playing the Fifth Symphony of Beethoven in a Peoples' Symphony Society concert at the Cooper Union. Now too he began to go to performances at the Metropolitan Opera, where his first experience was *Die Walküre*; Wagner gradually became his first love, and in the German's transmutation of Nordic sagas in the *Ring* and Celtic myths in *Tristan* the Jewish boy, late of Russia and then of Rivington Street, found what seemed his true homeland.

Again he changed teachers. The new one, Jeanne Franko, was the sister of the conductor in whose orchestra at the Educational Alliance Chotzinoff was filling in missing parts on the piano. Both Sam Franko as conductor and his sister as a teacher were stern uptown Jews, rich in social contacts, proud of being German rather than Russian in origin, and musically arrogant. They put the boy through his social and musical paces, hoping, one must assume, that his vaulting ambition would salve his spiritual wounds.

AN ARRANGEMENT was quickly made for the young pianist to play the Mozart D minor Concerto K. 466 with the Alliance orchestra. Chotzinoff was now for the first time soloist in a concerto; for the first time he played a real concert grand piano, and for the first time visited the Steinway & Sons temple of immortal pianists and pianos, then on 14th Street. After a bit of stage fright, the concerto went brilliantly; Chotzinoff received kudos even from those who had looked down on him as an amateur. Best of all, Katz of Katz's music store asked

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him to come down to the shop afterward to continue the celebration.

Flushed with pride, Chotzinoff's mother threw a party at home for relatives and friends in honor of her now famous son. Though he knew and appreciated the sacrifices she had made, the pull of his new life was too strong. The first volume of his memoirs ends with a passage summing up in moving terms a personal experience known to every Jewish talent (at least every Jewish talent of a certain period) on the verge of growing up:

> *Pesach* [Passover] wine and *taeglech* [honey confections] were passed around. Someone broke into a Chassidic song of a jolly nature. It was a tune well known to everybody, and soon others joined in, clapping their hands in rhythm. One of the bearded men, overcome by the *Pesach* wine and his own emotions, executed a Chassidic dance, vainly trying to force my mother to be his vis-à-vis. All at once I felt a longing to be at Katz's store in the company of fellow musicians, to drink in knowledgeable words of praise, to bask in the adulation of colleagues, to be a part of the *real* world. The longing was like an ache that throbbed with increasing intensity. Did I dare leave the house at this moment? My mother would grieve. The guests would not understand. I would be like a groom stealing away alone in the midst of the wedding festivities.
>
> . . . I ran down the stairs two at a time. On the way to East Broadway I began to feel ashamed of what I had done, and thought of returning before my absence could be noticed. But when I opened the door of Katz's music store and beheld the familiar company leaning against the counter, the diminutive form and shrewd, eager face of the proprietor behind it, and heard voices loud in argument about music, I forgot my home and all the people in it.

CHOTZINOFF'S second volume, devoted to the years remaining before his majority, would at first glance seem to express just how far he had come from home. *Day's at the Morn*, the book's title, is taken from Browning's famous poem, *Pippa Passes*; the book itself begins with a glossy preface by Sir Osbert Sitwell, the English aristocrat turned novelist and memoirist of his eccentric family.

But in fact Samuel Chotzinoff did not, as a young man, leave home. While he continued his studies he became increasingly the support of his family. He gave piano lessons, he began to accompany frequently, and he even managed to find time, while living at home, to go to Columbia. As he rose in the musical world he also tried to bring his new life into his mother's milieu. In a long passage filled with embarrassing detail, he describes the difficulties of entertaining the stuffy and patronizing Daniel Gregory Mason, professor of music at Columbia, and his wife at Chotzinoff's parents' home for an evening of chamber music.

The last section of the book is given over to the circumstances—at once fortuitous and somehow preordained—of Chotzinoff's encounter with the violinist Efrem Zimbalist, then making his first tour of America. Through his association with Zimbalist, Chotzinoff was catapulted not only into the refined world of rich German Jews but also into the giddy atmosphere of New York nabobs like the Vanderbilts. In their reflected glory he himself radiated glory: what Zimbalist signified as a prince of Russian Jewry to the entire Diaspora, Chotzinoff now meant to the teeming world of musical life on the Lower East Side in general and to his own family circle in particular.

THROUGHOUT Chotzinoff's memoirs, indeed, one cannot escape the impression that he and his mother—and through her his whole family, and even by implication the entire Jewish people—met on the common ground of his own destiny. In the idealized world of his dreams everything was allowed, and everything was possible. When, to cite only the most poignant example, his mother for the first time in her life breaks the proscription against riding on the Sabbath in order to hear her son accompany Zimbalist at Carnegie Hall, he describes her behavior in exalted terms:

> That night when I undressed and got into bed, my mother came to me in the dark, and hugged and kissed me and wept for joy. She told me that when she saw me come out on the stage of Carnegie Hall, she knew complete fulfillment for the first time in her life—everything she had ever hoped for had come to pass. . . . As for her breaking the Sabbath law, she was confident that the Deity would not overlook the exceptional nature of her case. If it was permissible in the sight of God for an ailing Jew, even for a paragon of piety like a rabbi, to eat on Yom Kippur (and it *was* permissible; both her father and mine had vouched for it), there must surely be some provision in Heaven for a mother who yearned to see with her own eyes the public triumph of her only son. I asked her what she would do if my father found out and accused her to her face. "I would deny it," she said indignantly.

The element of egotism in all this is undeniable; but so too is Chotzinoff's fierce intention to hold together, to the utmost of his abilities, all of the apparently disjointed realms of his life, of which not the least precious to him was his life as a Jew.

TO MOVE from Samuel Chotzinoff to the recently deceased Jan Peerce, a vastly more prominent musical performer, is to leave the world of an aspiring intellectual for that of a born entertainer. Peerce, born Jacob Pincus Perelmuth in 1904 in a cold-water walkup flat on Manhattan's Orchard Street, was not only a famous opera singer, a star whose audience began to approach in size that of popular idols; he was in addition, and perhaps not unrelatedly, a very public Jew. As such his is the model of a career made by a man whose Jewish origins were both a passport to and an emblem of his fame.

In social terms, Peerce's early life did not differ greatly from that of Chotzinoff. Economically, his family was somewhat better off; his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

father was the head presser in a garment factory, and he moonlighted at odd jobs to add to the family income. His mother, like Chotzinoff's, had higher ambitions for her son. But in Peerce's case these seem to have taken a rather pedestrian form; the description we have of them comes from his "as-told-to" memoir, *The Bluebird of Happiness*:

> My mother had always dreamed of playing a musical instrument, but in her little *shtetl* of Horodetz there was nobody who could afford one and nobody who could give lessons—not even a fiddler on the roof. But it was part of my mother's culture that a person should grow up on speaking terms with an instrument. And this was part of what she expected from the New World for her child.

So he started the violin, because a piano would be too expensive to buy; the lessons were paid for by his mother, who took in paying guests at dinner, and then boarders. Peerce does not appear to have been very gifted at the violin, but he did begin earning a living by playing in hotel dance bands in the Catskills and in a catering establishment his parents had come to own.

He sang, too, at first as a boy alto in a synagogue choir. A woman who worked with his father in the garment factory took Peerce to concerts at the Metropolitan Opera House, and on his own he heard music at the Educational Alliance. At Katz's music store—the same institution central to Chotzinoff's formation—the proprietor tried to dissuade Peerce from embarking on singing lessons, but Peerce took them anyway, on a "scholarship" from an accompanist to the great tenor Giovanni Martinelli. This teacher, however, seemed to lack the dedication to higher things which marked Chotzinoff's mentors; when Peerce later started to become successful, the teacher sued him for the amount of the "scholarship"—and won.

In the early 30's he got his big break. While performing as a singing violinist at an Astor Hotel benefit for a vaudeville team, he was heard by Samuel "Roxy" Rothafel. This mogul of the entertainment world was then getting together the attractions for the newly opened Radio City Music Hall. Peerce soon became his protégé, and after an unheralded beginning—his first stint at the Music Hall consisted of singing anonymously, behind a curtain, to organ accompaniment—his career began to gather steam.

It now became clear that neither his original name of Perelmuth nor its related successors would fit his activities, at first in the Music Hall and soon on radio as well. Finally he metamorphosed the slightly too Christian-seeming John Pierce into its present form of Jan Peerce. He recorded his first hit, "The Bluebird of Happiness," but made little money from it. At last he got a call from Samuel Chotzinoff, then serving as a functionary for Toscanini. The *maestro* had heard Peerce singing Siegmund in a broadcast of the first act of *Die Walküre* from the Music Hall, and wanted to audition him for the tenor part in the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven.

It is a consistent weakness of the Peerce memoirs that we are nowhere told just where this rough diamond acquired the kind of sophistication with music and words necessary to please someone as exacting and arbitrary as Toscanini. But whatever Peerce's secret may have been, Toscanini liked the audition, and for over a decade the conductor used him in a succession of radio broadcasts of the NBC Symphony as well as a number of now-classic recordings. In 1942 Peerce made his debut at the Met, where he was successful for many years both musically and as a box-office attraction. He later became active as a singer of a refined classical and baroque repertory with the Bach Aria Group, and still later appeared on Broadway replacing Zero Mostel as Tevye in *Fiddler on the Roof*. And with a longevity of career rare among singers, he continued to sing in concert with success as he approached the age of eighty.

Along the way, in a not untroubled personal life, he fought to keep his Jewish faith and its observance. Early in his career he faced down his employer when "Roxy" Rothafel wanted him to perform the liturgy in full cantorial garb on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur at Radio City. Even more remarkably, though less publicly, he managed to adhere to the dietary laws while performing for and being entertained by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. at Pocantico Hills. His High Holiday services at Grossinger's were famous, as were the large and opulent Passover celebrations he used to hold at his New York suburban home. When he died this past December at the age of eighty, musical culture and Jewish culture alike lost a faithful son.

We come finally to Aaron Copland, the most important composer America has yet produced. Aaron Copland has written a body of work both popular and cerebral; in the process he has created a music of beauty and force which has invaded the otherwise sacrosanct group of European composers who have written our repertory of great and frequently performed pieces. He has done more: in such works as *Billy the Kid* (1938), *Rodeo* (1942), and *Appalachian Spring* (1944), he has created the characteristic musical sound by which cultivated Americans hear themselves among the nations. It is perhaps not too much to say that in his best works he has created a folk music which not only speaks to his own nation but also achieves a kind of universal comprehensibility.

It must be stated that the man who has accomplished all this has in the past shown no particular desire to be connected with his Jewish origins. Though born in 1900 to an immigrant family of Russian Jews once named Kaplan, Copland for many years paid little public attention to his social and cultural past. Indeed, in the 1980 national celebration of his eightieth birthday, he appeared as an American composer and an American phenomenon. In so doing, he was being consistent with the version of his early life he had promulgated in an autobiographical sketch,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

written as a chapter of his 1941 book, *Our New Music*:

> I was born on a street in Brooklyn that can only be described as drab. It had none of the garish color of the ghetto, none of the charm of an old New England thoroughfare, or even the rawness of a pioneer street. . . . It probably resembled most one of the outer districts of lower-middle-class London, except that it was peopled largely by Italians, Irish, and Negroes. I mention it because it was there that I spent the first twenty years of my life. Also, because it fills me with mild wonder each time I realize that a musician was born on that street.
>
> Music was the last thing that anyone would have connected with it. In fact, no one had ever connected music with my family or with my street. The idea was entirely original with me.

By 1968, however, Copland was beginning to lift the veil by which he had shrouded his past. In a conversation with the musicologist Edward T. Cone, printed in the periodical *Perspectives of New Music*, the following colloquy took place:

> *E.T.C.*: Were you brought up as an Orthodox Jew?
>
> *A.C.*: Well, my father was president of the oldest synagogue in Brooklyn—it used to be off Court Street, down near Borough Hall. I was born on Washington Avenue, possibly half an hour away, so it wasn't a question of going there every Saturday; but on the High Holidays, *naturally* [emphasis added], we went. Nevertheless I can't say it was anything more than a conventional religious association.
>
> *E.T.C.*: Were you Bar Mitzvah?
>
> *A.C.*: Oh, yes, it was a big affair! I never mastered Hebrew properly, though. I merely learned how to read it, with only a hazy understanding of its meaning. I'm sorry to say I can't speak a word of it today.

WHAT a pleasant surprise, then, to find in the composer's recently published memoirs a detailed account of his early years which makes clear both his extensive Jewish background and the rich musical life around him during his childhood. As for the Jewish background, one fascinating paragraph in the just-published *Copland: 1900 Through 1942** tells a story with which the eighty-four-year-old composer now feels comfortable:

> Sometime before I was born, my parents had enrolled as members of Brooklyn's oldest synagogue, Baith Israel Anshei-Emes, situated at Kane and Court Streets in downtown Brooklyn. On high holy days you weren't supposed to ride, and it took us about forty-five minutes to walk there. By the time I was almost thirteen and being readied with Hebrew lessons for my Bar Mitzvah, my father had been president of the synagogue for several years. By curious coincidence our rabbi, Israel Goldfarb, was himself a composer of liturgical music and the possessor of a fine baritone voice. Rabbi Goldfarb was a sensitive human being and an effective leader of his congregation. The part of my Bar Mitzvah I recall most vividly was the banquet—it actually took place in [Copland's father's] store! Relations came from near and far. The merchandise was moved away and an area cleared where we could set up tables. Religious observance in the Copland family was mostly a matter of conventional participation rather than a deep commitment to otherworldly experience. Despite this, one very solemn moment remains vivid in my memory: on Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, the elder graybeards of the congregation stretched themselves out prone in the aisles of the synagogue and prayed for forgiveness of man's evil ways. In a lighter vein, it was the small dance bands at Jewish weddings and parties that fascinated me.

The Jewish life around young Copland was not only religious. Not yet sixteen, he was sent by his family to spend a few weeks in the Catskills at the Fairmont Hotel in Tannersville, "the gathering place for well-known Jewish literary people." There he met Aaron Schaffer, twenty-one years old, an intellectual, and the son of a "respected" Baltimore rabbi. The young Schaffer was studying French and French literature at Johns Hopkins; most important, he was a music lover who encouraged Copland to "play the pieces I was studying and beginning to write." Indeed, at this time in Copland's life, and for many years after—even after his departure for France in 1921 and his studies with the very Catholic Nadia Boulanger—the influences on Copland, and his closest friends as well, were Jewish.

Whether one looks at teachers or at associates, one finds Jews everywhere in Copland's life. His piano studies began with Leopold Wolfsohn, and continued with Victor Wittgenstein and Clarence Adler; his composition teacher before Boulanger was Rubin Goldmark. Among orchestra conductors, the two who championed his music were Serge Koussevitzky, who in the 1920's and 1930's was the first to introduce him to American audiences as a major composer and a pedagogical eminence, and Leonard Bernstein, who has so basically contributed to making Copland the grand old man of American music. Nor should the influence of his relative Harold Clurman be ignored: it was Clurman, himself one day to become a grand old man of the American theater, who as Copland's roommate in Paris and later back in the United States was the composer's guide to a wider theatrical and literary world. It must be mentioned too that an early financial backer of Copland's during the difficult early days of the Depresson was another relative, Percy Uris, of the famous real-estate family.

As FOR Copland's springing full-blown from a musical desert, that also, like the sanitized 1941 version of his Jewish origins, no longer washes. Here, too, the material in his new memoirs, so different in tone and extent from his earlier account, deserves quotation:

> Whatever music we heard at home was supplied either by my oldest brother, Ralph (violin), or my sister, Laurine (piano). Ralph studied with Heinrich Schra-

* By Aaron Copland and Vivian Perlis, St. Martin's/Marek, 402 pp., $24.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dieck, a German violinist of some reputation, while Laurine had her lessons with Mrs. Schradieck. Ralph and Laurine played duets at home—mostly potpourris from operas—but their top accomplishment was a fair rendition of the Mendelssohn Violin Concerto. . . .

WHAT, then, have we learned, notwithstanding the fragmentary and often singular evidence available, in our consideration of these musicians and Jews? At the outset, we must stipulate that the music they wrote, played, or sang, was, in the main, Jewish neither in its origins nor in its presenting features. Aaron Copland has written a demonstrably American music; Samuel Chotzinoff played an exclusively Western European repertory; Jan Peerce made his great operatic career singing Italian operatic roles, not just in competition with Italian artists but to the taste of the greatest Italian conductor the world has yet known.

At the same time, there can be no doubt that their Jewish origins influenced the work of these men. Though Copland wrote only one demonstrably Jewish work—the 1929 *Vitebsk* trio for piano, violin, and cello—the critic and composer Arthur Berger has found Copland's melodic declamation as a whole influenced by the "psalmodic chants of the synagogue with their biblical air of prophecy and gloom . . . from time to time, and often where we least expect it, a Hebraic suggestion is not unlikely to enter . . . a chant-like dwelling on a single note." It is not accidental that Chotzinoff, who as a boy had sung in a synagogue choir on the High Holidays, spent most of his performing life accompanying Russian Jewish violinists. And Jan Peerce too found an easy passage between the expressive requirements of being a *chazzan* (cantor) and being an Italian tenor.

But more is involved here than the existence or nonexistence of specifically Jewish musical elements. The achievement of Aaron Copland suggests that a Jew, coming out of a cohesive immigrant society, can nonetheless both express and form the musical voice of the American people. He does not—he could hardly have been expected to—express it in a characteristically Jewish manner; but his achievement both provides his country with a viable music and at the same time frees the entire discussion from the blighted terms in which Wagner framed it when he claimed that no Jew, however assimilated, could speak for the wider nation.

The careers of Samuel Chotzinoff and Jan Peerce help us understand something else: just why it is that so many Jews have, over the last century, gone into music. The evidence they provide, to be sure in a New York context, strongly suggests that the great cause has been the powerful desire, rooted in centuries of oppression, to see one's children rise in the world.

Why *culture* should have been the particular medium through which this striving was expressed is perhaps less clear. Ordinary business and commercial activity on the one hand, and the professions on the other, were at all times a more rationally attractive area for the investment of talent, industry, and scarce economic resources. Part of the explanation here must lie in the Jewish tradition of literacy and reverence for learning; as the world at large became increasingly secularized, some Jews naturally transferred their loyalties away from religious learning and toward the acquisition and mastery of secular culture.

Even in these terms, there was something special about the hold music had on immigrant Jewry, not least in New York. Some of its appeal can be traced to the heritage of cantorial singing; Peerce expresses this attitude when he writes that "the most exciting voice in which to worship G-d is the tenor. It just seems to have something more to say to G-d." Jews were thus ready, as they had been in Renaissance Italy centuries earlier, to enter musically into a secular and even Christian milieu. What made this possible on a wider scale in the 19th century was the special position of music in the larger world of which the Jews were now starting to become aware.

Already in czarist Russia serious music was so highly valued in the educated community that it provided a way by which the most gifted Jewish performers could become, in theory at least, equal and respected members of the polity. In America, the years before World War I saw the advancement of art music as part of the push for educational uplift which was sweeping the country. And still more fundamentally, music at this time was riding the crest of a cultural wave as the great aesthetic achievement of the age, the leading edge of artistic and intellectual progress, and, not coincidentally, the most elegant means for the middle classes to employ their leisure time.

BUT what was the effect on Jewish musicians themselves of this choice of direction for their efforts? Did the Jewish movement into music serve the purposes of assimilation? For Aaron Copland, given the way he first approached the recounting of his life, it seems likely that music was indeed a way out of home, cultural origins, and perhaps even of being self-consciously Jewish. For Jan Peerce, by contrast, a career as an opera singer went hand-in-hand with public Jewish identification and activity. In the case of Samuel Chotzinoff, the evidence we possess of the first twenty-one years of his life suggests that he was able to bring the success he had achieved in the secular, non-Jewish world home to his family, without false pride or shame.

Beyond what we know of these three men, moreover, it seems clear that wherever successful Jews have gone in music they have encountered other Jews as colleagues, patrons, and audience. If, for many Jews, music has served as a vehicle of assimilation into the wider culture, it has also served at the same time as a vehicle for the preservation of a distinctively Jewish identity and even, sometimes against their own best efforts, as a vehicle for Jewish survival. So, to a significant degree, it still serves today.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eddie Murphy, American

Richard Grenier

If the world of entertainment is any guide, something rather large is happening on the American racial scene. In recent months three events have occurred, each in a distinct entertainment medium. The names of these events are: (1) Michael Jackson, (2) Bill Cosby, and (3) Eddie Murphy.

In popular music, someone is always on top. There is always a number one, and a number two. But in the memory of Americans alive today, there have been at most three super-super-super star singers or groups, of the kind that makes girls faint and drives crowds hysterical. Over the years, Frank Sinatra, Elvis Presley, and the Beatles stand out, strange, giant monuments thrown up by the *Zeitgeist*, and all white. A fourth name has now been added to this august list: Michael Jackson. No black entertainer has ever drawn such huge and feverish mobs (and white mobs) as did Michael Jackson during his "Victory Tour" of the United States in the summer of 1984.

In September of the same year, NBC brought veteran comic Bill Cosby back in a new TV comedy series slotted for 8 P.M. on Thursday nights. It was a "black" series, but with a twist—it was about an upper-middle-class black family (Cosby an obstetrician, his wife a lawyer), which is to say, the comic stereotypes in it had nothing to do with race. It was about an American family that just happened to be black. Nothing in plot or situation depended on being black in a white society. *The Cosby Show* shot to the top of the ratings list—number one—and now, some five months later, it has never been out of the week's top ten.

But perhaps the most dazzling rise of all has been that of a twenty-three-year-old black from Long Island named Eddie Murphy. A member of the third generation of performers on NBC-TV's *Saturday Night Live* (Bill Murray, Chevy Chase, John Belushi, Dan Aykroyd, and Gilda Radner had all come out of the first), Murphy made his first two movies in 1983, *48 Hours* and *Trading Places*. Both ended up among the ten biggest money-makers of the year. But Murphy was still suspected of being a mere novelty, possibly just a flash in the pan, especially after the failure of his next film, *Best Defense*. The entry of his fourth movie, *Beverly Hills Cop*, into the lists for the big Christmas competition of 1984 was attended with much curiosity, particularly since Murphy was playing a role once intended for Sylvester Stallone.*

The film took off with such velocity as to leave Hollywood somewhat stunned. At the close of the Christmas-New Year's holiday season (for the movie industry the year's second most important after summer), *Beverly Hills Cop* not only led the field, it had brought in three times as much money as its closest competitor (*2010*), while in third position was a film starring both Clint Eastwood and Burt Reynolds. In 1984, Hollywood's aggregate domestic box-office returns crossed the $4-billion line for the first time, a result which had been anticipated by *Variety* months before. "But nobody knew at the time," reported the trade journal, "that Eddie Murphy would almost single-handedly be pulling the year's final tally" to an all-time record.

It had never happened before. No one knew how long it would last. No black actor before had ever come within a country mile. But after years of laments over the dearth of roles for black actors and actresses, suddenly, out of the blue, young Eddie Murphy was the biggest star in Hollywood.

How did such an extraordinary thing happen? Talk of "crossover appeal" ("black" entertainment which appeals to white audiences as well as black) seems somehow out of date. Eddie Murphy's audience does not just include whites; it is overwhelmingly white. He lives, and excels, entirely in what would once have been considered exclusively a white man's world. His home is in Alpine, New Jersey. His idol is Elvis Presley. He is patterning his career on that of Bob Hope—whose cheeky confidence his own style recalls in an eerie way.

Nor does Eddie Murphy interpret "black experience," except to a minor degree. He interprets American experience. If he did not, the whole thing, simply, would not have happened. He has freed himself entirely from the Dick Gregory tradition of playing to white guilt. The fact that, for almost a generation, black satirists attacking American racism have been able to count on the instant sympathy of white audiences all over the country leads one to think that the racist America of liberal

---

Richard Grenier *is* Commentary's *regular movie critic, and the author of a novel,* The Marrakesh One-Two, *which has just been issued in paperback by Penguin.*

* Hollywood has seen more bizarre substitutions than this. When Chartoff and Winkler, producers of the *Rocky* series, were at the beginning of their careers, they were pressing eagerly for a screenplay that had been written for Julie Christie. The studio finally gave them the green light, but they were told they could not have Julie Christie. In her place they were offered: Elvis Presley. After a lightning rewrite, the film went before the cameras.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doctrine has not existed for many years now, and is, indeed, a piece of liberal mythology. Eddie Murphy, in any event, will have none of it. Actually, much of his material is devoted to satirizing, not racism, but liberal stereotypes about racism, and there is no better example of this than the show Murphy gave just before Christmas 1984 when he returned as honored guest-host to the television program of which he is an alumnus, *Saturday Night Live*.

MURPHY's hallmark is a kind of sassy self-assurance, strangely without malice. He gets off the most biting lines in a sunny manner which magically neutralizes any suspicion that he himself is malicious. But cheeky, he is. Greeting the audience on the Christmas show, he explains that he swore he would never do *Saturday Night Live* again because "the show is *terrible*!" [Hilarious laughter] "I did *48 Hours* and *Trading Places* and I felt like I was an *actor* now. It was like—*Saturday Night Live*? *Huh*!" Unfortunately, he says, he soon made another movie called *Best Defense*, which failed dismally:

> It turned out to be the worst movie ever done in the history of anything and, all of a sudden, I wasn't that hot no more, so I called up the producer of *Saturday Night Live* and I go, "You still got my dressing room?" . . . So I signed the contract for the Christmas show, and while I was waiting for Christmas to come, sitting in the house, all by myself, somebody brought a script for a movie called *Beverly Hills Cop*. [Sustained applause and cheering] *Beverly Hills Cop* is a hit! All of a sudden I'm an actor again! But it's too late to pull out! . . . Now listen. Not everything on this show is hysterical. They lied to you. You're going to see some things that suck. I want you to be prepared for that.

As can be seen, Murphy's material contains a strong strain of veracity. At this point in his opening monologue, in any case, Murphy, in a smooth transition, adopts the solemn manner of a person about to make an appeal for victims of cerebral palsy. "Now before we get onto the funny stuff," he says, "I want you to see something that I take very seriously. I want you to watch something. Watch this." After a dissolve, Murphy is back, speaking with the utmost gravity:

> A lot of people talk about racial prejudice. And some people have gone so far as to say that actually there are two Americas, one black and one white. [Sternly] But talk is cheap. So I decided to look at the problem myself, first hand, to go underground, and actually *experience* America [he drops his voice] as a white man.

Da da! trumpets blare portentously. "I hired the best makeup

"Writing is a struggle against silence."
—Carlos Fuentes

WIESEL

AGAINST SILENCE:
The Voice and Vision of ELIE WIESEL

Compiled and Edited by Professor Irving Abrahamson. He is Professor of English at the Kennedy-King Campus of The City Colleges of Chicago, a distinguished editor, a film script consultant, a literary critic, a book reviewer, and a special adviser to the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.

A voice of conscience for all mankind, Wiesel here displays his literary versatility, artistic richness, and deep emotional range. Never before have these qualities, which grace all of his writings, been exhibited in such a wide and sustained fashion.

A quarter-century of works previously unpublished have been meticulously compiled over a ten-year period by Professor Irving Abrahamson. These three enduring and illuminating volumes reveal the man of thought, the man of vision and the artist who embodies both.

This major literary work will be available in the spring of 1985 in a regular trade edition as well as a special limited edition for collectors.*

Introductory essay, bibliography, index and glossary.

*Call or write for details. *Regular edition: 3 volumes, cloth, $60.00*

Holocaust Publications
A Non-Profit Organization • Publishers of the HOLOCAUST LIBRARY
216 WEST 18th STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10011 (212) 691-9220

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people in the business," Murphy continues, maintaining dramatic intensity. "If I was going to pass as a white man, everything had to be *perfect*." We watch as Murphy is transformed into a rather plausible, pink-faced white man. He studied for this role very carefully, the actor explains, watching the television serial *Dynasty* ("See? See how they walk? I got to remember to keep my butt real tight") and reading Hallmark greeting cards ("You always mean lots more to me, than you could ever guess. For you have done so much to fill, my life with happi-ness"). At last he is ready!

As the audience screams with laughter, Eddie Murphy begins his life "underground" as a white man. The first thing he discovers, when he tries to buy a newspaper, is that white people don't have to pay for things like black people. *For white people, everything is free!* Riding a bus, he makes another startling discovery. On the bus there is only one other black man, and when he gets off at 45th Street, the conductor, thinking there are no more blacks aboard, turns on dance-band music and the passengers begin to dance and party, turning the bus into a kind of mobile Club Med resort. *So this is the way white people really live!* Murphy intones: "The problem was much more serious than I had ever imagined."

His next experience as a white man is borrowing money from a bank. He is first received by a black loan officer, who points out regretfully that "Mr. White," although he wants to borrow $50,000, has no collateral, no credit, and even no ID. But the bank manager, seeing that the client is a *white man*, sends the loan officer off and grants the loan with no "formalities." Murphy, catching on now to the way things are done in the white world, joins in the bank manager's laughter and, referring to the departed black loan officer, giggles, "What a silly nee-grow!"

As the sketch closes, Murphy, black again, asks, "So what did I learn from all this?" And then, as *My Country, 'Tis of Thee* swells in the background, he concludes solemnly, "Well, I learned that we still have a *very* long way to go in this country before *all* men are *truly* equal. But I'll tell you something. I've got a lot of friends. And we've got a lot of makeup."

THIS sketch would not seem to need much interpretation. But Eddie Murphy does not let up. In the next sketch he plays the South African bishop, Desmond Tutu, winner of the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize, on a U.S. television talk show where he is upstaged by another guest, Boston College's star quarterback Doug Flutie, winner of football's Heisman Trophy. As Flutie is explaining his "Hail Mary" pass, wherein he drops back, closes his eyes, and prays "Hail Mary, full of grace, let this ball fall into the hands of your humble ser-



LibertyPress
LibertyClassics

American Political Writing During The Founding Era: 1760-1805

In Two Volumes

Edited by Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz

These volumes provide a selection of seventy-five pieces relating to the founding of republican government in North America, most of which have been available only in research libraries. The editors have examined many hundreds of pamphlets, sermons, newspaper articles, and other documents in order to select those which they believe are of highest intellectual quality. Volume II includes an annotated bibliography of five-hundred worthy pieces which could not be printed even in this extensive collection.

This work is intended to provide a platform once again for those who contributed in anonymity to the new nation's preparation for self-government or were pushed from public memory by those contending for a place in history.
Hardcover $28.50 the set;
Softcover $13.50 the set

Prepayment is required on all orders not for resale. We pay book rate postage on prepaid orders. Please allow 4 to 6 weeks for delivery. *All* orders from outside the United States *must* be prepaid *in U.S. dollars*. To order, or for a copy of our catalogue, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. G105
Indianapolis, IN 46250

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The definitive study on an important subject."
Walter Laqueur, *The New Republic*

"A **fascinating, disturbing picture**.... this book will have a significant impact on all future writing on the subject."
New York Times Book Review

"An **important book** that also deals with major questions such as the role of business in society."
—*Library Journal*

$25.00 *At better bookstores or send your check to:*
Oxford University Press
Box 900, 200 Madison Ave., NY 10016

Now in paperback!

TOWARD THE FINAL SOLUTION
A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN RACISM

George L. Mosse

First published in 1978 and reissued here with a newly revised introduction, George L. Mosse's study of European racism is truly a classic. Mosse shows anti-Semitism for what it is—an integral part of a long European cultural tradition, starting in the Age of Enlightenment and culminating tragically in the Holocaust. This is critical reading for anyone concerned with Jewish studies or the complex roots of a modern disease.

324 pages, 15 illus.
Paperback $12.95

At your bookstore, or order direct from
University of Wisconsin Press
114 N. Murray St., Madison, WI 53715

vant, the wide receiver, amen" (Boston College is a Jesuit school), Murphy/Tutu fidgets clumsily with the Heisman Trophy. Finally he breaks off the arm, which draws down the wrath of the talk-show host: "You fix it! Do it! Quickly! Okay?" "But I didn't break it on purpose!" cries the woebegone Murphy/Tutu in a South African accent. "And what about that stuff on your hair? What is that?" demands the host irritably. "That's just Carefree Curl," pleads Murphy. "It just makes it curlier." When Murphy tries to bandage the broken arm with the ribbon from his Nobel Prize (Murphy, joyously: "It is a unifying symbol of our commitment to fighting racism all over the world!"), the host says wearily, "Well, that's real nice, Tutu." And when the bishop's good-hearted but clumsy attempts to repair the trophy finally destroy it utterly, the host turns to Flutie, obviously the show's real star, and says, "Thanks for coming, Doug! . . . And . . . uh . . . yuh, Tutu, if you win anything else, come back, okay?"

BUT if Murphy's treatment of Bishop Tutu is disrespectful, the working over he gives a (fictitious) Black Studies professor named Shebaz K. Morton during the program's "Black History Minute" is merciless. At the opening of the Black History Minute, Murphy appears as Morton, glaring censoriously at the audience. This in itself brings a laugh. "I don't see what's so funny!" snaps Murphy, which brings even more laughter. When he fluffs a word, Murphy barks, "So I messed up. *Shut up!* You're not going to make me smile!" He then proceeds to tell the story of George Washington Carver, with a few modifications.

Now, George Washington Carver, needless to say, is a truly sacrosanct American figure. Born a slave, he became one of the country's first educated black men and made important contributions in the field of agricultural chemistry, teaching soil improvement and diversification of crops and finding hundreds of new uses for the peanut, the soybean, and the sweet potato, thus stimulating substantially the agricultural productivity of the South. In Murphy's satire, however, the object is not George Washington Carver himself but the gross distortions introduced by the teaching of "black history."

One night (Murphy begins in his persona of Shebaz K. Morton), Doctor Carver was having a few friends over for dinner, and one of them said, "Excuse me, George, what's that you're putting on your bread?" It turns out that it is nothing less than a butter substitute made from peanuts, the recipe for which Carver gives two of his guests, "Skippy" Williamson and "Jif" Armstrong, preferring himself to work on a method for compressing peanuts into phonograph needles. Thereupon Skippy and Jif, both white men, *steal* Carver's recipe, patent it, and reap untold fortunes, leaving Carver to die penniless and insane, still trying to play a phonograph record with a peanut. Thus our Black History Minute.

(The real Carver died sane, wealthy, and widely admired, founding at his death a research foundation at the Tuskegee Institute.)

Beverly Hills Cop is a fairly conventional *film policier*, which without Murphy's star performance would certainly not be one for the history books, although it also has a talented young director, Martin Brest. Murphy plays Foley, a Detroit police detective whose best friend is murdered early in the movie. The trail leads Foley, on leave, to Beverly Hills, where the police procedures provide some comic contrast with those of Detroit. (The politeness of the police of the whole Los Angeles area must be somewhat incredible to anyone accustomed only to the inner-city police of the great metropolises of the East.) Foley, after scenes of high adventure, breaks open an international crime ring and avenges the death of his friend.

If this role had been accepted by Sylvester Stallone, an actor not without talent, the result would no doubt have been a straight action movie with vengeance as its driving force. With Eddie Murphy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the role it became what is known in the trade as an "action comedy." But the outline of the plot has remained quite unchanged, and almost no alterations at all were made to accommodate the fact that Murphy is black. He is simply a Detroit cop. In only one scene is there even any mention of race, when with no reservation Murphy bluffs his way into one of Beverly Hills's top hotels by raising his voice and charging the hotel with discriminating against him because he is a "Negro." (It is not discriminating, and both he and the audience know this full well.)

What the authors of the film have done is simply to ornament the basic story line with a number of occasions where Murphy can display his glib, sunny, comic talents. In one of his best scenes, he impersonates a federal-government inspector in order to intimidate a whole warehouse full of the chief villain's private security guards. One of Murphy's principal stocks in trade, in fact, is brassy, fast-talking impersonations in which he assumes another identity in order to get past some obstacle. In this one film alone he impersonates a government inspector, a correspondent for *Rolling Stone*, a street black involved in the cocaine trade, and a homosexual lover of the villain. The fact that in most of these cases Murphy is a black man outwitting and getting the better of white men might add a certain something to the scene for some viewers, but perhaps not that much. Heroes have a way of being smarter, stronger, or more courageous than their adversaries in any case. That's what a hero is.

So HERE we have young Eddie Murphy, the first black star to make it to the very, very top in Hollywood —and I mean $25 million for a six-picture deal. His father was a policeman. His stepfather is a plant foreman. Eddie Murphy does not take drugs. He does not drink. He even goes light on caffeine, preferring herbal tea. He wears a small gold crucifix around his neck. Murphy offers a sharp contrast to the other outstanding black movie comic today, Richard Pryor, who almost burned himself to death a few years ago while "freebasing" cocaine and whose whole comic persona is based on the stereotype of the feckless, improvident, black wastrel—be he junky, wino, pimp, or just general lowlife.

The differences between the two men, both extremely gifted, might be partly generational. When Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, Richard Pryor was twenty-seven, Eddie Murphy was six. In Richard Pryor's impressionable years, Governor George Wallace of Alabama was one of the country's leading racists. In Eddie Murphy's, Wallace had become the black man's friend, winning massive black support when he reentered politics. There are no longer prominent men in the United States like the old Governor Wallace. Eddie Murphy did not need to read about this in a sociology text; he has just been keeping his eyes open.

Conquest of the supreme heights by a black entertainer—let alone a hat trick, three in the same season —is unprecedented. Murphy, Cosby, and Michael Jackson might be the first black superstars of post-racist America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Confounding the Doomsayers

THE GOOD NEWS IS THE BAD NEWS IS WRONG. By BEN J. WATTENBERG. *Simon & Schuster. 431 pp. $17.95.*

Reviewed by SAMUEL MCCRACKEN

THERE may be no cliché more beloved of contemporary journalists than the one about not blaming the messenger for bad news. It makes perfectly good sense, of course, on the assumption that the news is not the poor fellow's fault. But if it *is* his fault, whom better to blame? Now comes Ben J. Wattenberg with persuasive evidence that, inadvertently or not, the messengers have been consistently getting the message wrong.

Wattenberg as a writer suffers from a tendency to cuteness that can be annoying, but as an analyst he is master of two disparate bodies of information: the national statistical accounts from 1970 to 1984, and media coverage of stories that reflect these accounts. It turns out that there is not much connection between the data and what the media have been making of them. Wattenberg's great contribution is to document the depth and breadth of this disparity between reality and appearance.

For many years the standard journalistic interpretation of our national statistics has been that things are bad and getting worse (Vice President Bush nicely captured the flavor of that interpretation in his campaign crack, "Whine on, Harvest Moon"). By contrast, Wattenberg's own survey of our condition, based on the same statistics, finds it flourishing. We live longer, we make more money, income is more widely distributed, life is safer, political participation more broad-based, racism dying, crime declining, and traditional values alive and well. Moreover, we are a society rapidly closing out our historic inequities and largely in control of our environment. To judge by the figures as analyzed by Wattenberg, if this is not the best of all possible worlds, it is a reasonable facsimile.

The detail and the almost druidical erudition of Wattenberg's analysis cannot be appreciated except by immersion in it. But his argument, whatever one's reservations about individual points, is on the whole irresistible. Indeed, one suspects that what he has to report would not come as a surprise to most Americans, who have given scant sympathy to doomsayers—at least those who have entered politics. This has been as true for relatively upbeat doomsayers like George McGovern and Walter Mondale, as for purebreds like Barry Commoner. The interesting question remains why journalists, who are among the best-educated and most affluent in American society, should be so profoundly and as it appears structurally pessimistic.

Part of the reason surely has to do with the professional obsession of journalists with bad news. (During the 1970's we were told repeatedly that we were being assaulted as never before by chemical additives, environmental poisons, stress, and other harmful things—yet the rise in life expectancy during this period underwent its most rapid increase in the century.) Another part consists in an inability (or refusal) to differentiate between evidence of failure and evidence of success. When fewer people die of polio and tuberculosis before the age of fifty, more will die of cancer after seventy. This increase in cancer will be diagnosed as an "epidemic of cancer," when it is rather an epidemic of longevity.

Sometimes the problem is that reality is compared to the ideal and found wanting. Thus, ignoring the dramatic narrowing of the economic gap between blacks and whites during the past decade, and the signs that the gap will inevitably narrow still further, journalists fix their eye instead on the remaining disparities. Still another problem is the tendency to sensationalize advances in science and technology that are thought to carry with them possibly harmful side-effects, and then to ignore later corrections and improvements. Wattenberg cites the example of the birth-control pill, said on the basis of early studies to be laden with a wide variety of dangerous side-effects. When scientists completed their winnowing of the evidence, the deleterious effects proved to be limited to small and easily-identified groups of subjects —e.g., those over thirty-five and heavy smokers. What is more, many side-effects actually proved beneficial, ranging from the prevention of ectopic pregnancies to the suppression of acne. *This* news was not considered newsworthy.

IN GENERAL, then, Wattenberg presents a true bill, and the title he has given his work is an accurate one. (Moreover, he understands very well that *sometimes* the bad news is that the bad news is right.) But occasionally, and perhaps understandably, given the immense bias he has undertaken to correct, he is too quick to wash away bad news with a cheery statistic. His treatment of education is an example.

Wattenberg is skeptical of "A Nation at Risk," the report of the President's Committee on Excellence in Education. He argues that there is no such crisis of achievement as is chronicled in that work. To show that our schools are really working well, he cites the fact that between 1970 and 1982, the proportion of Americans without high-school diplomas dropped from 25 percent to 14 percent.

This, however, is a slippery number. It does not necessarily indicate improved education: it may signify little but a decline in the criteria for graduation, or an improved ability on the part of schools to "warehouse" their students all the way to a diploma. It is, in any event, an inadequate

SAMUEL MCCRACKEN *is Assistant to the President of Boston University and the author of* The War Against the Atom.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

statistical antidote to the masses of statistical and other evidence suggesting the schools are failing badly at their primary task of inculcating basic literacy and numeracy. Nor is Wattenberg's case advanced by an even more dubious statistic he cites—that between 1970 and 1983 there was an immense increase in the proportion of classroom teachers with master's degrees. Considering that many of these degrees are granted not in fields of learning but in the mindless arcana of the educationist curriculum, this figure may in fact be a sign of decay.

Wattenberg is dismissive of another disquieting educational development, the decade-long slide in the national average scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). He denatures this figure with a claim that is already the mainstay of educationists—that during this period more students have begun to take the SAT, and hence the range of abilities represented has become broader. Since the best students have *always* sat for the SAT, the additional test-takers must be from the lower reaches of ability.

The trouble with this explanation is that it is not based on fact: between 1973 and 1983 the number of students taking the SAT did not increase, but declined slightly. A close examination of the score profile, moreover, shows not merely a rise in the number of students scoring less than 500 points (out of a possible 800), but a substantial *decrease* in the number of students scoring *over* 500 points. The most serious drop was in students at the top: between 1973 and 1983, the number of students scoring over 700 points fell by nearly 20 percent.

STILL, it is hardly shocking that a congenital optimist—and Wattenberg is self-confessedly that—should sometimes be carried over the brink. Both in its broad outlines and in most of its details the case he makes is overwhelming, and one could only wish that most educated Americans were as rigorously familiar with their society as is he. For the cost of false perceptions of reality is paid in the coin of bad policy, and in the corrosion of confidence and morale resulting from a steady diet of reported disaster. For this reason, too, Ben Wattenberg's message—that the emperor is not so bady dressed after all—deserves a wide hearing.

Apt Beginnings

BACK TO THE SOURCES: READING THE CLASSIC JEWISH TEXTS. Edited by BARRY W. HOLTZ. *Summit Books. 448 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by ROBERT ALTER

THIS cogently conceived, handsomely produced volume is a piece of good news about the state of Jewish culture in America. In this crucial regard, it is instructive to note the difference between this book and two previous landmark collections of essays by various contributors that also offer chronological surveys of the major phases of Jewish experience, *The Jews* (1949), edited by Louis Finkelstein, and *Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People* (1956), edited by Leo W. Schwarz. Both earlier volumes are the work of scholars who at the time of publication were already established authorities in the fields assigned to them. Both books are very much distillations of their sundry subjects for the edification of the literate general reader. The immediate model for such essays would be the authoritative encyclopedia article—or a retrospective show in a museum. Hellenistic Judaism or medieval Hebrew poetry may be exotic topics, irrevocably removed from the world we live in, but if you are curious enough to want a short guided tour of these strange locales, you need only go to Ralph Cohen's essay on the Hellenistic period in *Great Ages and Ideas* or to Shalom Spiegel's piece on the medieval poets in *The Jews.*

By contrast, the enlivening cen-

ROBERT ALTER, *a contributing editor of* COMMENTARY, *is professor of Hebrew and comparative literature at Berkeley.*

"Brilliant...Warnings that it would be very foolish to ignore." —John Gross, *New York Times**

In her speech before the Republican Convention, U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick said: "The American people understand, as the distinguished French writer Jean-François Revel understands, that 'clearly a civilization that feels guilty for everything it is and does will lack the energy and conviction to defend itself.'"



Now the author of the bestselling *Without Marx or Jesus* has written his most urgently important book, "urgent because he believes that the deepest danger to democracy is that it will acquiesce in its own defeat... Revel has few if any equals among his countrymen as a trenchant commentator on current affairs."—*New York Times**

"Truthful and terrifying," says Allen Drury. "Revel casts a cold eye on the intellectual side of our present danger," writes George F. Will. "His book is a firebell in the night."

At bookstores everywhere
DOUBLEDAY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tral virtue of *Back to the Sources* is that it provides a series of apt beginnings instead of neatly framed museum exhibits. In this respect, the volume is very much the document of a particular generation and a particular ideological orientation. Nearly all the contributors are scholars still in their thirties—typically, working on their first book or with a first book fairly recently published. Several of them were involved during the late 60's in the Boston and New York *havurah* movement that tried to create possibilities for Jewish worship, study, and fellowship outside the established community. The volume avoids a sectarian approach to Judaism; neither Reform nor Orthodoxy is given a real voice, though there may be a certain gravitation toward the more traditionalist values of the Conservative movement (two contributors, including the editor, have academic positions at the movement's center, the Jewish Theological Seminary). Finally, while all of the essays incorporate a good deal of intelligently assimilated historical information, most of the contributors in one way or another evince a literary interest in their materials, and three were actually trained as literary scholars—Joel Rosenberg, who writes here on biblical narrative, Barry Holtz, who has done the chapter on Midrash, and Alan Mintz, author of the chapter on the prayerbook.

THERE is, I think, a sense of personal engagement and of the excitement of discovery in all the contributors that can be related to their youthfulness and to their common experience of having themselves reclaimed some major aspect of tradition through a sustained intellectual effort of will. They write not as museum curators but as people living with the materials they expound. From this location, they invite the public, as the book's subtitle makes clear, to an active process of reading the variegated texts of Jewish tradition. These are assumed to be, as Barry Holtz stresses in his introduction, as challenging and relevant for literate moderns as Homer or Plato or Virgil:

> It is our contention that the Jewish textual tradition is one of the great literary achievements of human culture, representing a system that is unique, important, and deeply compelling to anyone interested in literature itself.

The demonstration of this programmatic declaration is a series of essays on biblical narrative, poetry, and law; on Talmud and Midrash; on medieval exegesis and philosophy; on kabbalistic texts and hasidic homilies; and on the liturgy. In each instance, the writer provides the essential historical context and then concentrates on the distinctive literary modalities and methods of organization of his texts. Each essay concludes with a helpful section called "Where to Go from Here," which offers a succinct survey and evaluation of primary texts available in English and of general and specialized studies of the material under discussion. The hope is that the energetic general reader will then have not a pat summary of the genius of the Talmud or the profundity of the Kabbalah but rather a set of tools with which he can approach a translated text and begin to make sense of it.

It would be a miracle if this procedure really worked in every case, and some of the texts—perhaps most egregiously, medieval philosophy—seem particularly resistant to the method. It is nevertheless impressive to see how well most of the contributors handle their difficult task, writing with clarity and felicity yet not condescending to the uninitiated, and effectively showing how their texts are put together and convey their meanings. I would especially recommend Robert Goldenberg's essay on the Talmud, Laurence Fine's contribution on kabbalistic texts, and that of Arthur Green on hasidic teachings. The one section, however, that seems to me to stand out above all the others is the fifty-page essay on biblical narrative by Joel Rosenberg that begins the volume with a grand flourish.

Rosenberg has assimilated all the recent studies of this subject but he also has many fresh things to say, and in any case his formulations have a lively aptness that continually brings out the complexities of the narrative corpus that is his subject. As a result, he avoids the suspicion of a review of the familiar that sometimes casts its shadow, at least for the informed reader, over other contributions to the volume. In a characteristic moment, he speaks of the "mischief" that the biblical texts work on the reader: "For while biblical narrative unfolds in a plain and ingenuous voice, its sticky surface soon becomes apparent." He goes on to mention the importance of seeming discontinuities and omissions in the text, the concealment of motives, the proliferation of wordplay, and then offers this evocation of time in biblical narrative, which amounts to an essay compressed into a sentence:

> The forward movement of fictional time yields, on closer reading, to a more subtle interplay of flashback, repetition, quotation, allusion, dream-vision and waking, prospective and retrospective glance, fade-out and fade-in—all of which make time seem to proceed in a mottled and disjunctive fashion.

WHY go back to the sources? Behind the title of the volume one feels the pressure of the Hebrew *teshuvah,* return. At least one contributor, Arthur Green, uses the word in its full theological implication, arguing, at the end of his essay on the hasidic masters, that the world's survival depends on *teshuvah*. In a related neo-pietistic vein, Alan Mintz concludes that "The question in the end is not whether the Siddur [prayerbook] is relevant to our age, but whether we possess the will to join our ancestors in the enterprise of interpretation." This would seem to echo the midrashic declaration that if the Torah seems empty, it is *mikem,* because of you, because you are empty. This is hardly a tenable rationale for a modern study of the texts, for without a firm prior belief in the inspired character of the texts, their plenitude and eternal relevance cannot simply be assumed. In fact, some of the texts for some readers will be empty, or opaque, or even occasionally antipathetic.

Fortunately, the volume offers a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plurality of rationales for a return to the sources. The editor, as we have seen, proposes a humanistic justification, emphasizing the status of Jewish texts as a classical tradition. Robert Goldenberg nicely discriminates between the traditional student of the Talmud, who seeks in it the "truth about how God wants the holy community of Israel to live," and the modern scholar, who "approaches the text for information." And yet, Goldenberg goes on to say, the talmudic commitment to intellectual activity as a sanctifying process has a certain appeal to moderns: by reenacting in study the rabbinic "relish for complicated but careful argument," moderns can experience for themselves a process of intellectual, cultural, and perhaps also religious behavior that is a distinctive mode of classical Judaism.

As has often been remarked, the Jews, at least from late Second Temple times, constitute an extraordinarily text-centered culture. Surely the essential way to maintain meaningful continuity with the Jewish past, whether one is a secularist, traditionalist, or somewhere uncertainly in between, is not merely to contemplate what has happened to the Jews but to engage actively in the study of the texts they created and conned, generation after generation. *Back to the Sources* will scarcely initiate a mass movement of return to the texts, but it will make some of this neglected literature freshly accessible to some readers, and that in itself is a real achievement.

The Custer of Our Dreams

SON OF THE MORNING STAR: CUSTER AND THE LITTLE BIGHORN. By EVAN S. CONNELL. *North Point Press. 448 pp. $20.00.*

Reviewed by WAYNE M. SARF

"I DON'T think I'll write any more than has been written on the Custer massacre," stated war correspondent John F. Finerty in 1890, explaining that "the Custer business has been written, so to speak, to satiety." But General George Armstrong Custer's defeat at the Little Big Horn and the wiping out of some 215 men with him remains our most frequently rehashed fight. Custer buffs still wonder whether he fell early or late in the battle; argue over whether the seeds of defeat lay in his decision to split his command; question whether his subordinates could have avoided the catastrophe and defeated the "hostiles" through more vigorous action. The Little Big Horn Associates, numbering over 600, study Custer, his last fight, and the Seventh Cavalry; many Associates also belong to the Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, which has over a thousand members. For mil-

WAYNE M. SARF, *a new contributor, is the author of* God Bless You, Buffalo Bill: A Layman's Guide to History and the Western Film *(1983), and a member of the Little Big Horn Associates.*

NOW IN PAPERBACK

Named one of the best books of 1983 by the *New York Times Book Review*

The "brilliant, densely textured, intellectually challenging book"* that sums up the major events and movements of the past six decades.

"Truly a distinguished work of history... MODERN TIMES unites historical and critical consciousness."—Robert Nisbet, *New York Times Book Review*

"Frequently surprises, even startles, us with new views of past events and fresh looks at the characters of the chief world movers and shakers, in politics, the military, economics, science, religion, and philosophy of six decades."—*Edmund Fuller, *Wall Street Journal*

"Wide-ranging and quirky, ... A latter-day Mencken, Johnson is witty, gritty and compulsively readable."—*Foreign Affairs*

"A marvelously incisive and synthesizing account."
—*Commentary*


"A brilliant, densely textured, intellectually challenging book..."
—Edmund Fuller, Wall Street Journal
MODERN TIMES
The World from the Twenties to the Eighties
Paul Johnson

832 pages, $9.95

Colophon Books Harper & Row

At bookstores or call TOLL FREE (800) 638-3030

1817

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lions of others, "Custer's Last Stand" remains symbolic of glory in defeat, a struggle against hopeless odds, or (most frequently now) military ineptitude and a comeuppance for racial sins.

GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER, a well-liked but "underachieving" cadet at West Point, was commissioned a second lieutenant during the Civil War just in time to distinguish himself at First Bull Run. The quick thinking and tactical skill he displayed impressed such generals as George McClellan and Alfred Pleasonton, the latter recommending Custer's promotion to brigadier at age twenty-three. At the great cavalry battle east of Gettysburg, the newly-minted "Boy General" and his Michigan Cavalry Brigade played a key role in stopping rebel horsemen from hitting the Union rear; Custer, having evaded superfluous orders, charged three to four times his own number of Confederate cavalry—and won. As a divisional commander (and major-general at twenty-five) Custer received the first flag of truce at Appomatox, and after the surrender General Philip H. Sheridan presented the table on which Grant's terms had been drafted to Custer's wife, writing that "there is scarcely an individual in our service who has contributed more to bring about this desirable result than your very gallant husband."

But Custer was flamboyant as well as useful, though the chief detail remembered today is his long blond hair. He was audacious—to a fault. ("If he had only added discretion to his valor," offered a friend, "he would have been a perfect soldier.") In an age which still treasured images of war's chivalry and thus insured that men would try to recreate them, Custer played himself, and glittered when he rode; before routing rebel troops led by his West Point classmate General Thomas Rosser, Custer doffed his hat and bowed in the saddle, and when Confederate General Joseph Kershaw was presented to Custer, he was "royally" entertained. The rebel Kershaw described Custer at the height of his career as the most inflamed Yankee journalist might have done:

> A spare, lithe, sinewy figure; bright, dark, quick-moving blue eyes; florid complexion, light, wavy curls, high cheek-bones, firm-set teeth—a jaunty close-fitting cavalry jacket, large top-boots, Spanish spurs, gold aiguillettes, a serviceable sabre . . . a quick nervous movement, an air telling of the habit of command—announced the redoubtable Custer whose name was as familiar to his foes as to his friends.

But in the minuscule postwar Regular Army, even popular heroes were hard-pressed to secure suitable positions. Custer, retaining his brevet rank of major-general, finally became lieutenant-colonel of the new Seventh U.S. Cavalry, which he generally commanded in the field. During General W.S. Hancock's fruitless 1867 Indian campaign in Kansas, Custer found himself court-martialed for various offenses, including going AWOL to visit his wife and ordering some particularly brazen deserters to be shot on the spot. Condemned to a year's suspension of rank and pay, the seemingly indispensable Custer was recalled by Phil Sheridan for his 1868 winter campaign against hostile Indians who had slaughtered scores of whites in Sheridan's military district.

Marching his regiment deep into the Indian Territory, Custer struck Chief Black Kettle's Cheyenne village on the Washita River—killing warriors, burning lodges, shooting ponies, and bearing off the women and children; some of these were also killed or wounded, but Custer had given orders against this and all or most of these casualties were probably accidental (save for those deliberately butchered by Custer's Osage Indian scouts). The victory still haunts Custer and his legend. He was charged with "abandoning" Major Joel Elliott and some troopers who became separated from the command and were wiped out by Indians from other villages along the river, and with attacking unsuspecting, "peaceful" Indians—though the slain, peaceably inclined Chief Black Kettle himself, who could not control his raiding warriors, had been warned that his village (which contained raiders' loot and white captives) might be attacked.

Custer's writings reflected his ambiguous feelings about the Indians. On the one hand, the Indian was "a *savage* in every sense of the word"; yet he also had many qualities which Custer could admire. In a passage often quoted by his defenders, Custer confesses:

> If I were an Indian, I often think I would greatly prefer to cast my lot among those of my people who adhered to the free open plains rather than submit to the confined limits of a reservation, there to be the recipient of the blessed benefits of civilization, with its vices thrown in without stint or measure.

But as an agent of civilization Custer warned that the Indian could not be given this option. "When the soil which he has claimed and hunted over for so long is demanded by this to him insatiable monster, there is no appeal; he must yield, or, like the car of Juggernaut, it will roll mercilessly over him, destroying as it advances." It was the "persistent paradox" of white-Indian intercourse, as well as his own contradictory nature, that enabled Custer in his memoirs first to denounce the stereotyped "noble red man" and then, a few pages later, lament that reservation life deprived the Indian of those qualities which "tend to render him noble."

Sometimes he seems all contradictions, a personality dividing those who knew him, and those who would only read about him, into opposing camps. He could be a brutal disciplinarian—yet a Kansas volunteer cavalryman wrote during the Washita campaign that Custer's men all liked him and thought him "a fine fellow, kind to them and will share with a private who is in need." He impressed men as modest, yet egomaniacal; methodical, yet reckless. His boyishness was a cardinal virtue, or a commander's fatal flaw. He was honest to the point of naiveté; he was cold and calculating. He cared only for duty; he hungered for glory at the expense of others.

BUT controversy is not legend; only Custer's death could guarantee his apotheosis. In 1876 the U.S. government, determined to bring

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all Plains tribesmen under its control—partly to make possible the seizure of the Dakotas' Black Hills, where an expedition led by Custer had discovered gold in 1874—ordered three columns of troops against the bands of such "irreconcilable" Sioux leaders as Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. Custer would have commanded one of these, had he not angered President Grant by testifying before Congress to the complicity of Grant's brother Orvil and others in Indian Bureau graft. By his own entreaty and that of General Alfred Terry, Custer was finally permitted to command his own regiment.

On June 25, 1876, Custer, having separated from Terry's column with the Seventh Cavalry, gazed into the valley of Montana's Little Big Horn River. His Indian guides insisted there was a big hostile village nearby—and that the soldiers' presence was known. Rather than conceal his regiment until dawn for a Washita-style attack, Custer felt obliged to mount a daytime assault. The regiment was divided into four parts, including one company for the lagging pack train. Captain Frederick W. Benteen went on a scouting mission to the left with three companies, while Major Marcus A. Reno, with three more, was to strike the village—Reno later testifying that Custer had told him he would be "supported by the whole outfit." Riding with Custer's own five companies were his brothers Captain Thomas W. Custer (holder of two Medals of Honor) and Boston Custer (a civilian employee), his skylarking nephew Armstrong Reed, and his brother-in-law Lieutenant James Calhoun.

Reno attacked first; but as he rode forward, Indians began to swarm from the village. Despite the lack of strong resistance, Reno stopped dead and formed a skirmish line, losing the value of shock and surprise. He then retreated to some timber, where Indian pressure increased. Reno apparently panicked and led another retreat (or "charge" as he called it) toward some bluffs on the other side of the river. Retreat became rout as the soldiers were pursued by the emboldened Indians, and heavy casualties included the black scout and interpreter Isaiah Dorman, later found to have been tortured before death.

Custer, aware of Reno's engagement, had apparently decided to support him with a flank attack. Trumpeter John Martin reached Benteen with the general's last message: "Benteen: Come on. Be quick. Big village. Bring [ammunition] Packs. W.W. Cooke. P.S. Bring Pacs [*sic*]." Benteen, who had ended his fruitless scouting mission, went forward to Custer but was stopped by Reno, who had halted his retreat. A movement toward Custer initiated by an officer acting without orders ended in withdrawal under Indian assault; no further attempt was made to link up.

In the meantime, Custer had engaged an overwhelming number of hostile Sioux and Cheyenne. His exact movements and actions will never be known, and Indian eyewitnesses, many of whom were interviewed in later years, told such wildly contradictory stories that little consensus could be reached concerning even the broad outline of the battle's progress.

After a second day of siege by the Indians, the Reno-Benteen men were relieved on June 27 by troops under Generals Terry and Gibbon, who informed the shocked soldiers that the bodies of Custer's command had been found. Custer himself, shot twice, lay naked among over forty men on what was later known as "Custer Hill," where a last stand had been made using dead horses as impromptu breastworks. He had been wearing his hair short and was not scalped, but, according to recently divulged information, an arrow shaft had been forced up his penis. He was thirty-six.

HERE were the raw materials of epic. After news reached the East and recriminations were exchanged (those blamed for the debacle included Custer, Reno and/or Benteen, corrupt Indian agents, and President Grant), the facts of Custer's last battle (as Bruce Rosenberg has traced in his book, *Custer and the Epic of Defeat*) were inter-

A Book of Lasting Value

JEWS AMONG THE NATIONS
A Message for Christians and Jews
Bernard Lande Cohen

A historical survey. Dealing especially with Jewish commercialism, the author maintains that this trait requires neither apology nor excuse, that it has been incidental to Jewish history since Biblical times, and has been a prime factor in the survival of the Jews.

The concentration is mainly on the political and economic aspects of the Jewish nation throughout the ages, starting with the Old Testament, which the author successfully "modernizes". Most notable is his version of the origin of the Pentateuch and of the synagogue, which is at variance from views currently held by many scholars.

ISBN 8022-2209-9 $10.00

At your local bookstore or order directly from:

Philosophical Library
200 West 57th Street,
New York, NY 10019.

This publication is available in microform from University Microfilms International.

☐ Please send information about these titles:

Name _____

Company/Institution _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

Phone (___) _____

Call toll-free 800-521-3044. In Michigan, Alaska and Hawaii call collect 313-761-4700. Or mail inquiry to: University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preted or altered to fit the mythic pattern of other last-ditch, no-survivors fights throughout history. For Walt Whitman, the Last Stand simply confirmed the

> . . . old, old legend of our race
> The loftiest of life upheld by death.

FOR many years, Custer's Last Stand eclipsed the Alamo as America's answer to Thermopylae. His popular image was heroic—often absurdly so. (Even if not tactically right, he remained romantic.) Custer's devoted widow Elizabeth contributed to the legend with three books recounting the couple's life; she also managed to inhibit (and outlive) some acquaintances of the general who pulled their critical punches during her lifetime.

After she died in 1933, the debunkers quickly gained the upper hand. In 1934 Frederic F. Van de Water published his *Glory-Hunter*, portraying Custer as a near-psychopath willing to betray anyone for personal fame. The hostility of many such "Custerphobes" bordered on the unhealthy. But Custer's personality puzzled even cooler-headed students; when, over thirty years later, the conscientious historian Robert Utley, who had entertainingly chronicled the legend's origins in *Custer and the Great Controversy*, was asked by the New York *Times* to define the "real" Custer, his article was rejected, for he had disdained to pigeonhole the hero as the *Times*—and perhaps the times—demanded.

As the symbolic Indian-fighting army officer, Custer soon became a whipping boy for "pro-Indian" writers and Hollywood film-makers. In the Vietnam war era, Indians were "in," Custer was the dead horseman to beat. Vine Deloria, Jr. told us that *Custer Died for Your Sins*; Dee Brown's best-selling "history," *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, denounced him to guilt-ridden whites. (Brown's later coffee-table book, *The Westerners*, contains a chapter on Custer and his wife in which virtually every statement is false or misleading.) In Arthur Penn's distorted 1970 film of Thomas Berger's *Little Big Man*, Custer conducts a My Lai-style massacre at the Washita before going mad at the Last Stand—which Penn, a bloodthirsty liberal, considered a Good Thing. Perhaps the culmination of this trend occurred in 1976, at the Last Stand's centennial observance at the battlefield, where Indian hoodlums poured urine on the monument to the dead (resting on a mass grave) and cavalry buffs reriding Custer's route were fired upon.

Other Western heroes, once debunked, cease to be important, but not Custer, the essential scapegoat. Although his defenders still attempt to restore his laurels, they are seldom heeded by the mass media, where oversimplification and error run riot—in one school text, Lieutenant Custer even wins his brigadier's promotion through a clerical error, a "fact" gleaned from the 1941 Errol Flynn film, *They Died With Their Boots On*. In the popular press, film, and television, Custer remains a complete buffoon and scoundrel, reviled like no other former hero.

ENTER novelist Evan S. Connell, fascinated by it all, to immerse himself in "Custeriana" and emerge with a best-selling work which John M. Carroll, one of Custer's most energetic defenders, calls "the best book ever written on the battle of the Little Big Horn." It is crammed with a wealth of vivid and fascinating detail.

Unfortunately, the "big story" often seems to elude Connell, who is obsessed with digression, flashback, and flashforward. Rather than telling the tale chronologically, Connell begins his crazy-quilt narrative with Custer's detachment already annihilated and the remainder of the Seventh under Reno and Benteen besieged by the Indians; but soon Captain Frederick Benteen is urinating against a tent within earshot of appalled ladies, as recounted at his 1887 court-martial. Before we really know who Marcus Reno is, we are already bombarded with opinions on his courage or cowardice; he dies on page 47 (complete with obituary) only to be resurrected later. The digressions are such that the narrative is almost indiscernible; it seems all potted biographies and discourses on subjects Western. Lost in Custer trivia, Connell even wastes more than a page on a temperance fanatic's destruction of a "Last Stand" lithograph put out by the Anheuser-Busch brewing company.

Connell does break with most popular authors in not vilifying Custer; absent is the Indian hater or incarnate fiend. But neither does he view Custer altogether favorably, and he sometimes repeats charges against him without applying the proper skepticism. He seems content to believe that Custer's military talent was minimal, a belief disputed by Gregory Urwin in his recent defense of Custer's Civil War generalship, *Custer Victorious*. Connell's Plains Indians are refreshingly unsentimentalized (he unflinchingly details their love of war, the atrocities they committed, and the ecological havoc they wrought), yet he repeats the absurd charge that of Cheyennes slain at the Washita, 92 out of 103 were noncombatants. Evidence and simple probability dictate otherwise, especially since over 50 prisoners were taken. Perhaps most disappointingly of all, Connell attempts little systematic analysis of the Little Big Horn battle, preferring to bounce about facts and possibilities and leave the possibly bewildered reader to choose among them.

In one sense, Connell's lack of system could be said to reflect his view of Custer's complex personality. Rather than pinning Custer to any post-mortem psychiatric couch, Connell in effect marvels at his paradoxical magnificence. Ultimately, he seems to savor the mystery of it all; if his book has one grand theme, it is that much of the truth about Custer is beyond our grasp.

PERHAPS one day what Bruce Rosenberg calls "the Custer of our dreams" will resemble a real person. In the meantime, Evan Connell's book at least strikes a blow in favor of complexity. As for the zealous student of the subject, he knows that no matter which book he considers the best, it won't be the last. Of the making of Custer books there is no end.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mormonism Today

AMERICA'S SAINTS: THE RISE OF MORMON POWER. By ROBERT GOTTLIEB and PETER WILEY. *Putnam. 278 pp. $16.95.*

Reviewed by KEVIN G. BARNHURST

MORMONISM was founded in the 19th century by Joseph Smith, a visionary who, beginning in the 1820's, elaborated a body of teachings that departed radically from sectarian Christianity. He taught that revelation is continuous; his followers compiled his visions as new scripture and published the Book of Mormon, a history of pre-Columbian Christians in America. He taught that property should be held under common ownership; his followers built cities and joined in a utopian experiment called the United Order. He taught that God is a physical person and that humans, as God's offspring, can some day attain godhood as part of the celestial family; his followers built temples in which to perform ritual baptisms for the dead and marriages for eternity.

Smith was anathema to traditional Christianity, and at odds with the prevailing individualism of the frontier, but he was also an expression of the millenarian and communitarian religious ferment of the period. His church, attacked in the courts and driven by violence from New York to Ohio, to Missouri, and then to Illinois, nevertheless grew from its original six members. After Smith was killed by a mob in 1844, about 10,000 of his followers fled to Nebraska under the organizational scheme of Brigham Young, who was more of a practical manager than a visionary.

From Nebraska, Young led the migration to the Great Salt Lake Basin, where he laid out and established a city and then sent out parties to colonize a corridor from the Snake River in Idaho to San Bernardino, California. He continued Smith's experiments, establishing communitarian enterprises and a variety of cooperative industries and advocating "celestial marriage" among select church members. Polygamy and theocracy brought the church into conflict with the federal government, first in the Utah War of 1857 and then in the national anti-polygamy statutes.

Federal marshals drove Young's successors into hiding, seized church property, and disenfranchised church members in a campaign aimed ostensibly against polygamy but meant in fact to destroy the system of Mormon economic and political cooperation. To save the institution, the church president issued the Manifesto of 1890 abolishing polygamy, disbanded the Mormon People's party, and asked

KEVIN G. BARNHURST, *a member of the Mormon church, teaches journalism at Keene State College in New Hampshire. His article, "Living without Health," appeared in the April 1983* COMMENTARY.

"SALMAGUNDI has been the liveliest, most original, and most adventurous critical quarterly in this country for many years." --Joseph Frank, 1984

Salmagundi

Winter 1985, issue #66

a special issue

"THE JEWS: HOLOCAUST, DISPERSAL, PRESERVATION"

GEORGE STEINER, "Our Homeland, The Text"
ROBERT BOYERS, "A Holocaust Fiction"
TAYLOR STOEHR, "N.Y. Jewish Intellectuals: A Retrospect"
GABRIEL JOSIPOVICI, "Biblical Revelation"
HOWARD EILAND, "Nietzsche's Jew"

also, an editorial feature on
"NEO-CONSERVATIVES & THE CULTURE"

later this year: Susan Sontag on feminists, Larry Nachman & Conor Cruise O'Brien on Kissinger, Milan Kundera on East vs. West, Jacques Barzun on Lionel Trilling, Robert Alter on American Jewish Writing, plus interviews with Alfred Kazin, John Fowles, and George Steiner.

#66 alone: $5.00
Five-issue subscription (#66-70): $10.00

Send name & address with check to:

SALMAGUNDI/Dept. C
Skidmore College
Saratoga Springs, N.Y. 12866

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New York financiers for bail-out loans.

This "Great Accommodation," as it is called, brought to an end the personalistic demi-nation built by Joseph Smith and Brigham Young. The anti-polygamy crusade had weakened the institution and left a leadership concerned more with survival than with experimentation. As the institutional structure began to recover, the church adopted turn-of-the-century management styles and took on many of the characteristics of other religious denominations and voluntary social organizations. During World War I, for example, the Women's Relief Society came to resemble ladies' service auxiliaries.

In the 20's and 30's, this recovery was hindered by a protracted economic decline in the Great Basin region. Like other establishment Americans, the top leaders, or General Authorities, opposed the programs of the New Deal. Mormon voters, however, strongly supported Roosevelt; in Utah, church members set up their own welfare program. Meanwhile, in Mexico, Mormons in effect seceded from the Utah church to form a separate national church. The institution's response to these challenges—absorbing the welfare ideas to create the well-known Mormon welfare system and excommunicating the errant Mexicans to force a reconciliation—reasserted the power of the church and of the General Authorities as successors to Smith and Young.

By the 1950's, the church had established itself as a mainstream American institution, known for its fair-haired president, David O. McKay, and its Tabernacle Choir broadcasts. From a rebuilt economic base, the newly assertive institution expanded a missionary effort that had been on hold since the Utah War one hundred years earlier. Two decades and a lot of free spending later, church membership reached almost three million.

During the 60's, Mormon religious and intellectual leaders initiated two movements that overhauled the institution. The first, called Correlation, was an attempt to reemphasize family structure and traditional roles, in response to the social instability of the period. At the same time, the bureaucracy was streamlined and centralized, and current management principles were systematically applied to church organization: financial holdings were restructured along corporate lines, holding companies were created, and modern accounting procedures imposed.

The Correlation movement brought the church to its greatest institutional strength since the Great Accommodation. The second movement encouraged the application to church history and culture of open intellectual inquiry and objective research methods. The archives were made accessible, professional historians were appointed, and an independent Mormon press appeared and expanded from a few intellectual journals into a wide variety of magazines and newspapers. One unexpected effect of both these movements was to bring into relief the church's racial inequities; in 1978, the priesthood was opened to blacks.

Which brings us at last to *America's Saints*, a study that opens with the church's 150th anniversary conference in 1980. What Gottlieb and Wiley describe is a church in crisis, a crisis brought on, they believe, by the financial strain of rapid growth, by an aging leadership, by damaging ties to Latin American dictators, by a dated insistence on sexual taboos, and by the divisive campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment, one of whose manifestations was the sensation-causing excommunication of Sonia Johnson in 1980.

The authors interpret Mormonism as a once-radical experiment in political, economic, and social communitarianism that was interrupted by the Great Accommodation. Developments since then, in their view, reflect the leadership's continuing drift away from these admirable beginnings. So the reaction to the abortive Mexican secession encouraged a flag-waving Americanism, still in evidence today. The church's long-term response to the polygamy raids has been to outdo its critics by conforming to a Victorian sexual code that forces women into a dependent role and rejects homosexuals. The bottom-line mentality introduced during the 60's has led to the destruction of historic Mormon buildings and to alliances with shady deal-makers, and has produced a worship of entrepreneurialism that has turned Utah into the nation's scam capital. Finally, they write, the church's involvement in politics amounts to a compulsion to intervene outside the affairs of religion, in an area where the church's efforts are often inept and sometimes illegal.

Gottlieb and Wiley do, in fact, expose some underhanded, unethical, and illegal Mormon activities. Church members have used tax-exempt property to raise funds, distribute literature, and get votes for political causes. Mormons organized to defeat the ERA have failed to register as lobbyists and have encouraged other church members to conceal their church affiliation when writing to their representatives. Members have been urged from the pulpit to pack local caucuses and state meetings in Utah and Nevada and to vote as directed by strategically placed leaders. The names of General Authorities have been connected with fraudulent sales schemes using missionary-style techniques. Mormon lawyers have represented Indian tribes in the sale of tribal lands while simultaneously representing the parties who were benefiting from the sale.

Such activities, with or without official church sanction, are of course reprehensible. But some of Gottlieb and Wiley's other charges rest on flimsy ground, or end up telling more about their own general attitudes than about the activities of Mormons. Their accusation that the church has not preserved historic architecture, for example, can be supported in some cases but not in others. They are probably right that the church breeds some paternalism and racism, but they fail to show that Mormons are any worse than other Americans in this regard. Their charge of jingoism seems to reflect a mentality that worships nationalism abroad (they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

do fault the church for being out of touch with nationalist movements in Latin America) but finds it embarrassing at home. They treat the church's participation in the political process as if the principle of separation of church and state required the Mormon church to be silent or neutral on political issues.

America's Saints is an exposé, but of what? Almost all the spiciest tidbits reveal the foolishness of individuals who happen to be Mormons, but what does this prove? For example, a General Authority is quoted as saying that only men hold the priesthood because without it they "would probably be eaten by the female, as in the case of the black widow spider." And a regional authority on Latin America is caught saying that the Argentine *desparecidos* and the Chileans executed under Pinochet "deserved it." This sort of thing may be shocking, but it hardly serves to indict anyone but the person speaking—unless all Mormons are viewed as mindless followers.

This, no doubt, is the impression Gottlieb and Wiley mean to foster. But again and again the voices of thoughtful and reasonably independent Mormons come through their own reporting in *America's Saints*. Gottlieb and Wiley, however, are less interested in these voices than they are in the Mormon elites; most of the sources they list in their bibliography are either employed in the church bureaucracy and education system or can be found on the mastheads and contents pages of the independent Mormon periodicals. (Among these, not surprisingly, Gottlieb and Wiley side with the liberals against the conservatives.) So the crisis of Mormonism in *America's Saints* is not unlike the "crisis" among bureaucrats and the press in Washington, especially just before a change in administrations. Things look gloomy because jobs are at stake; the masses who voted for the opponent are considered mindless; rumors "swirl"; and conspiracy theories abound.

Gottlieb and Wiley are simply wrong to extrapolate from institutional and elite history to the broader church and its membership; Mormonism encompasses far more than the tight circle interviewed in *America's Saints*. Mormons still believe in continuous revelation and the potential godhood of humanity. Institutional setbacks may have changed the circumstances and applications of these beliefs, but the Mormon religious experience has not been "interrupted," as Gottlieb and Wiley suggest, nor is the church in crisis. Although misdeeds merit exposing, the Mormon church deserves a fairer and more comprehensive analysis than they provide, not only because it is rich and powerful but because Mormonism—the complex array, from churches to splinter groups, fundamentalists to intellectuals—remains a separate and distinctly American religious movement, as different from Christianity as Christianity is from Judaism.

The Lesson of Vietnam?

THE 25-YEAR WAR: AMERICA'S MILITARY ROLE IN VIETNAM. By BRUCE PALMER, JR. *University of Kentucky Press. 248 pp. $24.00.*

Reviewed by ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN

THERE ARE two good reasons for reading this book. First, it is a thoughtful analysis of why we lost the war in Vietnam and how we might have won it. Second, it reveals what the military is thinking now and why it is thinking that way. This is important; the Secretary of Defense has gone on record as endorsing the military's own cautious, post-Vietnam view of how military force should be used. What

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN *is chairman of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.*

A PASSOVER HAGGADAH

Edited by Rabbi Herbert Bronstein
Illustrated by Leonard Baskin

Over 400,000 sold in ten years

The perfect companion guide to your Passover celebration containing:

- The complete Passover home service with transliterations of the ancient blessings.
- Twenty-four brilliant watercolor illustrations by the renowned artist Leonard Baskin.
- Additional meditations, readings, and poetry from prophets, rabbis, and contemporaries including Einstein, Buber, and Wiesel.
- Non-sexist language throughout the text.
- Fully-annotated collection of festival songs.

Order now from your Sisterhood Judaica shop, local Jewish bookstore or directly through the CCAR.

$7.50 softcover
$27.50 deluxe art edition
$79.00 for the seder set of 1 deluxe art edition and ten softcover copies.

Central Conference of American Rabbis
21 East 40th Street, Dept. 10H
New York, NY 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is more, he has done so at the very moment when our opponents seem to be seeking to discover the limit to our tolerance of unconventional violence, the point at which they can expect a serious response.

Bruce Palmer, a retired Army general, writes about the Vietnam war from a unique combination of vantage points, yet he produces a view of the war and the lessons to be learned from it that in many respects is shared widely by senior officers of the current generation. He watched our slide into Vietnam from the Pentagon, as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. In 1967 and 1968 he was in Vietnam, first as commander of Field Force II, then as Westmoreland's deputy. For the rest of the war, from his post in Washington with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he watched our withdrawal. Throughout, in other words, he was always near but never quite at the top—and this permitted a degree of detachment that usually eludes those in final authority.

Like an earlier "in-house" look at the war, Colonel Harry Summers's *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, General Palmer's book emphasizes the way civilian authority misused our military. Palmer's account, however, is more balanced and less apologetic, for it admits that the restrictive strategy imposed by political authority was not the whole story. In important respects, the military performed poorly. Accordingly, this is not only a tale of the resentment and distrust the military learned to feel toward civilian hawks who would lead it into another no-win conflict such as Vietnam, but also a tale of the military's diminished confidence in its own ability to handle the ambiguous, unconventional conflicts it is likely to face in the future. The balance makes for unusual reading.

Our armed forces see themselves as having been taken down a dead-end street in Vietnam, confined by a civilian-devised strategy that blunted the edge of every tactical offensive and insured that each one would cost the North Vietnamese less than they were willing to pay, and us far more. Palmer calculates, indeed, that the manpower available to the North Vietnamese would have enabled them to endure indefinitely the highest casualty rates we inflicted on them.

Why did the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree to such a strategy? Palmer notes that some members of the Joint Chiefs saw the writing on the wall from the very beginning, but were silenced by a knee-jerk "can-do-ism" and by their chairman's conviction that the Joint Chiefs had to speak to the White House with a single voice. This failure at the top of the military hierarchy was all the more galling because some Army officers without stars on their shoulders understood the enormous difficulties involved in implementing a traditional strategy of containment in South Vietnam. As early as 1951, some of Palmer's classmates at the Army War College had explained in a student report that we had already blundered in agreeing to help restore French power in Vietnam rather than helping to develop an indigenous leadership capable of governing the country. Our involvement, they wrote, would carry with it the stigma of colonialism, while Vietnam itself was bound to be an operational nightmare. The climate, the conformation of the territory, the distance, and the long, unsealable borders would all conspire against our efforts. The report also claimed that Vietnam was expendable strategically: our interests in Asia could be served behind an arc drawn to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain of Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines, an arc that would exclude unstable Indochina and most of Thailand.

For these reasons, the group of Army officers concluded, we should not commit troops to the defense of South Vietnam. The "best and the brightest," however, prevailed, and, after the war was over, the military found itself on the receiving end of an ugly backlash.

The debate within the armed forces continues: did they fail or were they dealt a losing hand? Colonel Summers argues that we won every battle and still lost the war because of the no-win strategy imposed from on high. His study, which gave intellectual ballast to much that his colleagues already felt, has become orthodoxy among the top brass, and the lessons to which it points were what the Secretary of Defense endorsed last November in his speech, "The Uses of Military Power."

If Summers's book nearly silenced the internal debate on operational performance, Palmer reopens it in *The 25-Year War*. Palmer is no apologist. He acknowledges the truths in Summers's analysis, but still asks whether operational improvements might not have yielded ultimate victory. Although he replies with a cautious "probably not," in the extended explanation of that "probably" lies his most important contribution. His study of what the military did poorly and why, should move military readers away from the neat rationale that Summers provided and that served to mask, if only superficially, their own self-doubts.

Palmer demonstrates, for example, how the chain of command during the Vietnam war was an awkward, irrational, and all but unworkable system, which hindered the effective direction and coordination of military operations. Into this extraordinary organizational jigsaw, the Joint Chiefs of Staff fit badly (Palmer argues for a reform of the Joint Chiefs system as convincingly as the case allows). Palmer disapproves, moreover, of the use of the Marines, an amphibious assault force, for extended land operations. He criticizes both the practice of annual replacement of combat troops, which sometimes left fighting divisions undermanned and inexperienced, and the creation of wasteful base camps that misguidedly brought with them amenities inappropriate to combat troops. Both practices, he believes, underestimated the quality and toughness of the young Americans they were designed to coddle. He also thinks that we ought to have insisted upon tight operational control over the other national forces fighting with us, especially the South Vietnamese, whatever political awkwardness the demand for such control might have caused.

Above all, Palmer criticizes the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way in which we gathered, analyzed, and used intelligence. Our intelligence operations often produced reassuring falsehoods in place of uncomfortable truths, and were sometimes just plain incompetent. Timely intelligence, suitably acted upon, is always crucial in war, but it is particularly so when the enemy consists of insurgents and guerrillas and everything depends on knowing where they are, how many they are, and what they intend to do. In Vietnam, the enemy had penetrated us as we had not them, so that we were frequently surprised and they invariably forewarned. Here again, a bad political decision lay at the heart of the trouble: that of President John F. Kennedy (urged by Averell Harriman, among others) to rid himself of President Diem without having a viable replacement. This single, amateurishly Machiavellian stroke caused the collapse of the entire governmental structure, as not only Diem but his men in the provinces and his men's men at the village level all came tumbling off their perches. The South Vietnamese intelligence services fell to ruin in the process and were never properly rebuilt. Without the indigenous intelligence, we had to rely too heavily throughout the Vietnam war on signal intelligence (enemy communications intercepts) which was difficult to collect in the jungle and which could not be relied upon to provide information about long-term intentions.

Still, even after making every allowance for the handicap under which our intelligence services had to operate, Palmer concludes that, with the exception of the CIA, they operated badly. For a start, there were so many of them that no one could be surprised when they kept bumping into each other. The Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, State Department intelligence, and each service's military-intelligence branch were all active simultaneously, and among them reported to three different Cabinet members. To compound such organizational problems, security leaks compromised the effect of our extraordinarily accurate B-52 strikes. The enemy usually had warning of the exact times and places because Americans chatted about impending strikes over unsecured communications channels, or because enemy agents had penetrated U.S. operational headquarters. When Strategic Air Command flight plans crossed world airways, they had to be reported to the appropriate authorities as though the planes were those of civilian carriers.

WHAT would Palmer have done to win in Vietnam? At the outset, he would have stationed a U.S. Army Corps, a Republic of Korea Army Corps with a Marine brigade, and a mixed U.S.-South Vietnamese Corps just south of the DMZ to guard against invasion and infiltration. These troops would have pushed their protective perimeter into Laos, across the narrow waist of the panhandle. If the North Vietnamese had attempted an end-run through Thailand, their logistical problems would have been more difficult and they would have become more vulnerable to combined ground/air attacks in the more open terrain. Next, U.S. Marines would have been deployed offshore in two groups: one highly visible, threatening an amphibious assault on Hanoi, the other operating along the coast of South Vietnam, launching quick attacks as necessary. The northern group would only have threatened, however, since Palmer fears an invasion might have brought China into the war. U.S. air and naval power would have blockaded the enemy's ports.

The aim of Palmer's strategy would have been to buy the time necessary to build a South Vietnamese army capable of defending the country. While being built, the army would have fought the Vietcong who, deprived of resupply and reinforcement, would have already been withering on the vine. This static defense would have required fewer American troops and they in turn would have sustained far fewer casualties. Eventually a thwarted North Vietnam would have found its way to the negotiating table.

In all this, however, there is a missing element. Palmer focuses on what *we* should have done, almost to the exclusion of how others might have reacted. Suppose our enemies had simply decided to wait us out. How long could we have garrisoned the South? Would not the success of such a protective strategy have robbed the South Vietnamese of much of the incentive needed to create their own viable defense force? Suppose infiltrating North Vietnamese and Vietcong units had launched terrorist attacks against U.S. military and civilian targets in the South? How long

INCHARDI

Novels by J. Inchardi
$15 each

Lines On The Death Of A Fisherman

Three Jews In A Tub

Dreamship

Yurros

A Paper Toy

Intercurse

Jehovah Mafioso

Saturn Maru

Drek Shlak

Om Budsman

Order from **Sirius Books**
P.O. Box 177
Freeport, Maine 04032

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could we have maintained our static position? What would have been the effect on friend and foe if we had announced that our policy of containment in the Third World had degenerated into frontier defense on the Roman imperial model? Above all, could we credibly have threatened an amphibious invasion that we had not the slightest intention of launching? If the enemy calls your bluff, you suffer humiliating exposure, as recent experience in Lebanon has surely demonstrated. Make-believe deterrence is a risky business.

The book makes some other unconvincing arguments. Palmer seems to think that we could have coopted North Vietnam's charismatic Ho Chi Minh, turning him into a kind of Tito. This, ironically, has long been a fondly held but untestable and groundless belief of the Left. Again, he agrees with Summers that a formal declaration of war would have maintained public support of the war effort. In fact the public, and the press, gave the administration three years of loyalty; it was lack of visible progress that convinced an essentially patriotic populace that Vietnam was a poor investment.

On the evidence of Palmer's book and Secretary Weinberger's speech, what the military has learned from its experience in Vietnam is that we must fight only for our "vital interests." (Palmer, for one, seems to think only of survival as being vital. He does not count up how many less than vital interests have to be at stake before they become cumulatively vital.) But what the military should have learned from Vietnam is to take insurgency seriously, to develop our capacity to cope with it. Palmer, like Summers, writes as though we fought a conventional war there against an external aggressor. Both make light of the insurgency that was inextricably twisted among the military problems that faced us, even though the final fall occurred when a North Vietnamese army marched on Saigon. Thus they ignore Clausewitz's injunction that "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." If the United States continues to refuse to face the recurring problem of how to deal with unconventional war, its power, unused, will be but a burden, and its efficiency in protecting even its vital interests will continue to shrink away to nothing.

General Palmer is right that "the Vietnam tragedy will probably be an inhibiting factor in our external relations and domestic policies for at least a generation." It has convinced too many of our military officers that the long-term consequences of knee-jerk can-do-ism are more devastating by far than the short-term consequences of knee-jerk can't-do-ism. Until they are disabused of that idea, they may go on clinging to the belief that deterrence does not require the willingness to act.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A full carat or more. For your better half.

De Beers

A quality diamond of a carat or more.

Quality. It's as important in diamonds as in anything else you own. It's especially important in diamonds of a carat or more.

Extraordinary. One of nature's most perfect gifts is also the hardest natural gemstone known to man. It's spectacular. Impressive. And rare.

In order to understand quality in diamonds, one must understand the 4C's: Cut, Color, Clarity and Carat-weight. It is the 4C characteristics that determine the value of a diamond.

Your jeweler is the expert where diamonds are concerned. He can show you diamonds of a carat or more of such exceptional quality as to please even the most discriminating tastes. Give her the ultimate. A quality diamond of a carat or more.

A diamond is forever.

The necklace shown features a quality diamond of 2 carats.
Since this isn't the kind of purchase you make every day, we've prepared an informative brochure to help you make the right decision. For your copy, send $2.00 to Diamond Information Center, Dept. C, 1345 Avenue of the Americas, NY, NY 10105.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The art of engineering.

When Audi's Chief Engineer Dr. Ferdinand Piëch states, "We don't style cars, we design cars," he incisively describes the art of engineering.

For styling alone can only affect the appearance of an automobile. It is the rightness of engineering design that affects appearance, performance, comfort and driver assurance.

After years of research, millions of kilometers of rigorous testing and an unwavering commitment to detail, Audi has created the most aerodynamically efficient luxury sedans in the world. Engineered to perfection, these sleek, uniquely quiet, total performers re-define the driving experience as it is known today.

To experience the art of engineering personally, call 1-(800)-FOR-AUDI for your nearest Audi dealer in the continental U.S. and arrange for a test drive.

(Manufacturer's suggested retail prices for the Audi sedans range from $13,950 to $23,875. Title, taxes, transportation, registration, dealer delivery charges additional.)

©1984 Audi

Audi

The art of engineering.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED